The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR CLINT A. LAUDERDALE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

US bases

State Department - Director of Recruitment & Appointments 1979-1980
Affirmative action vs. Merit System
Recruitment
Case system

State Department- Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel 1980-1984
Minority Recruitment
Women's Class Action suit
Foreign Service Act of 1980
Limited career extensions (LCE)
Past management issues

INTERVIEW

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your background? We were discussing beforehand that you are into genealogy, so about your parents, where you were born, a bit about that first.

LAUDERDALE: Yes. I was born September 14, 1932, in West Texas, on a farm. I grew up there. Those were the Depression years. I guess we were a poor family, although we weren't any poorer than our neighbors.

Q: Was that part of the Dustbowl or were you able to...

LAUDERDALE: No. That was further north, in Oklahoma. Of course I was born in the Depression, but by the time I got to be a teenager it was in the War years. Still, I came from a modest, poor farm family in West Texas. We were a large family. After I got out of high school, during the Korean War, which started in 1950 and I graduated from high school in 1950, I went off to college for one year. I had a hard time...

Q: What college did you go to?

LAUDERDALE: I went to one in east Texas called Tarleton State, a branch of Texas A & M. But I was poor, I had no source of income, I couldn't get a job so I was a little unhappy. My grades were okay, Bs mostly. So after a year in college I figured I was going to get drafted in the end, so why struggle. So I signed up in the Army, went to Fort Ord, California for basic training. Didn't want to go to Korea, by the way.

Q: You were there in 1951 then, in Fort Ord?

LAUDERDALE: Yes.

Q: We were neighbors. I was at the Army language school in Monterey at that time, as an Air Force private.

LAUDERDALE: Well all of the graduating basic training classes were off to Korea. I think everybody west of the Mississippi went to Korea! So I was a little unhappy about that, how am I going to get out of that? Fortunately I made a good score on the Army tests, so they called me for an interview and offered me an assignment in intelligence, which I snapped up immediately. So they sent me east to Baltimore to go to intelligence school.

Q: Holabird?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, it's interesting that you should know that. Then at Fort Holabird I got the word that anybody who volunteers for overseas will get it, so I said okay, I volunteer for Germany. So I did, I got it and served in Germany for two and a half years.

Q: Where were you in Germany?

LAUDERDALE: Wuerzburg. Beautiful, nice place.

Q: Baroque city. But then it was still pretty much in ruins I guess.

LAUDERDALE: It was pretty much in ruins, poverty stricken. When I first arrived in Germany I remember that we used to ride the streetcars free, because we were occupation forces. And during the time I was there they signed the Consensual Agreement which gave Germany its sovereignty, so then we had to start paying 10 pfennigs to ride the streetcar. I got married when I was there. In those days you could only get married when you were going home, so I got married a couple of months before going home. Came back, went to California, where I had been before - I had a sister who lived in the Bay Area - and enrolled in Berkeley. When I had gone to school before, I majored in mathematics. I had a good math score on the tests. But after three years away from mathematics I was a little concerned about trying to pick that up again. In the meantime, discovering the overseas world, I heard about Embassy-Bonn, the foreign service, so I said, "That's for me." So I went to see a professor at Berkeley and asked what I should study to be a foreign service officer, and he said, "Political Science." So I did, Got my degree, took my exam.

Q: You're talking about the Foreign Service exam?

LAUDERDALE: Yes.

Q: That was a three-and-a-half day exam?

LAUDERDALE: No, it was all day. I took it three times actually. The first time when I was still a junior. I failed it. The second time I took it I passed the written, but when I went for the oral I told the Board - we had three examiners - that my son was a diabetic. I wanted them to know that right up front. Anyway, I didn't pass. So I took it again. The next year they didn't give the exam. So I had to wait two years, took it again, passed it again, went to the oral. At the end of the oral, the examiner told me something I didn't know before. He said the last panel turned you down because your son is a diabetic, but you did such a good job that we're going to recommend you for a waiver. So anyway, I got past that hurdle.

Q: This was in 196....?
LAUDERDALE: The first one must have been in about '56, because I graduated in '57. Then the second one was in '58, and the third one must have been in 1960. In the meantime, after I got my degree I went to graduate school for a little while and then I went to work. I found a job in the federal government, GS-7, came to Washington, was later transferred up to Boston, and I took the oral that year, I guess it was '61 by then, in Boston, that's the one I passed. In the meantime I had prospered in my civil service career and I got an offer of employment as an FSO-8. I had just gotten promoted to GS-12 and I was just making $10,000 a year, or close to it. FSO-8 would have been about $6,000. I was also by then about 28 or 29. So I said, that's a little junior for me, but I would take an FSO-7. They said No, we can't do that, and so I said, okay, adios. A couple of months later I got a letter that said: "We've made some internal policy changes and we're going to adjust a lot of FSO-8s to FSO-7s, and we can offer appointments to new FSO-7s, and you're one. We'll offer you a 7. I got the maximum step of a 7, which was $7,500. So I only had to take a cut of $2,500. It took me five years to get back to $10,000! That was in 1962.

Q: It's interesting how the system does change and does work.

LAUDERDALE: Could I tell you an out-of-sequence story?

Q: Sure.

LAUDERDALE: Later, when I was DAS for Personnel, and Phil Habib, who had been Under Secretary of State and was retired but was working in and out on various projects, and he worked on a recruitment committee for Secretary Vance. He came to see me one day, upset, he was chairman of the Recruitment and Employment Committee, to do a study. He had been a professor or something at Stanford after retirement, and three of his graduate students, in his graduate seminar, took the FSO exam and failed the oral. They passed the written but failed the oral. And he told me: "Clint, there's something wrong with this exam if three of my best students failed it." And I said, "How many times did they take it?" And he said, "Well, once." And I said: "Well, I failed it twice! The answer to your students is, take it again." Since he had passed the first time he thought everybody did, but I told him half the people in the foreign service didn't make it the first time. Try, try again.

Q: You came in in '62, right? Did you go to the A-100 course? Can you give just a feel for what your group was like and maybe what their outlook was like at the time?

LAUDERDALE: My class, based on remarks by the course coordinators -- we had two at the time -- my class was older than the average class had been. I think I was the first class that they took in FSO-7s, that may have been the reason. Because the previous class had been just FSO-8s, and I guess some of the older people turned them down. The average age in my class...it's nothing by today's standards, but one of the students was 33! And I was 29, and the average age in the class was 27. I think the fact that they hadn't given the exam one year also had an impact. My class - we were 33 by the way - was an older class, it had a Black woman in it, the first black woman FSO, Joyce Scott I think her name was, but she resigned at the end of the class. And it had some, I suppose, iconoclastic, a little more challenging students, maybe because we were older, but they characterized my class as a different kind of class.

My two course coordinators, one was okay, the other one...they were not good role models for the Foreign Service, though.

Q: Do you think there was a tendency to, there wasn't much effort to make sure they got the right person there...it was just a job?

LAUDERDALE: I think it was just a job, I don't think they tried to pick role models particularly. One of the course instructors I think had an illness. I've heard of an illness of sleeping sickness, but we think he had it. Because he used to regularly fall asleep after lunch, even when we went to Citibank in Philadelphia and here the president and vice-president spends an hour telling us about the international banking business, and our coordinator falls asleep. We were embarassed, the young FSOs, so he was not a good role model. When he was awake he was okay.

I don't know if this is a good time to tell, but my class's future outlook...the survival rate wasn't very high. Within ten years more than half the class was out of the Foreign Service for one reason or another.

Q: I'm particularly interested in your mentioning Joyce Scott, who was the first Black woman FSO, and who left after the class. Do you have any idea why?

LAUDERDALE: Yes I do. She had what was then a little unusual but now a very common circumstance, a live-in boyfriend. She had a fiance, I guess. He lived in Detroit, from where she came. When it came time to go overseas she reflected and decided she'd go back to Detroit and live with him rather than go off to Australia or someplace. I think that was it.

Another class member who was a good friend of mine was a woman who is in the Foreign Service today, Mary Tracy; however, resigned, she was assigned to Australia or

someplace far away. She also had a boyfriend, got a proposal to marry, resigned to get married, and then didn't get married. Something happened. So for 15 years or so she was out in the cold, and when I was later DAS for Personnel we were recruiting minorities and women, I called her up. I said "How would you like to come back in the Foreign Service. And she said: "I'd love it." So we reappointed her and she's in the Foreign Service today. Didn't prosper very well because of the hiatus. The mid-career program didn't work very well. Some of my other classmates....various things happened. I think we lost three right away through resignations I told you about and through various things. One member later committed suicide, others, one spoke Russian, went to Moscow on his first tour and on his second tour he was assigned to Africa somewhere and he resigned. Just didn't have the discipline I guess. Thought he should go to Bonn instead.

I guess my class produced two Ambassadors. I was the first one, and then a couple of years later one other member. Most of the other members of my class never reached the senior ranks except the two of us. But I guess that's difficult too, everybody can't...

Q: What you're saying does point out one of the real problems in recruiting for the Foreign Service at the time. If women had to resign if they married, it meant that recruiters and Board of Examiners and all couldn't help but think...you know, the attrition rate is so heavy, particularly in those days people did get married more than they do now. It was one of the real factors. It was a bad policy but at least we knew what it was.

Well, now where did you want to go when you...

LAUDERDALE: In Berkeley I used to hang around International House quite a bit. One of my students friends married an Arab, I think from Baghdad. Another of my student friends was from Tehran. So I became interested in that part of the world. In fact I studied a little Arabic in the evening. I learned how to write the basic alphabet and such things. So when I was in the A-100 course we got to spend a few days "on the desk." So I picked what was called in those days "Greece/Turkey/Iran." And I was interested in going to Tehran or Baghdad. Instead I was assigned to Santo Domingo. And I wasn't too happy about that, but I got used to it. I went and enrolled in Spanish. Then before it came time to go, but after I had bought my island clothes and so forth, the Department said: "You're not going to Santo Domingo, we're going to send you to Mexico City instead." And I said, "I want to go to Santo Domingo!" And they said it was the first case we ever heard of somebody...! But I had bought a white suit. They say you need it down there. And I had bought a white dinner jacket for my otherwise black tux, because the post report said that young officers need it. I eventually wore that white dinner jacket 30 years later when I was Ambassador to Guyana I wore it for the first time!

Q: Was that a Schwartz special?

LAUDERDALE: Yes it was! And I carried it in that plastic bag all those years. And it still fit!

Q: S.S. Schwartz being the wholesale tailor in Baltimore whom all Foreign Service officers went to because they carried tropical clothes all year round, so you could always stock up there. And they were also used to the trade.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, I bought my tux there, which I still have. It still fits. And my white dinner jacket and so forth. So my first post was Mexico City.

Q: When you got to Mexico City, what were you doing?

LAUDERDALE: I was...they had started a rotational system and I was supposed to rotate. We all started in the Consular Section. In the doing I spent one year in the Consular Section and one year on the Administrative Section. I never rotated to Political and Econ. I was a visa officer. It was a real visa mill. We had four or five non-immigrant visa officers, all day every day in a little cubicle. I processed an average of 300 a day. You couldn't go for a cup of coffee, you couldn't go to the Men's room without knowing that there were 10-20 people standing in front of your window while you were gone. I used to even feel guilty about going to get a cup of coffee or to the Men's room or whatever. Just a real treadmill.

Q: What did this do?? Did this get to you? I mean this wasn't the fancy diplomatic life you expected. How did you feel about it?

LAUDERDALE: It wasn't so much that it wasn't the fancy diplomatic life. That puts it in a negative, and I think the wrong, context. It was dealing with foreigners, interviewing. So I didn't object to that. What I objected to was, because I had worked before in other jobs, these were awful working conditions. It wasn't that the nature of the work was so onerous; it was the volume and the conditions under which you worked that was objectionable.

Q: Were you refusing a lot of visas at the time?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. The other aspect of it was, to some degree, the arbitrariness of it. It was a lot more what I considered arbitrary, because in so many cases it was a judgment -- is this person likely to return? And often, under the circumstances I told you, where you do 300 a day, you can give each person one or two minutes, you don't have much data. If you could sit down and talk to each one for five minutes you'd have a much better sense. But we couldn't do that.

Q: How did you work it? I'm curious about the process. You're sitting there and somebody comes up to the counter, what do you look at? What were you...

LAUDERDALE: Kind of everything. Dress. You know, if a person comes in a coat and tie and he's a banker, we give him a visa. And if he comes in work clothes... So, dress, occupation, where does he live, why is he going, things like that. I said it was arbitrary,

but there were a lot of clues. A person has a good job and is well dressed, he's a professional person -- there's very little question. But many were just workers. A person is a carpenter, doesn't have a checking account, keeps his money in the cabinet at home, he's wearing work clothes. Is this person coming back or is he really going up to see his brother? You don't know.

Q: Then you moved over to the Administrative section. What were you doing there?

LAUDERDALE: Let me tell you something in between. The Economic Counselor at this post was an alcoholic and I didn't want to work for him. And the Political Counselor, I didn't like his personality. He was strange. So I didn't want to work for either of them. I didn't see a future in it. They weren't what I considered to be role models or what I would consider to be diplomats. So I'm under this rotational program, what am I going to do? I would like to serve in political work, I'd like to serve in economic work, but I don't want to work for either of these people. On the other hand, I had a great personal affinity for the Administrative Counselor. He was a kind of an exuberant, well-liked, popular fellow, competent. So he offered me to come and work for him and I said okay. And so I stayed in the consular section for about a year, first at visas and then I worked too at Protection and Welfare.

Q: Could you tell a little about that? Do you have any Protection and Welfare stories or problems that you dealt with?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. In Protection and Welfare, my first day we had a death. The death of an American. I didn't have much experience about that, but I learned. An American couple, husband and wife in their 60s I suppose, had come down to Mexico City on a vacation, and he died of a heart attack. That was not that rare because of the altitude in Mexico City. People who have circulatory or heart problems are a little at risk. Also, drinking affects you. So I went over to the hotel and dealt with the hotel people and dealt with the spouse, helped her decide how to get home, what to do with the body, and all that stuff.

I got called to the jail a lot. One night I got a call, by this time I had been to the police station often. They use a different system in Mexico City. It's not really the jail, it's the police station. The beat officer out on the street doesn't really make arrest decisions. They escort you to the police station if there are any problems, instead of dealing with it themselves. Maybe they're not trained or whatever. A lot of people get taken to the police station and there's a kind of a hearing, it's something that in America would occur on the street, where the policeman gets the facts and decides if you ought to be arrested. So I got calls a lot, and I had learned that the first thing to do was to assure that the person is an American citizen. So I go down to the police station at about 6:00 or 7:00 at night and the police bring out the fellow and I ask if he is an American citizen and he says, "No, I'm Canadian." And I said, "Well, what did you call me for?" And he said, "Oh, Canada's small, America's big. They don't have a duty officer, you do." So I said that I wasn't

authorized to help, but I did speak Spanish, and I am here. I'll make it clear that you're Canadian and see what I can do for you. So I helped get him out of jail.

Another common thing was automobile accidents. I got called to go to the scene of a lot of accidents. Of course we had a lot of stolen or lost passports, robbed hotel rooms, things like that.

Q: Did you find there was any problem with payoffs of local officials? Was this a problem, how to deal with it?

LAUDERDALE: Well, one heard stories all the time about the mordida, the common bribe system. I never used it. I was never asked for any bribes. If I went down to the police station to get somebody out of jail, no, I never offered anything and was never asked for anything. Now it's possible that in some cases where I was unsuccessful that a bribe might have made a difference. But there was no way I was going to bribe them with my own money anyway!

Q: Did you ever visit jails, people that were already in jail?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, we had a murder case. I don't remember the name of it, but it was a very famous case at the time. A wild man, an American, big, 6'4", 250 pounds, who went on a murder spree in Mexico. I think they called him King Kong. The police caught him and put him in jail for murder. I was assigned his case, so I went to see him and some other prisoners. He wasn't really in prison; he was in jail pending trial. On other occasions I went to the prison to see prisoners.

Q: How were they treated at that time?

LAUDERDALE: We used to have a system that the Embassy people collected pocket books and other kinds of materials that we would take to prisoners periodically. So I used to have a little basket of goodies, books or cookies or whatever that I took as a present. The people there, by and large, were familiar with Mexico. They weren't just passing through. So they weren't bothered so much...I mean, if an average American had to suddenly live on tacos, it would be hard. But these folks were either used to it, or whatever. My memory doesn't tell me there were any great hardships there.

Q: What were you doing when you moved to the Administrative Section?

LAUDERDALE: I was kind of an aide to the Administrative Counselor. I spent the bulk of my time on the construction of a new chancery and the move to a new chancery. At that time we were in an office building up over Sanborn's on Paseo de la Reforma, and we were building further down on Reforma a new chancery. It was under construction. I had very little to do with the construction, except for the office layouts. But toward the end of my year we actually moved to the new building and gave up the old. So planning and executing the move absorbed a good portion of my time.

Q: You had two Ambassadors when you were there, Thomas Mann and Fulton Freeman. Did you get any feeling for how they operated?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. We really liked the Manns. As a junior officer it would be possible that I'd never even meet the Ambassador in a big place like Mexico City. But we were able to meet the Manns. I met him several times and my wife and I got invited to the residence on various occasions. We liked them, and they were popular with junior officers, maybe senior officers too. I also had the impression of competence, ability, but certainly popular with the staff. They left. He became Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Fulton Freeman came. A different type of Ambassador, but they were both career officers. I don't remember if he came toward the end of my time, but we didn't have much contact with him.

Q: Since you were with the Administrative Section you probably had more to do with Mexicans than any other section. What was your impression of how things operated in Mexico?

LAUDERDALE: The Mexicans then, I don't know about today, had a minor paranoia about Americans. So they're a little bit...we're the Big Brother to the North kind of thing, they feel second-class, I think. A couple of traits we noticed: they don't like to tell you "No." I don't know if it was because we were American or if they do that to each other. So they'll tell you "Yes" and then not do it, all the way from craftsmen coming to your house, who is supposed to come at 10:00 and never comes. If you ask him if he's coming he'll say yes. Maybe he has no intention of coming but he says yes. So that causes a little discombobulation. It happens socially too. We were invited to a party from another vice-consul who invited two Mexican couples and we were all going to have pizza and beer and socialize and so forth. She asked them if they were going to come and they said yes, but they didn't come. That was one aspect of it.

Speaking the language is very important, even though a lot of people speak English. We spoke Spanish, we traveled around everywhere. I dealt with an American business couple who spent a year in Mexico and we got to know. They didn't like the Mexicans and they didn't trust them. I asked them why not and they said, well, they talk about you behind your back and so forth. And I asked him if he spoke Spanish and he said no. So I said, "Well that's your problem. I don't have any of that! You hear them talking but you don't know what they're saying and you make the worst of it." So we spoke Spanish, we practiced it, we enjoyed it, we traveled, we had good relations, we didn't have any incidents.

Q: This was your first Embassy. Overall, how did you think the Embassy was run, its effectivness and all that.

LAUDERDALE: My overriding memory--now--of Mexico was the oppressiveness against junior officers and of the calling card diplomatic calling system and the treatment

of wives. Some of my colleagues considered it oppressive even then, but we were wide-eyed and bushy-tailed and we accepted it. My wife and I were 29, we had two little boys and a baby by then in Mexico, living in temporary lodging. We had to make 18 calls on Embassy officials - Ambassador, DCM, Counselors, military attachés, immigration attachés. 18!! And my wife had to go too, with calling cards and the whole business. We had to find baby sitters, transport. It was a real burden and it created a lot of resentment. Also, there was a consular wives group run by Mrs. Coles, the wife of Leon Coles, who was the Counselor for Consular Affairs. Attendence was mandatory, monthly meetings, periodic, bring your own plate or pot or whatever, always mandatory. That created some resentment. We lived with it, but looking back at it now, it was a lot worse than we realized.

Q: You left there in what, 1964? Where did you go then?

LAUDERDALE: Rio de Janeiro.

Q: Was this a choice?

LAUDERDALE: Well, the assignments in those days, you wouldn't believe it. They had a degree of arbitrariness too. No, I was assigned to Tokyo as the Embassy Personnel officer. And the Deputy Executive Director of ARA called me on the phone. I knew him, which was a little unusual for a junior officer, I suppose, to know him, but I did. And he said we want you to go to Rio to be Embassy Personnel Officer. And I said, "I'm quite happy with Tokyo." But he said, "Yeah, but we want you to say that you want to go to Rio. Anyway, I've talked to Personnel about it and they don't want to let you go, but if you wrote and told them that you want to go, it might just make the difference. And I said: "Well, let me reflect on that, it creates a bit of an ethical problem for me." So I reflected on it for three or four days and I decided to accede to his wishes. So I wrote a memo to him that said I don't want to go to Tokyo, I want to go to Rio. So they cancelled the assignment and made Tokyo mad and sent me to Rio instead.

Q: What was the political situation like there in Brazil when you were there?

LAUDERDALE: Very unstable. There had been a revolution, a coup, around six months before I came. The elected president had been ousted and some general had taken over the government as president and the...it was bloodless, by the way. But it looked ominous. GIs on the street, on the city streets of Rio with submachine guns on every corner. They'd scare the hell out of you. But actually there was no violence. It was a military dictatorship at the time, and a real challenge for the United States, because obviously we wanted restoration of democracy, we wanted stability, reliability and so forth. And here you've got a military dictatorship with machine guns in the street.

Q: You were what, the Personnel Officer there?

LAUDERDALE: Right.

Q: When you first arrived, it was Lincoln Gordon as Ambassador, and it was a very large Embassy, wasn't it?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, it was big. Big AID Mission, big military mission.

Q: Was this comparable to Mexico?

LAUDERDALE: Yup.

Q: Well now, what were you as Personnel Officer, what were you doing?

LAUDERDALE: Well there were two sort of broad categories. Nationwide, we had something over 500 Brazilian employees, and the Embassy personnel officer administers their entire system. There's no statute and very few regulations, all the way from recruitment, setting salaries, classification system, promotion, keeping the jobs filled, the people paid, and so forth. That's on the foreign service national side. On the American side also, keeping the post staffed, helping people on the way out to deal with their preferences for onward assignments, welcoming the people that come in, orientation, processing, efficiency reports and all of that stuff, for Americans.

Q: How was living at that time in Brazil? Was Brasilia already established at that time, or what?

LAUDERDALE: We had in Brasilia a branch office of the Embassy. The capital was still in Rio. Brasilia was under construction, there were some government offices up there, some parliamentary sessions were held there, but none of the ministries had moved yet. We had a branch office up there with three or four people. It was a big Embassy, we had the big question again of planning for the move. Were our FSNs going to move to Brasilia? The Americans you can deal with easily. What about housing for Americans and for FSNs? Also, nobody wanted to move. Not only our employees but nobody in the Brazilian government wanted to move. Yeah, the Embassy was big. It was too big. And Lincoln Gordon's successor fixed that.

Q: It was Operation Topsy. What was your impression of how Lincoln Gordon operated? Did you get any feel for his work?

LAUDERDALE: We had a military attaché there, Col. Vernon Walters. He was the Defense Attaché, and there was a military government so the president was a general. So he was the principal player in the Embassy. He was Political Counselor, Defense Attaché, Intelligence Officer, Deputy Ambassador; he speaks six languages, was fluent in Portuguese and so forth.

Q: And if I recall he had been the liaison officer to the Division which fought in Italy, which the now dictator had served on.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, they had a relationship where they could go for martinis together. In style, Lincoln Gordon I would describe as professorial. Competent, as far as I know, administered U.S government interest with competence. But a lot of the operational, day-to-day stuff was taken care of by Vernon Walters.

Q: So, were people basically taking orders from the military attaché, as they never would at any other post, I think?

LAUDERDALE: Maybe taking orders isn't...

Q: Direction...

LAUDERDALE: I would say that the tone and thrust of the Embassy's view and the Embassy's recommendations to Washington and the Embassy's analysis were dictated by Vernon Walters. And the others obviously had to conform. Whereas normally that might be by the Political Counselor and the Ambassador together.

Q: Well, you were still a relatively junior officer there, so you were with the other sort of junior officers there, you know, this was a military dictatorship and all, was this...What was sort of the atmosphere there from your colleagues who were having to deal with the political officers there? Were they, how did they feel about our relations with the Brazilian government?

LAUDERDALE: There were some strains. We didn't know where it was going. We were unhappy with the military dictatorship. We wanted to get them to turn authority back over to the civilians. There were no commitments to do so, in the short term. So it was one of, one might say, frustration. It's not so dissimilar from the situation in Haiti today. I think our relationship, because of the circumstance of Brazil, it's great size, its important economy, it's a much more important relationship and the ties between the two countries are much greater, but some of the frustrations are similar.

Q: I've never served in Latin America, but I've heard that in Brazil not only the language is different, but the attitude is different, where the United States is not looked upon as the bogeyman of the North, that there is a different attitude toward the United States than there is not only in Mexico, but down in Argentina, where they're always thinking, it's sort of a little paranoia, but that it's not true in Brazil. Did you find that....

LAUDERDALE: Yes, that is true. It is a different relationship. The Brazilians are completely friendly and open to the United States and to Americans, and to each other! They're not a people or society with a lot of hangups or ulterior motives; one might say simple, pleasant, happy people. We used to laugh about the Brazilian revolution because they're always bloodless, nobody gets killed.

Q: What about inflation? I don't know if it was at this time or later when one would hear horrific accounts about inflation and all that. Was this a factor when you were there, particularly as a Personnel officer, having to deal with local staff and cost of living for locals and Americans. How did you work it?

LAUDERDALE: It was a big problem. Inflation was great, something like 40% a year. And they had then as they have now provisions where all contracts are adjusted periodically and so forth. Individual Americans had to gauge when and how much money to exchange, whether they should exchange for a week or a day or sometimes an hour! Because the rate would change, often daily, and with FSN salaries it was always a burden. They're behind, you can't do a wage survey every day. Let's say you go six months. In six months they're 20% behind, then it takes Washington a couple of months, with everything having to be sent to Washington. So you have the problem of the lag. It was a chore. We adjusted salaries twice a year and on some occasions gave as much as 40% pay raises.

Q: Did you find Washington could work out a system for dealing with this? I've often heard it said that the American government gets an awful lot from its foreign service nationals but it is not very good in dealing with them in circumstances that are not unique to Brazil. Did you find the machinery antiquated, was there a problem?

LAUDERDALE: Well yeah, it worked a little better at my post, because in the time that I was in the civil service, before I joined the Foreign Service, I had participated in wage surveys. So I knew how to do them and I did the one in Brazil myself. I did the one in Mexico City, when I was there in the Administrative Section. I did a wage survey for foreign Service nationals and did a compensation plan. So I did that in Rio. The problem was the time that it took...first of all you have to wait until the local firms adjust their salaries, and then you have to do the survey, and then you have to send the data to Washington. My view then, as now, which didn't sell by the way, is that when you have inflation of 40% a year and you have to adjust 20% twice a year, let's say, and employees lose money during that time, that 100% accuracy isn't that important. Timeliness is more important. Because if you miss the mark by, say, 5% -- let's say you raise salaries by 25% when it should have been 20%, two weeks later you're up to date. This great delay and great analysis to avoid making a 5% mistake is not worth it. That was my view. So, it's approximately 20%, let's give 'em 20%, let's do it now, and if it's off a little bit it will all come out in the wash. Didn't sell. No, we want the data, we want exactitude, so forth. So we all struggled by somehow.

Q: When John Tuthill came as ambassador -- he again, like Lincoln Gordon, both were economists I believe, and Tuthill was very much a Europeanist, how did he fit in?

LAUDERDALE: I can tell you about Operation Topsy, which I think was very interesting. I wasn't there for its execution but I was there for it's beginning. He was an economist. He had been ambassador to the Common Market (USEC). He came to Brazil and found this big Mission that you described, and I'll tell you two or three of his

techniques. One was that within the first month I got called up as Embassy Personnel Officer. He called up me and the doctor, and the Administrative Counselor and he said: "I'm very worried about the health of this community. An AID officer had a heart attack last week, everybody's charging around trying to conquer the world and move the earth and the pace of life here is very hectic. Let's slow this down! So, we're going to have some rules. Thursday afternoons is volleyball on the beach. Recreation and exercise. No representational activity on the weekend. I'm not going to host any except for force majeure, diplomatic necessity. But this routine stuff is going to be during the week and I expect weekends to be family time. I'm going to slow this pace down. We're going to stop setting unrealistic deadlines, we're going to stop causing people to have heart attacks. We're going to pay more attention to health and so forth. So, go work out the details."

So that was one meeting. Another meeting was with AID. He said to them: "I see you have three hydro-engineers. What are they for?"

"Well, we're building this great dam.'

"Well, don't the Brazilians have hydro-engineers?"

"Yeah, but ours are better."

And he said, "I don't care if ours are better. Let Brazilian engineers do this. We don't need American engineers down here to build Brazilian dams. They can build their own dams."

So he put AID working on a different concept, even though (it reminds me of the Vietnam war) "Americans can do it better," this is their country, let them do it, and so forth.

So he slowed the pace down, he cut down the concept of what Americans needed to do and what the Brazilians could do. Once he did that, he said, "Now we've got too many people. We can cut this place by 25% or 15%," and put it into effect.

Q: Well how did the bureaucracy respond to that? Because one of the things that I think is endemic in the Foreign Service is this rushing all over the place and doing things that I think in retrospect, now that you and I are both retired, you kind of wonder what was all the rushing about? How did you find the system, at the early stages, responded to this?

LAUDERDALE: I really respected his technique. Before then and since then I've been involved in retrenching government. The history of the Foreign Service is retrenchment, just about. Cutting back. Establishing new programs with no new resources, you've gotta cut old ones. And I've learned over the years that there are basically two ways to do that and I've seen both tried. One is, you just cut staff, you cut an Embassy, you tell an Embassy you can't have four political officers you can only have three, we're going to cut one. Now you guys work out how you're going to cut the work. I never liked that system.

Because what I find is that Foreign Service people in particular are ego-driven, they're end-product driven, and they'll work themselves to death trying to do the same old thing.

The other way to cut, or retrench, is to cut the work first. Cut the work first, then cut the staff. That's what Tuthill did. He cut the work first by challenging it. What is all this rushing around? Who says this has to be done by Friday? I think this could be done by September 15th, it's quite enough. Why do you need an American engineer? Why can't you use Brazilians? So you cut down the expectations, cut down the demands. Then you can say: "Now we can cut staff by 15%." I consider that really professional.

Q: How did you find... were there any... in your dealings because anything particularly when you're dealing with an administration you're always up against your opposite number. How did you find the Brazilian government as a deliverer, particularly now as it was under military rule?

LAUDERDALE: On the administrative side, it worked, with airport arrivals and departures, customs and immigration, with the thousands of interchange things that we have, it all worked. We talked about the mordida in Mexico, in Brazil they have a word called "jeito." You pull a jeito. What is a jeito? A jeito is a deal. It's not a bribe, it's a favor. You get things done with jeitos. So we had some jeitos. What is it? It's smoothing relationships, maintaining... of course we sent over our Christmas gratuities and so forth. But I don't remember any particular head-to-head dealings with the Brazilian government on the administrative side.

Q: You didn't have any of the problem you had in Mexico of visas and all that, because people would only get visas if they really had a reason to come to the United States and probably come back. So that didn't turn into...

LAUDERDALE: No, no visa mill there. Our consular section was quite small. Had three or four Americans only. No great non-immigrant visa lines. Most of the people who applied, qualified. It was a completely different environment.

Q: What was your impression...we had what, three or four consular posts there? It's a big country, what was your impression of how they were used, their utility and all that?

LAUDERDALE: They had one down in Porto Alegre, one up north in Belem, we had one in Curitiba which later got closed. We had one in Salvador, Bahia. Recife, we had not only a consulate there but an AID Mission. Some of those have been closed since that time. Some of those still survive to this day. I think they were probably all appropriate in those days. The only ones I might question was Curitiba, which we closed. I don't know if we need a post in Porto Alegre. I don't know if we need a post in Belem. Salvador, probably yes. Recife, probably yes. Because the distances are so great. From Rio to Recife you're talking 1,000 miles, so you need a little presence up there.

Q: Was there any problem with staffing or keeping Brasilia going during the time you were there?

LAUDERDALE: In the posts yes, we seemed to have problems in the posts. In Belem, when the inspectors came they relieved a couple of people; they relieved the principal officer in Belem. I think he was sleeping with the female USIS officer or something. And maybe not coming to work every day. And staffing Brazilian posts was always a bit of a problem; I guess one thing is the Portuguese language. They used to have a Portuguese language school in Rio in the old days, which they had to close. So keeping people, new officers speaking Portuguese...So one thing I spent some time on was keeping the posts staffed. The problem in Rio was just the numbers. In the posts it was sometimes personalities, people didn't want to go, so forth.

Q: How about Brasilia itself? Was it hard to get people to go, from what I gather...

LAUDERDALE: It was a frontier.

Q: That was the whole idea. Was it Kubitschek, or the president before, that was his great dream, that we'll move...we'll get the Brazilians away from the coast and out into the interior.

LAUDERDALE: You're right. People didn't want to go. The only asset Brasilia had was a beautiful blue sky. It was a great flat plain, the climate wasn't that bad. But there was absolutely nothing to do, nowhere to go. So people didn't want to go, and those that went used to use the shuttle to Rio pretty regularly.

Q: I have to ask, having never served there, did Mardi Gras pretty much shut things down in those days?

LAUDERDALE: Absolutely. Just closed down. As a matter of fact my wife and I bought tickets and we were going to see the Mardi Gras parade, and we had children at home. We had a maid, but we forgot to check with her. So as soon as Mardi Gras came she said "Adios, I'll be back next Tuesday." And we said, "Wait a minute." But we had to let her go. But we found a babysitter somehow to go to one parade. I'm never going back. We went down about midnight and left at about three in the morning. I guess we went down at eleven o'clock, but the parade didn't begin until midnight. It's nice, it's worth seeing, but you wouldn't want to do it twice.

Q: As a post, let's do a little compare and contrast, how would you compare Mexico and Rio in those days in terms of people?
Were there any differences?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. For Americans, Brazil is a better place to live. The living conditions in Mexico City were better than in Rio, but the relationships with the Brazilian people were a lot better, it's a lot more open, it's a lot friendlier. You feel less threatened.

So I think the relationship between the two countries and between the two people's were probably more friendly with the Brazilians, and that's why I think it's a better place for Americans to live. In terms of amenities, Mexico City in those days was superior to Rio, but that may not be true today.

Q: Was Vernon Walters still there when John Tuthill came?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah I believe he was.

Q: Well how did that work out?

LAUDERDALE: You know, I don't know. Maybe about that time I left. I left shortly after Tuthill...he'd only been there three or six months. So either the relationship wasn't settled by the time I left... I don't have any particular memory of it. I think Walters may have left also, maybe a little after I did.

Q: Well with Walters, because he is such a phenomenon, when he was there during the Lincoln Gordon time, did you sense any resentment on the part of the Political Section there, or not?

LAUDERDALE: No, not particularly. Frank Carlucci was the Political Counselor, another officer that was there was Sam Lewis, Bob Ryan was in Econ. He was a young officer like myself. He and I and Frank Carlucci used to go out to lunch pretty regularly. Max Krebs was Political Counselor before Carlucci. I don't remember anything Max Krebs said. It wasn't anything that Frank Carlucci complained about.

Q: Was Herb Okun there at that time?

LAUDERDALE: Herb Okun was up in Brasilia.

Q: I heard that some people were sort of annoyed about...I came into the Foreign Service with Herb. I heard that he was a little bit difficult to deal with when he was up in Brasilia.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, he was. But if I can digress, I was later in the Embassy in Spain when Franco was still in power. He died during my tour. But the situation was not that different. Under a military dictatorship like Franco and Madras (of Haiti), and whatever his name was in Brazil, where generals are in power, the contacts are military contacts. And the source of information is Intelligence. So in Spain, guess what I found? The CIA Mission is important. Military attachés are important. What does the Political Section do? Very little. What do you read in the newspaper? Nothing. Parliamentarians to talk to? No. So the Intelligence and the military side of the house was predominant. It changed in Spain while I was there when Franco died. We had to change the staffing. We need econ officers, we need political officers. You can cut the Intelligence out. I think that they accepted that as inevitable under a military dictatorship.

Q: Well then your next assignment...you stayed away from Washington, I see. You went to Brussels from '67 to '70. What, now again, was this, did you ask for this or...

LAUDERDALE: No. I was assigned to Kinshasa. I didn't want to go, either. I had a diabetic son and I was really quite annoyed, because I put in a preference sheet or whatever it was called, it was completely ignored, they assigned me to Kinshasa. I called AF/EX on the phone one day and said, "Look, I don't know if I can go to Kinshasa. I have a son that's a diabetic." And they said, "Forget about it. We're going to send you anyway. Med says its okay." So I dropped it. Before I left Rio, in the hustle-bustle of moving, of packing up at home, we forgot to give our son his insulin shot in the morning. Got up in the morning, 7:00, we're packing, drinking coffee standing up, and at noon he flips over and we rush him to the hospital, and then we remembered, we didn't give him his insulin shot. So he stayed in the hospital until evening, as I recall, came back home, scared us all. But in the process we contacted the Regional Medical Officer and it came out that we were going to Kinshasa. And he said: "You shouldn't go to Kinshasa." And I said, "Well, I told them that. They raised that and they said that Med said it was okay." So he said: "You go to see Med when you get to Washington. See the medical director. They're a big bureaucracy just like everything else. You just got lost in the system. You go tell him your circumstance and they're not going to send you to Kinshasa." So I said okay. When I got to Washington we went to FSI-French. Like most Administrative officers I could not be spared for the full program, which was 16 weeks. They said you can have 8 weeks. So I was enrolled at FSI for 8 weeks. For my son's medical exam they don't do them at the medical division, you do it privately. We took him up to Boston, to the Jocelyn Clinic, which is a world-famous diabetic clinic. We had lived in Boston, so we knew about it. We took him up to Boston for in-patient observation and insulin adjustment. He's a growing boy who's been overseas. We took him up to the Jocelyn Clinic and left him for five days. Then I went back to get him. When they got finished they wrote a two-page letter to Med. about his clearance. I gave the letter to Med., meantime I'm still assigned to Kinshasa. Med said, you're not going to Kinshasa. Mr. Hume Horan who was the Personnel Officer in AF, was nasty to me about that. He said "Oh, I notice you went to an out-of-town doctor, as if there was something sneaky about this whole thing. Anyway, they cancelled it. So here I am in French, and no job. And the Personnel system was not centralized at that time. It was decentralized, each bureau had a personnel officer. They had a central coordinator and I went to see him. Because I went to AF and they said they didn't have anything for me. I went to the central coordinator and he said: "Well, we're planning an expansion in Brussels for the NATO move. We're going to create an additional job there as Embassy GSO. I've got three choices: Frankfurt, commercial officer; Lisbon, commercial officer; Brussels, GSO. Frankfurt, the guy extended; Lisbon, something else happened. Anyway, I went to Brussels as assistant GSO. New Position in anticipation of the NATO move. So after my 8 weeks in French I went to Brussels.

Q: Tell me, I know everything was in flux back then, but you would end up kind of being coned. In a sense you were typed as an economic, political, consular, or administrative officer.

LAUDERDALE: You became typed, but I hadn't been typed yet.

Q: How did you feel about concentrating sort of on the adminstrative side of this and that. What was sort of the atmosphere. Where did one want to be as a type of officer. I speak as...I found myself getting typed as a consular officer and everybody told me "Don't be one." But gee, I liked the work and I kind of stayed on longer than people thought was a good idea in those days.

LAUDERDALE: As I recall it was about two years later that the coning process occurred. As long as the question of coning didn't come up, I didn't really care. I would have preferred, for substantive reasons, either of the other two kinds of job. But for other reasons they didn't work out, so I wasn't unhappy about this one. While in Brussels, they came out with this system they're going to cone everybody and the first cut they're going to cone you in the work you're now in. And under that formula I would become administrative cone, and you had a right to appeal. So when I was next in Washington I went to see the central Personnel people about whether I should appeal or whether I should accept it. So one of the things I asked them was... by then they had the newly centralized Personnel system... one of the questions I asked them was about the role and future of adminstrative people in the Foreign Service. Because they didn't have any tradition of that. I asked them, for example, can I get to the top as an Administrative Officer? Can I aspire to be an ambassador as an Administrative Officer? I got a lot of coughing. Coughing and hhhmmming. I never got a straight answer. The answer was, it depends and so forth. So in the end I accepted it. I didn't appeal.
Q: What was the situation in Brussels when you got there? it was not the Embassy to NATO at that time, am I right? It was a straight Embassy?

LAUDERDALE: Right.

Q: And how did you find the Embassy, how it operated?

LAUDERDALE: There were two Missions in Brussels at that time: USEC, which was the Mission to the Common Market at that time, kind of small; and the Embassy, which was accredited to the government of Belgium, which was also kind of small. It was by and large a sleepy...I would call it kind of a sleepy, unimportant Mission. The Administrative Officer, for example, was an FSO-2, to give you an idea of level. By the time I arrived, it was getting ginned up. And the next year was very, very hectic. We spent the year planning for the move of starting in January of '67, and NATO was going to move in September of '67. So we had about nine months to plan for that move.

Q: The Ambassador when you arrived was, what, Ridgway Knight?

LAUDERDALE: Yes.

Q: How did you find him?

LAUDERDALE: I used to call him the Consul General, because that's how he acted. After coming from Mexico City and Rio, where I was lucky even to meet the Ambassador, here I was at a post where no detail was too small. I met the Ambassador every day, and he would tell me where the flowers ought to go in the lobby. So I used to call him the Consul General.

Q: As a post, how did people like it there?

LAUDERDALE: The people who were there liked it. Brussels was very convenient living. Our relationship with the Belgian government was very friendly, the issues with the Belgian government were very few. We were both NATO members, the Common Market's there, so very few strains, lots of amenities.

Q: The Congo had ceased to be an issue then? It had been, I suppose, five years earlier.

LAUDERDALE: We had broken relationships with Iraq, and the Belgians were the protecting power in Iraq, so one of our more important relationships with the Belgians was practically every day going to the Belgian Foreign Office about Iraq.

Q: This is after the '67 Arab-Israeli War and many of the Arab states broke relations with us.

LAUDERDALE: Right.

Q: So, how does one go about all of a sudden having NATO headquarters dumped on them?

LAUDERDALE: Well, they had to decide what kind of headquarters building to build. They couldn't build a permanent headquarters during the time allowed, so they found a site and decided to build a temporary headquarters, with the idea that they would later build a permanent headquarters in another part of the city. A permanent one being brick and steel and opposed to this one, which is stucco, low-rise, that looks kind of like an army camp, temporary building for NATO. That was for the office side of the house. We had to have a school. There was an American school in Brussels that was where most of the American business community and Embassy kids went, but it could not accomodate the great influx. They were going to get 200-300 more students and they couldn't accomodate them. And they didn't want to expand to that scope. So the U.S. Army decided to build a school. So NATO's out there building their headquarters, the Army's coming in, buying land to build a school. Then we've got the question of housing for all these people. We decided to go government lease. So in addition from the U.S. Mission moving from Paris, there's also a military committee of NATO that's headquartered in Washington, and they decided to move it to Brussels simultaneously with the NATO. Between the military committee and the U.S. Mission to NATO, we're going to get over 200 people, 200 employees. So the number of housing units, as I recall, was 213, so we

decided to go government lease. So we had to lease and furnish 213 housing units. So you've got three things going simultaneously: headquarters office building by U.S. NATO, school by U.S. Army, Embassy and a joint adminstrative section -- of course NATO's not even there, so the Embassy Adminstrative Section has to do all the administrative work. We've got to locate 213 or so housing units, furnish them, all by September. I was scared!

Q: Also, you're in competition with all the other Embassies of NATO who were doing the same thing.

LAUDERDALE: I went out as assistant GSO. In the meantime I became the GSO, and by the summer I got two American assistant GSOs. I'll grant you, I was only an FSO-5 myself and they were FSO-6s, or something like that. Much too junior and much too few to do this massive job. So as I say, I was scared. And I never worked harder in my life, seven days a week, from January to December. I took no vacation that year. Nobody did. We were overloaded.

Q: How did the Belgians respond to this influx. Both at the government level and the real level, that is, the Belgians who were living in Brussels?

LAUDERDALE: The government responded positively. How the people felt about it? I don't remember exactly, but my recollection is favorably. The kind of aura at the time was that Brussels was going to become the capital of Europe. With NATO here and the Common Market here, this is going to become an important business, commercial, diplomatic center, why we're going to be the capital of Europe!

Q: Was there a real problem with pricing? With the competition and all I'd imagine that you found yourself competing for housing and all, trying to outbid each other. Was this a problem?

LAUDERDALE: We had difficulty finding units, but price wasn't really the problem. Belgium was kind of expensive anyway. But I don't remember any great rent escalation and getting there first. It may be that we were ahead of the others, even though our numbers were so much greater.

Q: Were you getting help from the US Army, coming out there, or the NATO side, or did they depend on you?

LAUDERDALE: They depended on us. Most of the military help came later. After NATO was established, or just before or simultaneously with it, there was a NATO support group that came that was military that worked closely with the Embassy and helped a lot with visits and other things. But in this process that I'm talking about, they were not a player.

Q: Did John Eisenhower...when did he come there? After NATO was already in or not?

LAUDERDALE: After the election. The Nixon election in '69. Ridgway Knight was summarily replaced... he read about his replacement by John Eisenhower in the wireless bulletin.

Q: How did he operate?

LAUDERDALE: Low key, kind of a loner. I don't mean loner in the normal sense of the world. He had no close associations. He didn't take up with the professional corps on a comrade basis, and he had no private friends. He felt alone, and he said so.

Q: It was sort of an odd...he was the son of the president, but it didn't fit one way or the other. Later he became...his son married Julie Nixon, but that wasn't in the offing at that time.

LAUDERDALE: No, she was a young girl in Brussels at that time.

Q: Did you get any feel for how Belgians felt about Germany and Germany was in NATO at that time. Was this a problem?

LAUDERDALE: I think that, at least on the surface, the animosities of World War II were pretty much behind them at that time. Now, I had been in Belgium earlier, when I was a GI in Germany in the '50s, and it was active then. The war memories were still fresh. But now in '69, I didn't hear anything about it.

Q: I think it was different, the Dutch harbored these things much longer, there may be reasons, but both suffered quite badly during World War II but the Belgians seem to be a different breed of cat.

LAUDERDALE: You're right about the Dutch. I was more aware of the Dutch sensibilities about it than the Belgian.

Q: There was another manifestation not on the German side but against us, about Vietnam. The Dutch were giving us a very difficult time, I'm talking about students, people on the streets and all, about our role in Vietnam, but you never hear about it in Belgium.

LAUDERDALE: You had some, they wrote graffiti on our building sometimes. It was not the way it was in some other countries, but there was some.

Q: What about the African business? Of course Belgium by this time had no Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, or Zaire. Did these play any role? Were things happening there where we were on one side and they were on the other, or were you...

LAUDERDALE: I'm not aware of any. My overriding memory of events during my time was the NATO side of the house and the invasion of Czechoslovakia that occurred while I was there. That kind of put NATO on alert, so they were on their toes there. And the U.S. forces along the East German border was a source of tension. It may have had some spillover in terms of the Belgians, but you know the Germans were now the front line. They were the guardians of liberty and the buffer between the Russians and the Belgians. So that may have influenced their attitude.

Q: What was the attitude about the Soviet threat at that time?

LAUDERDALE: I think we might talk about two parts of it: one, the Communist philosophical threat and the other would be the Soviet military threat. The Communist philosophical threat, by and large the Europeans, including the Belgians, thought the Americans were paranoid. Being Social Democrats, socialists they called themselves openly, they don't consider the Communist philosophy all that threatening or all that ominous, and they think the Americans are overboard about it. So they were never that greatly concerned about the non-military inroads of Communism or the threats of Communist domination of countries in Africa and so forth. They more or less shrugged and said, "So what? "What's the threat?

Now on the military side there's obviously some concern, and events such as those that occurred in Czechoslovakia [the 1968 crushing of liberalization in Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and their satellites], brought to the fore realization that there is a significant military threat and that there is a big army on the German border, and we are all to some degree vulnerable, and we need NATO and we need the American forces in Europe.

Q: Did the Embassy in Brussels play any role in helping our Embassy in Luxembourg, by any chance?

LAUDERDALE: Marginally. Yes, I mean not so much that we were a regional support center or anything like that, but when they needed help they called us and we always responded. It could be supply or technical assistance or even advice.

Q: Well then, you left in 1970, right? You came back at last to Washington. What were you doing?

LAUDERDALE: I went to the University of Michigan to mid-career university training. That was nine months of an academic year, and it was called Management Training. I had the choice of Systems Training or Management Training. Half a dozen or so administrative officers had gone off the previous year and most of them had taken Systems. People like Bob Lamb, Tom Tracy, and some of the others. I took Management Training. Like all my other assignments, that ones was screwed up too. I got a letter that said I had been picked for Columbia University. I wrote back, or called back and said: "I have four children. Ain't no way I can live in New York City. You got the wrong place."

After some embarrassing reevaluations they offered me four, more rural locales: Ann Arbor, Pennsylvania...anyway, I took Ann Arbor. Probably a bad choice, but...

Q: How did you find the Management Training?

LAUDERDALE: Later in my career, I realized that it was the right thing to do and it was quite helpful to me. At the time, I wasn't sure, and even my colleagues thought that it really wouldn't make any difference. You'll either get to the top or not. But I think it was worthwhile and I'm glad I did it.

Q: What did you find that you studied that came in handy later?

LAUDERDALE: One of the best courses I had was Organizational Theory. I used that a lot, later on in my career, even when I was in OIG. So that was the best course I had. I had a course in Personnel Administration and a course in Organizational Behavior which also was quite good. You know, the graduate school of business curriculum.

Q: Then you came back to Washington in '71, or was it still '70?

LAUDERDALE: No, in June of '71 I came back here. I was a post management officer in EUR.

Q: How did you find EUR? EUR always seems to do better for itself than any of the other bureaus. Was this your impression?

LAUDERDALE: Do you mean in the way of resources?

Q: Yes, both in terms of people and resources.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, I found it then and I find it now with a footnote -- they got there first. A simple answer. China has operated on a shoestring because relations got established later. Now establishment of all these new posts, the Eastern European posts, has just about bankrupted EUR, because they had to absorb that out of all their existing... So I think that may have changed that finally. But they were an old-time bureau, they had a base, they had a superstructure, and I think they've fared well over the years.

Q: What does a post management officer do?

LAUDERDALE: We provide liaison, support, and feedback to the Embassy on the full range of administrative and managerial problems that they communicate with us about.

Q: You were doing this in '71-'72, what were your main issues that you were dealing with at post?

LAUDERDALE: I had basically Western Europe, Great Britain, Italy, Iberia, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. So I could handle ten countries with one hand tied behind me, because they didn't have really big problems. Aside from the budget, the budget was the most complicated thing to handle. A couple that I can think of... I got a lot of letters to the Secretary from tourists who complained that they were in Rome and went by the Embassy and the flag wasn't flying. I got maybe ten in my first summer, all addressed to the Secretary of State, but they came down to me for reply. So I communicated with Rome about this and I got brushed off. Rome said, "Well, it's the Italian Government. Foreign missions fly the flag only on flag days. Furthermore our flagpole is in the interior courtyard and you couldn't see it from the street anyway." So I communicated back and said, "I'd like for you to go to the Foreign Ministry and tell them that in the absence of any major objection, we intend to begin flying the flag every day." The Embassy didn't want to do that. They didn't want to fly the flag and they didn't want to go to the Foreign Ministry. I said: "Look, I don't want to answer letters from tourists to the Secretary. This is a cheap price to pay. And besides, we fly the flag everyplace else in the world. So do it." So they did, and guess what the Italians said? "We don't care. Go right ahead. In general we don't like flags all over the city, but... Besides, we can't see yours anyway." So they started flying the flag and the letters stopped. While it's true they couldn't see it from the street, if they asked the guard he'd say, "Oh, it's right in there." And they could walk over and see it.

Another one that I remember was a cable from Copenhagen, or the Hague, that said, our xerox machines are costing us so many thousands a year and we could buy a xerox machine for the price of one year's rental. So send us the purchase money and we'll buy one and we'll save it in rent during the next year alone. And I said, "I don't have any money. But I have an idea. Just take all your rental money and buy the thing October 1. Then you don't need any money from me. " They thought that was a good idea. With the new fiscal year...

Q: Then off you went again. Clint, we're now going to Bonn, where you served from '72 to '75. How did that job come about, and what were you up to?

LAUDERDALE: Well, I was in the Department. I was working for Joan Clark at that time, who was Executive Director, and the question of my assignment came up. I wanted to go to Vienna, but she wanted to send somebody else. She wanted me to go to Moscow and be Admin. Counselor. I said: "I have two high school children and Moscow has no high school. So I don't want to go to Moscow." She said: I want you to go to Moscow! We need you." So I said "I have two teenaged children and I don't want to send them to boarding school." So she said okay, we'll send you to Bonn. So off I went to Bonn and served three years. Marty Hillenbrand was the Ambassador at that time. Actually, he went out when I went out. So we went out together.

Q: What had you heard about Marty Hillenbrand in the corridors?

LAUDERDALE: He was a top-flight, career officer Ambassador. At that time he was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, highly respected, a German expert by the way. He had served there earlier in his career several times. I got to know him personally and really liked him. He was kind of self-effacing, low key, completely non-aggressive. More of a passive personality, but a real professional. That by the way was what got him fired later. That kind of personality and approach... I'll jump forward to two or three years later when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, and during those years he came to Bonn 13 times during my time there. And because of Hillenbrand's very low-key approach, because of his, one might say, really diplomatic dealing with the German government, he wasn't tough enough for Kissinger, and Kissinger basically said so.

Q: Were you there at the time? Did you see this developing?

LAUDERDALE: I was there, but I wasn't in on...you know when Secretary Kissinger comes he meets with Foreign Minister Genscher, and he meets with the Chancellor and the President. Hillenbrand was in some of those meetings and I was not. So I don't have any first hand...in fact I don't even know what the issue was. I know Kissinger had come back after shuttling through the Middle East to put the heat on the Germans about something, I don't remember, but I do know that the word got around that Hillenbrand didn't present the issue to the Germans forcefully enough. So he basically said: "He's not tough enough, so we're going to let him go and get somebody else."

Q: Who came in?

LAUDERDALE: You know, I don't remember. A little bit later it was Stoessel, but I think there was an Ambassador in between. I left.

Q: When you were out there in '72 how did you find...because we're looking not only at the political situation but also at how the system runs. What was your impression about how our Bonn Embassy, a huge Embassy, was run at that time?

LAUDERDALE: A couple of the things that came up. After the war, HICOG was in Frankfurt, a big institution settled in Frankfurt in consfiscated offices and so forth. The German government had been given the contractual agreement i.e. sovereignty, of the three Western occupied areas, and they decided to set up headquarters in Bonn. So the U.S. government built a big complex there under two different circumstances. They built a big housing complex on land that the United States government owned. They had either purchased it or the government gave it to them. I don't know what the arrangement was. But I know that the U.S. government owned the land under a 400 or 500 unit apartment complex, with shopping center, school, club, service organizations, movies, a church. A town, a little town. The office building was a little bit different circumstance. We built the building on German land, with the understanding that we would have the building for as long as we wanted it. That was the circumstance in Frankfurt also.

When I went, the office complex that had been built in '48 was much too big for the Embassy. We had given almost half of it back to the Germans and we occupied the other half. Also, by that time it was almost 30 years old. It had to be rehabilitated, a major face lift. Or we had to build a new chancery. So there was a proposal in the mill to build a chancery in Bonn. That came to a head about the time Hillenbrand and I came to Germany.

Q: Just some historical background. Nobody was even foreseeing that Germany would be unified at any point in the foreseable future at that time.

LAUDERDALE: No. It became more clear later. Within about five years there was a consensus that Germany would never be reunified. And Kissinger and some others at some point said that there was no reason to believe that Germany would ever be reunified. However, there was also always that glimmer of hope. Hillenbrand killed the new chancery project, for exactly the reasons we're discussing here. His public reason was that it would send the wrong signal politically. It would tell the Russians and the East Germans and the eastern bloc that the U.S. has accepted the division of Germany and they have built a 100-year chancery in Bonn. He didn't want to send that signal, even though nobody believed reunification would occur in the near future, he said we're not going to do anything like this that sends a signal of acceptability and stability in Bonn. No. No chancery. So eventually they rehabilitated the office building. And it turned out that was wise. Because what happened in the '90s was completely unexpected! I thought they'd made a bad mistake, that we were going to build a new chancery in the parking lot so we'd have a place to live while it was under construction, and when the chancery was finished we'd tear down the old stuff. But it didn't happen, we stayed in the old windy chancery. It was really what was called a temporary building, like the old buildings on Constitution Ave. that were built during World War II and then kind of hang on forever. That's the kind of building it was.

Q: Well, how did you find dealing with the Germans? On the official side, first.

LAUDERDALE: Very pleasant, very cordial, very responsive. I dealt with them mostly on management issues of course, including security, property issues. They were very cooperative. I don't want to overstate the case, but we got just about everything we wanted.

Q: You spoke of security issues. Was this the period when you had terrorists, like the Bader- Meinhof gang? These were basically radical "students" who were going around killing and bombing and doing things. Basically anarchists. They were quite a threat. Can you talk about this?

LAUDERDALE: Yes I can and I can tell you about an incident that occurred that kind of clarified our policy on the issue. The Bader-Meinhof gang were setting of bombs and doing other terrorist acts throughout Germany, mostly against the Germans or against the American military. A bomb went off in Frankfurt, at Rhein Main Air Base. And threats

were made against the American Embassy. We just had German civilian guards, as I recall they were unarmed. And no great number, a couple of guards at the gate, that's it. It was perceived that there was a need for much more security, so when...actually I think it was just before I came when the Admin. Counselor was away from the post, something happened, and the Embassy brought in the American Military Police. He came back to the post and the Embassy was surrounded by American Military Police, and he knew that this was not right. This is not how we protect our Embassies abroad. Protecting our Embassies abroad is the responsibility of the host government, and a lot of things can go wrong if you have the American Military Police surrounding it. So he convinced the Ambassador, the one before Hillenbrand to get the Military Police out of our compound. We talked to the Germans and got them to send the Bundeswehr, the border police. So the border police came in, this was in April or May of '72, and guarded the Embassy and they have been doing it ever since, to this day.

Q: Were there any actual incidents against the Embassy while you were there?

LAUDERDALE: No. We spent a lot of energy and time and effort on security. We built a fence around the compound, the border guards brought armored cars, tank-looking like vehicles, in the housing compound which was five miles down the road, no fence around the property, no real armed presence. That was all beefed up. More police. In subsequent years a fence was built, barriers were built and so forth. But no incident while I was there.

Q: Did we have Marines there?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, but they had no role at all in the housing compound, except to live there. They were chancery oriented. Their duty stations were in the chancery, they didn't really provide perimeter security. Unless you have a fence, then within that compound they protect the entry. But we had no fence, wide open, any stroller could walk through or by. So they were inside, front door. We spent a lot of money on access control: bulletproof windows, shatterproof glass, that kind of stuff. They were more concerned in those days about individual terrorists, that a terrorist or a couple of terrorists might get into the chancery, into the consular section, into the public areas, with a briefcase with a bomb in it. So we established very strict...

Q: I was in, at this time, from '70 to '74 I was...a bomb went off in our parking lot and killed the two people who were going to set off the bomb. There was a lot of that going around in those days. These were an Italian radical and a Cypriot radical, I think, and they blew themselves up, thank God.

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, they had the Japanese Red Army, Bader-Meinhof, and there was a group in Italy, the Red Brigade.

Q: I wonder if you could comment, what is and was your impression of the Marines as a protective force. I've heard people say that because they're young they get into more

trouble, and it would be better to have more a civilian, older group. How did you feel about the Marines?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, I felt good about 'em, I felt it was worthwhile, I felt we ought to have them. Then, that every Embassy ought to have Marines. I think it is important to have a clear understanding of the Marines' mission. Their mission as I understand it is to protect American classified material. They are the guardians of our code facilities, really, our classified material and our code books, and within the Embassy itself the sanctity of that as a haven, as a refuge. Even the host country authorities, the police, the fire, no one can come inside that chancery without our permission. And the mechanism by which that is implemented is by the Marine guards. Also, in dealing with individual terrorists, individual troublemakers, such as the kind you may get in any country -- a person comes into a bank and makes a scene -- you need "security" to come and escort them out. The Marines can do that. They do it, they do it very well. They speak English, they're American, they're trained. And I think the thing we learned in Tehran, when the hostages were taken, is that it's not foolproof. Basically it's a delaying mechanism. The Marines are supposed to be able to delay entry of any group long enough to give the communicators and the code people time to destroy the codes and the classified material. That may be minutes or hours, the more they have the more they can destroy. But that's basically what it's for, and to prevent surreptitious or illegal or unknown entry outside office hours. So I consider them guardians of our codes and classified materials, our comm. centers, and so forth. And I think they do it very well. Now if you want a Delta Force to destroy the invaders and so forth then the Marines are the wrong ones. They're not equipped for that, they're not suitable for that. They're American citizens in a foreign country. For that you need the German border police, that's what they're out there for.

Q: How did you find the German local employees, the foreign service nationals?

LAUDERDALE: Competent, efficient, but a little bit hard to control. The two go together. Because they're educated, they're trained, I guess basically they're not willing to accept a second-class status. And our Foreign Service national employment system is based on a two-tier, sort of a second-class citizen relationship. The Americans are American diplomats, they're foreigners, they have their role and the others are the clerks and the bookkeepers, the accountants and the maintenance people, and ipso facto they are lower in the pecking order. The Germans had a little trouble with that relationship and you sometimes had to slap one down a little bit because he was too uppity vis-a-vis taking orders from Washington, or whatever.

Q: Well also I speak as...I went out to Frankfurt as my first post, as a young vice-consul, not knowing anything, and here I was supervising people who knew a lot more about whatever it was than I did. It's a little hard for them. They keep having these new people coming in and telling them what to do, and they often do it better. Were there anything equivalent with labor troubles while you were there?

LAUDERDALE: Not in the Embassy. The Amry and Air Force had a long history of labor troubles, in the sense that the Germans have a fairly strict labor law, they have employee protection systems. And of course the Army and Air Force are used to sovereign immunity, doing as they damn please. So they were fairly regularly...if they wanted to close down a base, or cut the staff at the officer's club or something and lay off ten Germans, the Labor Ministry was over talking to us to get the Army to... You know we had about 250,000 military troops throughout Germany during most of the time I was there, and dependents added on.

Q: How did you find... I mean you were kind of the mayor of this rather unruly group. Diplomats are very nice, but when you put diplomats and their families all together, they don't take control easily, do they?

LAUDERDALE: Well, complicated on the one hand, but easier than you might expect on the other. As you said, it's like being a mayor. You have maybe 400 housing units, 400-500 American employees and their dependents running everything from movies to church to clubs to tennis courts and so forth. So there's lots of areas that could produce strife, management challenges. And of course there were some. That's why they had a big and senior administrative staff. On the other hand, it worked. It worked well, people were by-and-large happy. The morale in Germany, in my experience, would go up and down in almost direct proportion to the exchange rate. There were times when it wasn't very favorable, and the place is almost under siege. Nobody leaves the compound to go out to dinner or take a trip. It's too expensive! They just sort of sit around the compound. But fortunately we had enough activities there. We had ball games and softball teams, a high school with football teams, a teen club, other things, and an American Club, the Embassy Club, to which Germans were admitted; more than half the membership was German. So there were ways you could survive without having to spend a lot of marks out on the economy. And depending on the exchange rate that's what happened, or a lot of grumbling. When the exchange rate was better and people could go out or take a trip, then morale was better.

Q: Any problems that come to mind, just to give an idea of what you might have to deal with?

LAUDERDALE: We started some programs, one was started before I got there that was called the Swap Program, where we swapped -- remember I told you that the housing compound we owned, we had more housing than we needed. So before I came to Bonn the Embassy had swapped some apartment units to the Germans for houses out on the economy. Some previous... I think it was Henry Cabot Lodge, had called Bonn the golden ghetto, and he wanted some of the diplomatic officers to get out of that compound. So we traded some apartments to the Germans for I think about 10 houses. So we had some Political Officers and diplomatic officers out living among the Germans, so to speak. While I was there we sold the Germans two apartment buildings, and we turned over to the Germans the streets. It turns out we had built the streets within the housing compound in '48, five or six streets, regular paved streets, sidewalks, curbs, the whole business, and

everything was our property. The streets, the sidewalks, the buildings, the lawns, everything. And I think the Legal Office had previously ruled that diplomatic immunity applied to the whole area, so if you were a diplomat living in an apartment and you walked across the street to another apartment, you're still in diplomatic territory. So we went to the Germans and told them, we'd like to give you the streets -- and the streetlights and the sidewalks. It worked because we had good relations with the Germans. They said, we're not going to take streets in bad conditions. No potholes or any of that stuff. So you have to bring them up to good maintenance level, all the light bulbs in the streetlights had to work, and we will accept.... So we actually gave the streetlights to the German government. That pattern by the way is happening again right now.

That same pattern is happening now since the Berlin Wall has come down and so forth, the German government is moving to Berlin, we're moving to Berlin in the out years, maybe five to ten. We are now, today, engaged in trading the German government apartments in Bonn -- we've already signed some agreements -- in exchange for some houses in Berlin. So that part works. We also traded some in some of the consulates, in Munich, Stuttgart, and so forth. That was an example of our good relations with the Germans. We could make deals.

Incidentally, after the wall came down, and Germany was reunited, it announced that it intended to move its capital to Berlin. I was DAS for Inspections in OIG. The DCM from Germany was in town and came by to see Sherman Funk. He said that a decision had been made not to build a chancery in Berlin. Said they didn't have the money. They would use the old East Berlin Embassy for the embassy substantive sections, and put consular, administrative and everyone else in the old army space occupied by the U. S. Mission to West Berlin, a 45 minute drive away.

After the meeting, I wrote a memorandum for Sherman Funk's signature, to Admiral Fort, who was the Assistant Secretary for Administration, pointing out that for the U. S. to plead poverty as reason not to build a chancery on out property at the Brandenburg gate would be interpreted by the Germans as a lack of respect for their decision to rebuild a united Berlin. Within out embassy, it would drive a wedge between the two halves of the Foreign Service (something I had fought all my career) by housing them in buildings 45 minutes apart, be dysfunctional by requiring 1 and 1/2 hours travel every day, for those who travel from one building to the other for meetings or other purposes. Somewhat to my surprise, the Inspector General signed this memorandum, and off it went with copies to others. This memorandum caused a re-evaluation within the department, and the decision was made to build a new chancery on our property at the Brandenburg gate, as Britian would also do.

Q: It sounded like a very long, drawn-out process getting out of the...when we first arrived in '45, and the war and the immediate post-war years we had to go in and almost build everything and then it was a slow disassembling of this machine which, as you say, is still going on today, almost 50 years later. Did you have a problem with the pecking order, who got what apartment? Did this end up in your lap?

LAUDERDALE: Yes it did, and no it wasn't a problem, basically. Amazingly few problems of that nature got to my level. There undoubtedly were a lot of back and forth and so forth at lower levels, at mid-grade or among secretaries or clerks or junior officers, I assume there were. But during my years no more than two or three cases reached my level. The reason for that I think is that aside from the houses, the people who built that compound did it right. I have nothing but praise for them. All the apartments were coded as to kind, they had secretarial apartments, executive secretarial apartments, mid-grade officer apartments, senior officer apartments, and so forth. They were all coded; we had six or seven categories in terms of square footage and degree of appointments within the apartment, the quality of the furnishings. We had them all coded and people were assigned to them according to where they fit in the pecking order, their rank, size of family, and so forth. And by and large it worked, there were no great grievances that reached me.

Q: How did you find...was there a problem in sort of dealing with the consulates? We had quite a few consulates given the size of the country, there was Berlin, which was a special case, and there was Hamburg and Frankfurt, and I guess Stuttgart and Munich at that time, and I guess Dusseldorf.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, there were some problems that required my travel. I went down to Munich to deal with some furniture and property issues. In Hamburg we were going to build a new Consul General's residence, didn't work out. But yes, support of the consulates and relations with the consulates was a fairly big part of my job. I dealt with all the entire management, administration, budget support area, the DCM dealt with the principal officers on their substantive issues, the Consul General dealt with them on consular issues. So the three of us each had our little niche in terms of dealing with the consulates. And basically it worked. Relations were good. We had principal officer conferences once or twice a year, get together, talk things over. They would drive up occasionally for consultations. In some cases where they were close like Dusseldorf and Frankfurt, which were only a one or two hour drive away, the ambassador and DCM used to regularly invite them to diplomatic functions at the Embassy, and when it was worthwhile, they would travel that distance to attend diplomatic functions in Bonn.

Q: What was the feeling about the Soviet threat? Again, we're trying to recreate the time. One of the things I assume that would have been on your plate would have been the E&E Plan, emergency evacuation, which was really...what were the Soviets going to...how did we feel about the Soviet threat at that time?

LAUDERDALE: Well obviously it was a big part of our...it was the umbrella under which we all lived, the threat umbrella, the stress umbrella. And dealing with Berlin brought it to the fore practically every day. We had a...not only did we have the Mission in Berlin but we had within Embassy Bonn we had an officer who was full-time Berlin liaison officer, Berlin issues officer, and the Russians or the East Germans or somebody was always causing us a little grief, holding things up at the border, doing something in

Berlin, or a G.I. would go AWOL and cross the border. So there were constant incidents with the Russians or the East Germans that the Embassy had to deal with. It was kind of an irritant that constantly reminded you that there is a Cold War, probably more so than in other countries. And also I think it is generally known that the Americans always considered the Soviet threat more of a threat than anybody else. More than the Germans, the Italians, the French, the Spanish, even the British to some degree, with their Socialist governments or social democratic governments, they weren't that excited about the dangers of Communism. Now, Soviet military threat, yes, but the Communist threat, which in some ways we also hyped in the United States, although those were really two different things, the Soviet military threat and the threat of international communism. The Europeans just didn't get excited about those things, at least not to the degree we did. Nevertheless the British particularly could be tough on Berlin. And we had a group in Bonn, I think it was called the Bonn Group. It was the DCMs, the American, British, French DCMs that met regularly, sometimes even weekly throughout the year to deal with Berlin issues. How to answer this diplomatic note, how to deal with that issue, what kind of protest we should lodge, and so forth. Also the presence of 250,000 or so troops in Germany was an overwhelming aspect of our total environment. Their maneuvers, their training exercises, their GIs who went AWOL or committed crimes, got in the newspaper, often spilled over into the diplomatic arena. So in Embassy Bonn we had a USAREUR liaison officer and an Air Force liaison officer, they were at colonel levels, and of course we in turn had POLADs at their commands. Political advisers, diplomatic officers assigned to Stuttgart and Heidelberg that tried to keep the information flowing both ways so that we could coordinate and deal with these issues smoothly. More or less it worked.

Q: How about the spy problem? One always thinks of Germany as being permeated...this is one of the biggest industries next to Volkswagen is being a spy. How did you deal with the spy business?

LAUDERDALE: Well we were obviously alert to it. We had an intelligence capacity in Bonn and a counterintelligence capacity in Bonn. Most of the espionage that was occurring at that time, and certainly that made it to the press and came into the public domain seemed to be directed a) either at the NATO context, and the spies were in Brussels and often maybe through a non-American in Brussels or against the Germans. You know, Willy Brandt left office because of that. We used to say "A German is a German. You can't tell an East German from a West German." They don't wear labels on their chest. They're Germans, and some of them were East Germans masquerading as West Germans and they were able to penetrate the West German government periodically.
First of all the Germans who worked in the United States Embassy didn't have access to classified material. And while we were alert to such matters, I'm not aware of any espionage incident involving the U.S. Embassy.

Q: Back to something other than say an invasion by the Soviets of West Germany, which didn't happen, did you have which is the second most cataclysmic event, any presidential visits while you were in Bonn?

LAUDERDALE: No.

Q: Then you were very fortunate!

LAUDERDALE: I had two vice presidents at other posts and President Nixon in Brussels, but the President did not come to Germany during my time. We had Secretary Kissinger 13 times, but...

Q: Was he difficult to deal with?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah.

Q: How? In what way?

LAUDERDALE: Well one of the things that complicated life considerably, in more than one way, was that he became Secretary of State from the National Security Council, and he kept both hats. As Chairman of the National Security Council, he had a right to Secret Service Protection. The Secretary of State has always been protected by State Department security people. And when he travels State Department security people...and we're plugged in to those people, we're on the same frequency, our walkie-talkies are on the same frequency. Kissinger would come with Secret Service, all these aliens, they don't know anything about State Department, about Embassies, they've been to the Embassies, but they don't know our Regional Security Officers, they don't know the hierarchy -- the Regional Security Officer reports to the Admin Officer -- the way our own people do. And we didn't fully trust them either, I mean in terms of information. If I were talking to a Regional Security Officer who was protecting the Secretary of State, I would tell him anything, about the Embassy, about the Ambassador-- but when I'm talking to a Secret Service officer, he's outside of my...and they have their own channels, they talk on radio back to the White House -- and that's another issue, they're talking back to the White House, not to the State Department. And this caused some stress in terms of the arrangements. And most of these arrangements are actually dictated by security people. The advance people are security people -- who goes in what car, who goes to what meeting and so forth -- the security people are in that up to their neck. And here they're from another agency! That caused considerable strains on communication. They can talk to the White House and I can't, and I can't talk to them very easy either, the way I could to a State Department security officer, because he probably has a walkie-talkie that I gave him! They've brought their own, with their own frequencies.

And the second thing was that Kissinger was quite imperial. So those two things.

Q: Could you give any feel for...I mean, you say "imperial." What...

LAUDERDALE: Yes. He liked -- I suppose all Secretaries do -- he liked to be attended to, waited on. Everything ready. He expected an officer to be holding his overcoat when

he got ready to go outside. Which is okay. Matter of fact I held his coat once. What we found annoying was that he wanted all this service, which is okay, but he didn't want people around. So the order I got, because I had around 15 people supporting his visit, the order I got was "keep your people out of sight, out of the way, keep them behind the scenes. Kissinger doesn't like to see all these minions standing around." Well, I can understand that too. But you take that to such an extreme that you've got to hold his coat but you've got to be out of sight. How do you do that? He was tough. Kissinger was a tough guy. But that's okay, he was a tough policy guy too. As I told you earlier about Hillenbrand. Effective, but I was just giving you a little sense of style there.

Q: Did the fall of Vietnam have any particular impact... I mean here we were holding the line in Germany and all, and we tried to hold the line in Vietnam and it didn't work out. And in the spring of '75 we pulled out in great disarray from Vietnam. Did you feel that?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. A couple of things. It improved our relationship with several European countries, including the Swedes and some others that had not supported our efforts in Vietnam. They didn't see the threat in the same way we did. It also lessened, diminished considerably all the demonstrations we used to get, graffiti on Embassy walls and rallies against Vietnam. That all went away. So I think that at least in some superficial way, I don't know how deep it went, the pulling out of U.S. troops and disengagement in Vietnam contributed to better relationships with Europeans. It removed a little thorn that was in the side there.

Q: Well speaking of pulling out, just about that time you pulled out. What happened?

LAUDERDALE: I was assigned to be Admin Counselor in Spain from Bonn in 1975. Similar circumstances -- Wells Stabler was coming out as a new Ambassador. I think the tour of the previous adminstrative officer may not have been up, but I remember that Stabler wanted a new Admin Counselor and he wanted what he considered to be a first class, competent, active, can-doer, and it was worked out that I was the guy. I had been in Bonn three years, and Stabler, unlike Hillenbrand, was tough. One might say difficult, but certainly hard, and that made itself felt right from the beginning. I was due home leave, and I've got a wife and kids. So I was going to leave in June when my time was up, go on home leave, and report to Madrid in August. He said "No." So I said "Well I haven't had home leave." He said "Nothing goes on here in August. I don't need you here in August, the whole country goes off to the countryside on vacation. I want you to come in June and then you can go on home leave in August." So I said, well how do I do this? I've got to arrange it as kind of a direct transfer, deferred home leave. I'll raise it with Washington. They approved it. So I went direct, left my family behind, direct to Madrid in June and worked in Madrid in June and July, went on home leave with my family in August, and came back in September. And when I got there in June he told me "This is a sleepy little Mediterranean post that we're bringing into the 20th century. We're going to make it a first class Embassy, you and me. So pull up your bootstraps and get at it!"

Q: What was the political situation like...you were in Spain from '75 to '79. Let's start when you arrived. What was the political situation like at that time, as we saw it?"

LAUDERDALE: Franco was dictator. He had been dictator ever since the civil war. He ran the country with an iron grip, with the Guardia Civil. He controlled the press. There was elements of a rough Parliament, which he controlled. Basically a police state. He was getting on in years, was in ill health. Was expected to die several times even before I came. Somebody told me, "You may be in Spain when Franco dies. Two successive tours of officers have thought they were going to be in Spain when Franco dies." He outlived their tours. So when Franco was going to die and who was going to succeed him was a big part of the reporting. And how its going to...is there going to be another civil war? Will there be strife? Transition to democracy, is it going to be another military takeover, some other general going to step into his boots? So keeping up with that was a full-time occupation.

Because of this sleepy little Mediterranean post thing, because it was a military dictatorship, the role of our military attachés was very important because the press were controlled and the Parliament was limited the role of our intelligence agencies was important. So it was basically a military/intelligence post. Our political officers were a little bit in the backwash. No democracy, no press, no parliamentarians to go talk to. The people who know something are the generals, so we send our colonel over to deal with that. Economic affairs was low-key. Of course if Franco died and it became a democracy or a democratic monarchy, that changes things. That's what Stabler anticipated and he was 100% right.

Q: Okay, you're the Administrative Counselor and you're going to turn this sleepy Mediterranean post into a 20th century dynamo. From your perspective and the Ambassador's perspective, what did you do?

LAUDERDALE: I worked on infrastructure and some basic services. Get the telephone answered when it rings. We'd got a 19th century switchboard with inadequate lines, the old pull-cord type. So one of my programs was to get a new, modern switchboard so that we don't need three operators to pull cords when one or two could do it pushing a few buttons. And maybe the phone gets answered. Beefing up the duty officer situation so we're in operation 24 hours a day seven days a week. First class! None of this business that we can't find a duty officer, school will keep til Monday. Office space arrangements. Getting the telegrams distributed earlier within the Mission and getting enough copies. Which was the same story, they had old copying machines that were slow and didn't make enough copies and you couldn't make copies in color and this and that. So I revamped all that to get better communications going. Things along that line.

What dominated the staff meetings at that time was Franco's death. Franco was going to die practically every day. It used to take up all the time of all the staff meetings, and we would get urinalysis reports from the military attaché who got them from the Army doctor. His urinalysis shows that he's got bile in his liver or whatever and he's going to

die within 24 hours. The station chief sent out a critic message that Franco had died. Ambassador Stabler called me at home about 10 o' clock at night, demanding to know how he could send out a telegram when he chose, but the Ambassador had to give two hours notice to do so. Apparently the station chief had given him that excuse for sending out a critic message instead of reporting to the ambassador to do so. I explained that he had a communicator standing by at the embassy, in case he were needed, but we had to call one in for duty when required, because we did not have the overtime money to keep one on duty routinely, and he did. Stabler said this was unacceptable. I suggested he tell the station chief not to send cables without his permission instead of chastising me about the communications structure; he said "you let me worry about that." Well it turned out that franco had not died, they put him on a dialysis machine. They had to send a cancellation to the critic message.

But one day he did die. It was about the first year of my time there, it must have been '76. And Stabler was kind of doing the same thing I was. He was getting a first class team. He got Frank McNeil as Political Counselor, which was an excellent choice. So he was on hand and in place when Franco died. When the Spanish wanted to talk about a new constitution or parliamentary democracy we had Frank McNeil there who could...we might have brought experts from the States, probably did, but Frank had a lot of this stuff right in his head. And he did a lot of groundwork with the foreign affairs people and with parliamentarians and so forth. And Stabler had excellent contacts, right from the King on down to discuss all of these issues. So I think the U.S. was able to play a facilitating role and offer some good counsel in the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Q: What were our concerns with Franco gone? What were the issues and the problems?

LAUDERDALE: Well one real problem, which actually occurred later, was the threat of a military coup. Not exactly a coup, but that some other military general would step in and say "I'm going to succeed Franco." Of course our goal was to move Spain, or to see Spain move to a parliamentary democracy. And as you may recall, the sword was passed to King Juan Carlos as the sovereign, with a parliamentary democracy, with a prime minister, and there was actually on the floor of Parliament, and a colonel with a machine gun and they were going to close down Parliament and take over the government. And King Juan Carlos was able to cut that off with his charisma and leadership. So that was the real threat we were all worried about.

The second thing was to make it governable. You don't need a lot of fragmented parties like you had in Italy, where nobody had a majority, nobody could rule. There was also concerns about retribution, the same thing we're concerned about now in Haiti. When you change from a Franco government to a non-Franco government there's a lot of people who have grievances going back to the civil war. Are some of those people going to come out on the streets? Is there going to be a new civil war? Are there going to be killings in retribution for what happened in '36? Or even '56? Mostly that didn't happen. Mostly it worked. There were some strikes of course.

Q: What was our estimate before Franco's death...I mean obviously you're sitting in on country team meetings and all, what were you getting the impression of Juan Carlos...he became King, later he gained in stature, but before something happened what was sort of the feeling about him?

LAUDERDALE: Favorable, but with some kind of lingering doubts because he had kept a low profile. He hadn't really stepped forward and said "This is who I am, this is what I stand for and this is where I'm going to take Spain." I think he felt he couldn't do that with Franco alive, so he stayed in the shadows and nobody knew for sure what kind of sovereign he was going to be. So there were some doubts, some 'let's watch carefully,' but with an overlay of optimism. He seems to be the right guy, he seems to want to go where we want to go. So, general favorable impression but some doubts because that impresison wasn't based on in-depth knowledge.

Q: Well, on a more practical level, here you were, you were going to turn it into the 20th century. You've just some from Germany, where you have an extremely competent -- maybe overcompetent -- foreign service national staff, how did you find the Spanish employees of our Embassy?

LAUDERDALE: Very good. Very competent, none of this "siesta" kind of stuff that you might visualize. Basically we cranked up the tempo, and some people told me to my face, Clint, you guys ruined that post. Spain used to be a "good" post, why you could go out there for two or three years and play golf out at the airbase on Friday afternoon and have weekends to yourself to travel, and you guys are out there were working the ass off of people. Coming in on Saturday and you don't have time for golf! Well, that's exactly what happened. Two of my staff members were out playing golf on Friday afternoon when I arrived. I stopped it. I said "no golf on duty hours." I was a real you guess what, I was a real son of a bitch. So we cranked up the tempo. We had more work and we mostly did it with the same number of people. There were some shifts in staffing, I think we got another economic officer, we got a political officer, and we probably cut an intelligence agent and a military attaché to make up for it. But the volume of production and work probably doubled. So it was a spinning operation when I left.

Q: On the death of Franco was there a change in the nature of our representation? Did you see a real change in how one dealt with the Spanish?

LAUDERDALE: Ambassador Stabler, yes. And it caused some stress within the Mission. Our three colonel-level officers, Army, Air Force, Navy, they were used to dealing with the Spanish officials on a lot of business. They were used to seeing the Minister of Defense, and Stabler reined them in. He said, "I'm the Ambassador here and I will deal with Cabinet officers. You will not. No member of this staff will call on a Cabinet officer without my approval and advance knowledge. And I may want to go and interview them myself. And I may want to take you with me and I may not." The response was "You can't do that. Why can't we go and see the Secretary of Defense? Why we're old drinking buddies!" And he said "I don't care. You're not going." He moved it out of the military-

intelligence arena into the diplomatic arena. And more work shifted from the military officers, who used to get the information from the military, to the diplomatic officers who were now getting it from the Foreign Office, parliamentarians, from the Prime Minister's office, and so forth. So it changed the emphasis of our reporting, it changed the source of our information as this occurred.

Q: Just to emphasize what you're saying is that one of the problems we have with governments that are basically totalitarian is that the relationship between intelligence officers and military officers and their counterparts gets to be a little too chummy, a little too cozy. We're too comfortable with the situation and we become part of the problem instead of trying to further what are essentially American interests, which is the free, open give-and-take rather than the closed little circle. Is that your feeling?

LAUDERDALE: I think that's right and I think Spain was an example of it. What we were doing in Spain was cozying up to the military, who were in power there -- when I say we, I'm, talking about the military officers in the Embassy -- and their relationships were kind of military-to-military and they got invited over to military clubs for a drink and they had the colonels and generals out to their house for a drink and the whole thing was really very cozy. And they cooperated and exchanged information, without the equivalent occurring in the diplomatic arena.

Q: Looking at this, I was in Athens between '70 and '74, where that kind of thing was happening too. And it blew up in our face. Was the example of being too close to the colonels in Wells Stabler's mind at all, because he was coming out of EUR at the time. I mean, did you get any feeling that he was looking at this as being sort of a bad example, because the repercussions were just being felt when he arrived?

LAUDERDALE: I think what you and I said about what happens in military dictatorships, I'm sure Stabler knew that and felt that, but I don't think that was his primary motive. I think his primary motive was to take control, to manage the relationship with Spain himself, and to do it with diplomatic officers like Frank McNeil who know about diplomacy and constitutional law and democracy and so forth. That was the keel upon which he wanted to base our relationships with Spain, and to do that, he's got to put the military down, put them in place. He can't have them going off independently, doing their own thing, and saying God knows what outside his control. So he brought them in control and he shifted the emphasis to Frank McNeil and his staff.

Q: Well one of the problems I would think would be that no matter how you slice it, the air bases there and Rota, the submarine naval base, can get to be a controlling element as the Azores were...everything we did with Portugal was based on the base in the Azores. Did you all feel the heavy weight of trying to keep those bases going?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, yes, and it was a source of stress. The presence of Torrejon particularly, that's the big air base next to Madrid. The naval base, the submarine base at Rota, was from a strategic standpoint probably more important to us, but it was off to one

side and it wasn't an embarrassment to the Spanish the way this big airbase right outside the capital, with all these Americans out there and these fighter planes coming in and taking off, and the GIs from the base smoking pot or getting arrested -- all these were potential political problems for the Spanish. So we had to walk softly on that. Also, Spain was very conscious of their sovereignty, they were very afraid and very tough on the issue of our using Torrejon as a launching base for non-Spanish operations, in the Middle East or somewhere else. So even if we're headed off to bomb Qadhafi or something, we're not going to land at the Spanish airbase and refuel or something else without their permission, and mostly they didn't want us to do it.

Q: This came up in '73, particularly during the '73 war between Israel and Syria and Egypt.

LAUDERDALE: It came up many times when I was there, including some cases involving Qadhafi, when we wanted to send planes over to make a point or whatever and for convenience or geography or whatever they wanted to refuel at Torrejon, and they said "No, we don't want you to."

Q: I think we've mentioned all of them, but what would you call your main problems while you were there. Anything that we haven't talked about?

LAUDERDALE: No. I can summarize... Our major problems were infrastructure, the telephone system, office space -- we built an annex on the chancery -- we expected with the democratization process that the cost of operations, the travel would increase, the visa workload would increase. We had to prepare for that. You don't wait until they're standing in the waiting room. So we remodeled the consular section. Simultaneously we were doing things on security. So we remodeled and enlarged the consular section, we put in bulletproof interview windows for security reasons. We built an extra wing so some of the operations could be consolidated -- Administration, GSO. We got better communications equipment, we improved the security of the vault, the communications vault so that we could operate really 24 hours a day, seven days a week on alert basis. And ginning up the tempo.

Q: How did you find the...was there a chage in dealing with the Spanish government with the demise of Franco, from your point of view.

LAUDERDALE: Yes, after Franco died obviously our way of doing business and all our contacts and relationships changed markedly. There was a period of a few months when there was some stress, dealing with the palace where Franco had lived and dealing with Mrs. Franco's aspirations and demands. But by and large the Embassy disengaged from dealing with the Franco aides and Franco household and so forth. There was an election, an elected prime minister. So you now had a constitutional monarch, an elected prime minister, you had the Cortes, a parliament, so our business was with the prime minister, the prime minister's cabinet and his aides and members of the Cortes whom we wanted to influence and also learn their views. And of course the Ambassador met periodically with

the King. The Secretary of State came, I think still Kissinger at that time, and called on King Juan Carlos, and they made some arrangement whereby the Secretary of State would visit Spain once a year. That still happens to my knowledge, it may change because of the NATO relationship. Spain was not in NATO. The U.S. met with NATO officials, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense met with NATO every year and here's Spain out in the cold. So, the Secretary of State will come to Spain every year. So it did change quite a bit, yes.

Q: Did you find when you arrived that the social life and all was around sort of what passed for the nobility? Was it captured by "high society" of the Franco era, as opposed to a more representational thing?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. Exactly, it was.

Q: Because I had a feeling that again, not only on the military and intelligence side but on the diplomatic side it's very easy to get caught up with the not very influential but high society of a country. Socially prominent, they've got the money and the houses and they entertain well.

LAUDERDALE: And they like the Americans...

Q: They like diplomats dangling around and all...

LAUDERDALE: That's it, you've got it.

Q: This is one of the curses of our business, and how you disengage from that. Did Terence Todman come while you were there?

LAUDERDALE: Yes he did.

Q: Now he's another old hand, but coming from quite a different area. How did he use you, and what was your impression of how he operated?

LAUDERDALE: He came...he had been Ambassador twice, but just as important he had been Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. When he first arrived we found his style a little bit imperial. More demanding of support and services than a small Embassy can provide. The Bureau could provide, in terms of press briefings, translations of major press articles by 8:00 every morning. It was a fairly big strain. He was also very much of a written person, as opposed to Stabler who was oral. You could tell Stabler almost anything orally. Todman wanted things in writing more often, and as you know writing takes more time, etc. etc. So, on the other hand, he wasn't the hard driver that Stabler was. Stabler was kind of a hard driver, demanding on the staff in terms of output. Todman was softer, one might say, he wasn't as demanding in that way which offered a little respite, on

the other hand he tended to demand...his immediate office required more support. But I must say he was very effective in dealing with the Spanish and I thought he had the right attitude. On some occasions in staff meetings and such where I saw him correct officers, I thought he was absolutely right.

Q: Could you give a feel for what his thrust was where maybe the officers might be disagreeing?

LAUDERDALE: We had some dispute with the Spanish about the use of Torrejon Air Base, and we had an officer who almost every day, full time, would call the Spanish every day based on cables coming in from the military wanting 3 F-15s to land tomorrow or two C-30s, and the Spanish required that we get approval for every one. That were outside of the planes that were stationed there. These were planes that would stop and do something and go on. I think our officer tended to talk tough to the Spanish on these issues, because sometimes they might say no or whatever, and he felt he had to push and demand and so forth. And I remember on that issue and another issue Todman asked: "Aren't we supposed to have friendly relations with the Spanish? Why don't we tell them that's what we're here for? We want friendly relations. We want to treat them fairly and we want to be treated fairly, and here's our need and can you help us. Let's watch out for the desk-pounding and strong language, because I don't think that's how you promote friendly relations. I don't think that's even going to get you a positive response!" And it seemed to work. We didn't always get our way, but...

Q: Again, you left there in 1979. What was your feeling about whither Spain and all, at that point?

LAUDERDALE: I was very hopeful. My concern was primarily about the economic side of Spain. Two or three things happened when King Juan Carlos came into power and democracy, along with that came a lot of abuse, a lot of pent-up resentment that produced abuse. The press wasn't a self-disciplined press. Suddenly you could buy Playboy magazine which had been banned for 30 years, so guess what, the newsstands were just filled with girly magazines, just to excess. Boys and girls who weren't allowed to kiss and hold hands on the park benches for 30 years now would kiss and hold hands not only on the park bench but in restaurants and just about everywhere else! Crime went up. There was no crime before, at least you didn't know of any because it wasn't reported in the press. And the Guardia Civil ran a tight ship. Now there was rampant crime, pickpockets all over the place. There was a demonstration...I had a good relationship with the chief of police, who was an army colonel, until they got democracy. There was a demonstration while I was there and the police beat up a number of demonstrators, which caused quite a flurry. I had lunch with the chief of police and he told me "You know, I have a hell of a time re-directing the police. They've been used to beating people with a club for 30 years when they don't get out of the way or do what they're told. And I'm trying to tell them this is democracy now, and we don't hit people over the head, you can steer these crowds down dead-end streets or cul-de-sacs to get them out of the way. There are other

techniques we can use to defuse these crowds without hurting a lot of people." So I was confident that some of these things would peter out, and it did, and it all worked.

The economic side -- unemployment was high, the economy was kind of stagnant, and that took a little time. It's still true today, by the way, even through they joined the Common Market and the economy is up, unemployment is higher in Spain today than most other countries. So they still have an economic struggle.

Q: Well, when you left in '79, you came back for a relatively short time to Washington, didn't you?

LAUDERDALE: I came back for five years, but I was in my first job only for a year. I was director of recruitment and employment for the State Department from 1979-80.

Q: What does that job entail?

LAUDERDALE: It has three divisions: recruitment, examination, and employment. The examination side is exclusively foreign service. You know for civil service employees the civil service, OPM, administers tests and determines eligibility for competitive ranking, to get hired. But for foreign service, the State Department does all of that itself. So it's running the foreign service officer examination, the written and oral examinations, all of the other things, producing the register of eligibles, hiring new FSOs and Foreign Service secretaries and communicators into classes. That's the recruitment and examination part. Employment is basically getting people on board, on duty. So I was in...I'll tell you I had a real trauma. I still remember the day I reported for duty, on August 20, 1979, and there was a memo scotch-taped to my desk and it said: "You have an appointment with the Secretary of State in 10 days." it gave a date and time and said -"Be there!"

He was very unhappy about...This was Secretary Cyrus Vance. and Ben Reed was Under Secretary for Management and Harry Barnes was Director General. Ben Reed and Secretary Vance were very, very unhappy about minority recruitment and women into the Foreign Service. They had set goals--they called them goals, not quotas--those goals had not been met. They were annoyed. And I guess somebody said we've got a new director coming and I guess the Secretary said: "I want to see him." So I went to a meeting with those four with some others about ten days after I...and we all got chewed out was basically what it was. We were admonished and reprimanded for not doing better.

Q: Well, you knew this shoe was going to drop. You arrived and you knew this was going to be the issue.

LAUDERDALE: I didn't know that it would dominate my job the way it did.

Q: Well just to get the atmosphere -- you've just arrived, you're the new boy, you know you're going to see the Secretary of State, you know that goals have been set and all this.

So you assemble your staff, what were they telling you was the problem? What were you getting about the system before you had any control over it about what the problem was?

LAUDERDALE: I'll use the word infrastructure again, it's probably not the best word, but the infrastructure, the bureaucracy, was not designed to bring in large numbers of women and minorities on a short-term basis, so it didn't work. The other thing is that the very nature of the Foreign Service is not conducive to bringing in mid-level people. They had two programs, a junior officer program and a mid-level program, and the Foreign Service is not conducive to bringing in mid-level people. So in thumbnail those were the two major barriers. And my ability to do anything about it is very limited.

Q: I've had dealings with...I was with the Board of Examiners at one point, around '75-'76, and the thing with bringing mid-level people in, they're a different kind of cat, coming from outside the Foreign Service. I'm told that even today it doesn't work because they come in and they don't understand and they're not very good!

LAUDERDALE: I was in that job for one year and I'll tell you, I compromised most of my principles. I came from a personnel background, I was a personnel officer for three years before I came into the Foreign Service. Not only was I a personnel officer, I was a merit systems officer. I helped create and establish and operate merit systems. And most of the principles that I learned and believed in I had to compromise when I was in this job. And as you say, we brought in the mid-level -- before I came Secretary Vance had set a goal of 20 mid-levels for five years, to bring in 100 officers. By the time it was all over, we did it in six or seven years, we brought in 120 officers. Most of them are not in the Foreign Service today. They didn't survive, they didn't prosper. We've got a few, but there was a lot of slippage and wastage in the process.

Q: When I was with the Board of Examiners were mainly civil servants who were working on the EEO side of things who would read the notice first and apply, and they really weren't of the same caliber at all as people who had come through the Foreign Service. We're talking about competitiveness, not just being our type, but they just couldn't write very well and weren't very responsive to foreign affairs problems. But that was my impression, what was yours?

LAUDERDALE: That's basically right. Let's talk first a bit about structure. One of the structural problems you know is about the merit system. What is a merit system? The civil service system is a merit system, you have to compete for appointment, you have to be examined in some form or other, you have to be ranked among the best qualified. If you do all of that you can be selected by a selecting official and you can be hired. Having gone through that process you are then assured certain protections. You are protected for being fired for political reasons, you were hired on the basis of merit and you were given tenure. Now Foreign Service is a merit system too, the law says it is a merit system, not the same as the civil service, but a merit system. And we have some parallel systems to meet the same principles. We have an FSO written examination, an oral examination, an

evaluation of training and experience and health and security and conduct and behavior and we rank order people and hire them off registers into the Foreign Service.

The minorities and women that we're talking about don't go through that process. Well how are they going to meet the merit test? You can't just hire them, that's illegal. Well, there was a pre-existing structure that they grabbed onto. There's a provision in the Foreign Service Act that says if you have three years of civil service experience, that is to say, if you've got tenure, because the civil service has a three-year career conditional element, you're tenured into the government merit system and therefore you can be tenured into the Foreign Service. So to qualify to become an FSO you had to have three years of government experience. Now a lot of these candidates didn't have three years of government experience. We were appointing people in those days in State, domestic and overseas, in Foreign Service reserve appointments. We would hire people from outside the government, as FSR appointees, Foreign Service reserve appointees, where they would have to serve for three years. Then they could be converted to Foreign Service Officers. To do that they had to take a lateral entry examination. There was a good reason for that structure. That structure pre-existed, it was not set up for minorities and women, it was set up to help the Foreign Service meet its needs and still comply with the merit system. So they used that structure for the minorities and womens' programs at the mid-level, not for junior officers. So they had to be recruited and selected initially, and they were given an oral examination,, to be hired, and then three years later they had to go through another examination to become an FSO. A lot of them didn't make it. The system wasn't working. And it came to be that the FSO oral and remaining lateral entry examination was called the second oral. So then some people who thought progress wasn't enough wanted to know why did we have a second oral? Well it wasn't really a second oral, it was the Foreign Service examination! The first oral was just an employment interview. So using that structure was one of the first problems.

Another one was that if you want to recruit minorities and women, particularly into an elitist organization, like the Foreign Service where you have highly educated, highly motivated, highly competitive people, you can't just throw people into that career at mid-level. If you want to recruit minorities and women you have to head hunt. You have to do it on an individual level, you can't throw nets out like you're fishing for tuna and see what comes in! And that's what they were doing. Head hunting was not authorized. Head hunting was taboo!

Q: My impression was a couple of years before in this, this was just a notice that went out to civil service places and we were getting...

LAUDERDALE: Ads in newspapers...

Q: And we were getting the people who read it first, often the EEO people, which is not the cream of the crop in any organization. It may not be fair, but this is not the place where somebody who is a real go-getter if they're a minority...

LAUDERDALE: And then the third structural barrier was, well, you came in the Foreign Service Officer system and I did, and it's a two-year process! So for the junior officer program streamlined a little bit you might be able to do it in a year. And for the mid-level, if it's streamlined, you might be able to do it in a year. They wanted it done next month! They called me on August 21st or whatever it was, talking about the September class! We had an FSO class every two months. "There are no minorities in the September FSO class, so Lauderdale, go get some." Wait a minute, this is a two-year process and you want me to get some for next month?? So that was my problem.

Q: Did you find yourself in a position of wanting to say, Oh for God's sakes, just go stuff..."

LAUDERDALE: No, although I did have to face some issues later, and I did some things I'm ashamed of, probably ought to have gotten fired for. In the middle of September I got a phone call that said "Ben Reed said to cancel the September FSO class", after I said I'll look into it and I gave them a report that said I couldn't get any minorities, it's too short, it's impossible. I got word back to cancel the FSO class. So I went to my staff and I found out that they had sent cables to some 35 people that said "give notice to your employer, quit your job, kiss your wife, sell your house, report to Washington." And I'm going to cancel it? I said "No I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to create those inequities and hardships and maybe get lawsuits against the State Department." And even if they don't sue, the amount of ill will is just endless, and it will haunt you for years!

So I said I'm not going to do it. So the first thing I did was nothing. I didn't pull the plug, I didn't give any orders, I didn't pass along the order. It was only about two weeks hence anyway. I waited about two weeks and sent a message saying "I'm sorry, it's too late. My staff tells me that you can't do that. Some people are en route, checking into hotels here in Washington." I got by with it! I was sweating blood! I was never prepared to be insubordinate to an Under Secretary for Management, but that was an example of things that I did that I'm not proud of, but...

Now you asked a question about... Here's what happened. We had standards and we had cutoffs so that enough candidates were not getting through the screen. The problem was the quality of the candidates. But there were pressures to lower the screen. And we lowered the cutoff score... I've forgotten the numbers now but just to illustrate, we were using a cutoff score of 70, and if we reduced the cutoff score to 65, I can pick up another 30 candidates to come into processing. And we did that. The decision was made to do that.

Q: Was this only for minorities?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, women were only eligible for the mid-level. If we lowered the score to 62, we could get so many more. But I looked at the quality of those candidates and I didn't know what to do. I was troubled. We needed the candidates, we needed a bigger pool. So I conferred with Bob Gershenson, who was the Deputy Assistant

Secretary, and Harry Barnes, the Director General, and I told them the problem. That to have a pool big enough, we need to reduce the score to 62, but from 65 to 62, that group, which are another 20 people or so, are marginal. Some of them may make it, many of them won't, and I'm troubled about admitting them and I seek your advice. They both said no, don't do it. So I didn't. So we didn't take numbers where we thought the failure rate would be 50% or so, but we did go down to 65, where we thought the failure rate would be 30%. So basically what I did to keep the system going was I just worked harder. I worked harder, I worked faster, I intervened personally, I called candidates on the phone. We got the security clearance of a Hispanic candidate from San Antonio on a Friday, that we had been pushing for all week. An FSO class was starting on Monday, and I called that candidate on the phone and asked him if he could be in Washington on Monday. If you can, I'm offering you a job and asking you to come. And he said, "Well, gee, I have to give my employer notice." So I said, "Well, just walk out. Leave him a note, call him on Monday." He said "I'm going to be treating a lot of people shabbily here," and I said "Just do it, do it and come. I'll give you a letter later if you want." But we did that. Just crummy behavior. He came, by the way, and joined the class. But I felt awful about that kind of stuff.

Q: Did you feel there was a problem, something within the infrastructure that was not reaching out to the right people to get more minorities, or was it that the interest and the pool just wasn't there. I've heard people say, well, we concentrated too much on the traditionally black colleges, which have never really been competitive, with the exception maybe of Howard. But if you really want it to go, you've got to go to the Harvards, the Yales, the top schools in the United States who also for a long time have been making special efforts to get this. And the traditional black colleges are not the way to go. Were you able to go the recruiting people and say change it around?

LAUDERDALE: Well today we do not, but in those days we had two programs; we had the regular FSO written examination recruitment program and we had a minority junior officer recruitment program. Now for the regular JO recruitment program our goal has always been to get a significant number of minorities through that process, let's say 10, 15, 20%, more or less proportionate to the population, through the regular.... It is futile to try to do that by going to the historically black colleges, because they can't pass the written examination. Black or white, if you go to a second class school you're not going to pass. I went to Berkeley and had to take the exam three times! Stanford candidates can't pass the first time, some do, but many don't. It's a tough exam, a very tough exam. You have to be a top-flight student at a top-flight university to pass this exam. So it's no use recruiting at secondary or third level universities. They can't pass it. And that's what they were doing. And that's where most of our minority JOs were coming from. The mistake I think we make, we don't need that many minorities, we recruit a couple of hundred officers a year, what do we need, 30 or 40? You have to recruit them individually. You have to do it on the basis of personal contact. That's the way IBM and AT&T do it. We just throw nets to the wind, we send an officer down to Atlanta to talk to historically black colleges. One officer talking to a room of 30, 40, 50 people, no personal contact. You're not going to recruit top-flight candidates that way. If you want to get an MBA out

of Harvard, or someone with a Master's degree in economics -- which is what their white counterparts have -- or a Master's degree candidate out of Tufts School of Law and Diplomacy or Georgetown School of Foreign Service, you've got to talk to the man or the woman. You've got to go see them and say I want to recruit you to the Foreign Service. We don't do that. We put ads in papers, we speak to groups of 30 or 40, and we wait to see what comes up. And the really good, the really successful, who can go out and make a place in the economy, they don't come to us in sufficient numbers. That's the problem in my opinion, then and now.

Q: What were some of the other issues that you were dealing with. Let's concentrate on this one time.

LAUDERDALE: The Junior Officer Program and the Mid-Level Minorities and Women Program completely monopolized my time. I didn't really have time to work on any other issues, except one. A major contribution I made, I think, is we approached the Educational Testing Service to recruit, to score candidates by cone. We had tried various systems. We had required candidates to specify at the time of application what kind of a cone they wanted...

Q: Cone being...

LAUDERDALE: This would be a kind of specialty within the FSO Corps. The cones were Political, Economic, Administrative, and Consular. We had various techniques over time. At one time the candidate had to specify which of the four at time of application. But they had no knowledge. We tried that for two or three years and then threw that out. We tried recruiting everybody without regard to cone. That didn't work very well. But I thought that we could do both. So I said to the Educational Testing Service, now that we have computers can't we designate each question on the exam as administrative, consular, economic, political, or general or all or whatever, and based on the score of the candidates come out with a profile that says his score as an administrative candidate is 60, as a political candidate is 70, as an economic candidate is 80 and as consular is 32. They said "Yes." I said, "Let's do it!" And let's put people on multiple registers, the same candidate, and his place on each register is based on his score on the exam. And then we call up the candidate and say: "We offer you a job in the Foreign Service as an economic officer." And he says "Oh, I don't want to be economic, I want to be political." And you say, "Well, you're a third way down in the register, if you want to wait you can wait, if you want to take this, you can take this. You can do whatever you want." It was his decision what to do.

That, I thought, ...because we had the women's class action suit hanging over us, and they had been making for years conal determinations administratively, and these administrative determination of cones resulted in a lawsuit that said that it wasn't done objectively, it wasn't being done impartially and without bias. So I wanted to make it scientific. So I presented that channel to the Director General and it was approved and we implemented it. It's been thrown out since (because the exam was biased), but it lasted

several years. I thought that was the way to do it. So that's one of the contributions I made.

Q: Well, give a little feel of the atmospherics. You mentioned the women's suit. It was a women's class action suit which they eventually won, wasn't it?

LAUDERDALE: They lost in District Court and they won on appeal. The issue was whether they had been discriminated against in recruitment, employment, assignments, promotions, awards, and conal designations.

Q: Did that affect what you were doing at the time? Was this part of...?

LAUDERDALE: Oh yeah, sure. I testified in the women's class action suit. And I supervised later, because I was only in this job for a year, and then I moved up to DAS for Personnel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, I supervised the presentation of all the documentation to the lawyers for the womens' class action suit, answered their questions and so forth and then gave testimony personally.

Q: What was your impression at the time, after coming in and out of Washington...We had a Secretary of State who had, who was coming from the idea that...and also the Carter administration which was very strong on minorities and women's representation and all, up against the sort of corps of the Foreign Service. What was your impression of the State Department and the people who were involved, not just the Secretary of State but on down, in the problem, how they were looking at it and all.

LAUDERDALE: I thought they were making a lot of mistakes. Earlier in my career I had never really dealt with the most senior level. When I dealt with the State Department I was dealing with an institution, so from Madrid and within here, I saw a lot of what I considered to be bad decisions. I'm not talking about diplomacy now, I'm taking about internal management of the State Department, the Foreign Service. And my disillusionment was to learn that those decisions were made at the very highest level, by Secretary of State Vance, or Under Secretaries. I thought some bureaucrat made them, or that Gershenson made them, and I was going to help them fix them. And I found out that the Ben Reeds of this world are making them and you couldn't do anything about it.

Q: Were these decisions made just off the top of the hat or were they being done to be, which term was not then in use but is in use today, to be politically correct?

LAUDERDALE: This business of canceling the September class two weeks before it was to start. That's the epitome of a bad decision.

Q: This sounds like spite. it sounds like somebody saying, "Well, if the system can't respond to me then I'm going to stick it to them."

LAUDERDALE: That's exactly what it was. We're going to punish the bureaucracy because the bureaucracy is not responding to us. Even today you hear this same talk, that minorities are under-represented, I had heard Perry over at Secretary of Defense saying minorities are under-represented, and that's what they told me then. If Ben Reed or Secretary Vance had given the Office of Recruitment maybe as little as $200,000 for travel money and for officers to go out and do what I said was required, to press flesh and personally recruit people -- I did a little of that personally, I got two trips, I went to Puerto Rico and recruited some Hispanics down there and I went to Los Angeles and tried to recruit some Asians. I got two trips. If we had a couple of hundred thousand in travel money we could recruit minorities. Do you think they would give us $200,000? Well, it's not THAT important!

Q: I thought we might close this session with one final question. We've talked about ethnic things, but what about women? Women come through at about 51% of the nation, and they also, even in this period, were coming through the best universities at about the same level as the so-called white male officer. They were getting the same education. The problem with the recruitment of minorities, mainly Hispanic and black, was that they weren't getting the same quality education. But women were. So I would think that getting the right number of women would not be a problem. Or was there a problem?

LAUDERDALE: No, at the junior level there was not a problem. Well, it's a problem depending on how you define the problem. If you define the problem as needing a proportion of the population, then we weren't. We were not getting 50% women. If you define the problem the way I defined it and some others defined it, we were doing quite well. If you do a study, which we did, of what kind of university degrees provide the background to be a Foreign Service Officer, then you come up with six or seven, history, political science, international relations, economics, foreign studies, and so forth. If you then go over to the Education Department and find out how many women major in these subjects and you get the percentages, we were able to meet those percentages. Because the percentage of American women who go to the university and major in these subjects was something like 25%. And 25% of FSOs were women. It's now more like 30.

So the problem with women was the hierarchy profile. The number of ambassadors, of minister-counselors, middle-grade officers. The reason for that problem is very clear and very simple, but I had a hell of a time explaining it. I explained to them that I am a senior officer, white male, because I was a junior officer white male 15 years ago. And 15 years ago there were no women junior officers. They were 3%. So don't worry that there are only 3% of senior officers, that's the reason. And the way to fix that is through time. You fix it at the bottom and 15 years later it's solved.

Q: An Under Secretary for Management or a Secretary of State is in at most four years, probably less than that.

LAUDERDALE: They don't want to wait.

Q: They've got to prove their point right away.

LAUDERDALE: They don't want to wait 15 years. They don't trust that you'll do it in 15 years. They want it done this year, and the only way to do that is bring them in at mid level.

Q: OK, Clint, you remember what we were talking about. You became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, where you served from 1980-84. Now exactly what were you doing? What was your bailiwick.

LAUDERDALE: There were two DAS's. The other one, who was Ron Palmer at first and later Andy Steigman, had Foreign Service counseling and assignments. Kind of a biggie on the Foreign Service side. They also had Policy Coordination and performance evaluation.

I had the civil service, foreign service nationals, and all of the systems -- recruitment, examination, employment...the executive director of management, promotion numbers, limited career extension numbers, and the structure of the Foreign Service side of the house. I had the computer systems.

Q: Now having a sort of a broader perspective, I mean you'd been in recruitment, but you had this one level above how in this period of '80 to '84 how did you see the recruitment of minorities going, especially at the mid-level.

LAUDERDALE: Well, there were quite a few false starts. I'll explain a couple of them. I considered it largely an unsuccessful program, and it had a very high fail rate, which is another test. If you want to test by eating the pudding, over 50% washed out. Prior to my time Secretary Vance had set what they in those days called "goals and timetables." And those goals at the mid-level were 20 a year for five years to bring in 100 middle grade officers.

Q: We're talking about minorities, essentially blacks and Hispanics, right.

LAUDERDALE: At the mid-level, minorities was essentially a euphemism for blacks. It did include Hispanics, American Indians, Asians, but their numbers were minuscule, and there was almost no effort, targeted recruitment toward them. The efforts were toward blacks. That program had been established I guess a year or two years before I became the Deputy. They had not recruited 20 a year. They were getting about 10, 10-12 a year, and more than half of those were women. So the program in that way was largely unsuccessful. Secretary Vance was unhappy, Ben Reed was unhappy. They were pounding on Harry Barnes and me as to why we couldn't do better, and they established... By the way, the goals at the junior level were 33 a year, of minorities only. They didn't count women at the junior level.

They established, again before my time, or during my time, the piggyback system. It just shows you how crazy management can be. The piggyback system was "Your goal this year is 20. You didn't get 20, you only got 12." The deficit gets added to next year's goal. So next year's goal is 28. Well, if you can't get 20 then you can't get 28! Same with the juniors. You've got a goal of 33, you get 25, next year your goal is 41. Most of the effort I would call bureaucratic. It was such things as piggyback, such things as chew Lauderdale out, such things as break the back of the resistance of the Foreign Service to recruiting minorities -- when basically none of those were the problem! The problem was, if you want to recruit 20 minorities, you have to do a lot of targeted recruiting. If IBM wanted to recruit 20 mid-level minorities, why they'd scour the countryside with head hunters. We weren't doing that. What were we doing? Well, we were putting an ad in the paper. The second thing was that the recruitment system was ineffective in the way it was established bureaucratically. To bring in these...the legal means of appointing these people,, they looked for a niche in the Foreign Service Act, which is kind of restrictive on bringing in outsiders. They looked for a niche and used it instead of changing the law or changing the rule to recruit minorities, like the rest of the world might do.

We had what was called a lateral entry program, by which people could enter the Foreign Service laterally, which means mid-level, but it required three years of service. And it was designed deliberately for a civil servant, who might want to get into the Foreign Service and who might be needed. That was the reason it was in there, and it wasn't perceived as violating the merit system rules. But we were recruiting people outside of government. Almost all of our mid-levels came from outside. So the lateral entry three years of service doesn't fit very well. So they established a two-tier system. First you recruit them and hire them as an FSR, until they have three years of service, and then you examine them to become a Foreign Service officer.

Q: And by that time they're well in the system and it's tough to get them out.

LAUDERDALE: That wasn't the problem. The problem was that the lateral entry system required an oral examination by the Board of Examiners. And the Department recruited people, trained them, sent them overseas, let them accumulate three years service, they applied for lateral entry and then failed the exam. They also took an exam when they were hired, including an oral exam. But it was not by the Board of Examiners, it was by somebody else. So this came to be called a "second oral." And the second oral was knocking out about 50% of the people. It was <u>the</u> oral, but they called it the second oral. So one of the proposals shortly after I took office, and this program was only partially successful, Phil Habib, who had been Deputy Secretary and who had retired, and was out in Stanford teaching graduate students, three of his graduate students who were women at Stanford, at his encouragement had taken the FSO exam and failed the oral. And he complained to Secretary Vance and said something is wrong with this examination. And Secretary Vance was unhappy with it anyway, because it wasn't working for the mid-level minorities program. So he appointed a committee to study the recruitment examination process, which came to be called the Habib Committee. The Habib Committee began before I became Deputy Assistant Secretary; Habib was chairman, members were Diego

Asencio, George Moose, Ron Palmer, and Paul Boeker. They let me be on it as executive director, even though I was in Personnel, director of recruitment, because I had only been on the job two weeks. They made a series of recommendations, I don't remember, 12 or 13, but two of them that come to mind were, one was to abolish the so-called second oral, and secondly, at the junior level, minorities could be recruited into the Foreign Service without taking the written examination. The Foreign Service Officer examination, as you know, is basically a two-tier examination. It's a written examination and then subsequently, for the passers, it's an oral examination. It's essentially an assessment center all day oral. But minorities could be invited into the oral, based on meeting certain qualifications and applicant screening, without having passed the written. The pass rate wasn't very high. The candidates were different than the exam-passer candidates in a number of ways. They were almost all bachelor degree candidates, whereas almost half of written exam passers have Master's degrees. They were younger. They just got their bachelor's degree kind of last week, and they're 22 years old. And the exam taker has a Master's degree and is 26 and worked for two years. So they weren't equal candidates but they were thrown into the oral. The fail rate was pretty high.

On the other hand the minorities who passed the written examination did very well in the oral. So one of the ideas that the Habib Committee came up with, which caused quite a flurry at the time, was to admit minorities into the exam if their score was within 5 points of the pass rate on the written. So to be a white male you had to make 70 to go into the oral, but if you were a minority you'd be invited if you made 65.

There was another flap about that too. There was a radio program, Crossfire with Tom Brady and Pat Buchanan -- it's now a TV program -- and they interviewed me about this near pass business. Brady thought it was okay, Buchanan was against it. I had to defend it, of course, and the lawyers approved it. It was subsequently found to be illegal, contrary to regulations. It wasn't illegal under the law, but it violated our own regulations, which had been published in the Federal Register, even though "L" previously said okay. But as soon as somebody filed a grievance, they came around and said "somebody made a mistake." Harry Barnes was livid at the lawyers. So we had to go back and invite all exam takers who had made 65 for that year. So we gave oral exams to another couple of hundred people that we didn't want to examine and didn't need to, and wasted resources. But since we had invited the minorities, we had to. Still, that didn't produce all that many. So nothing seemed to work, nothing being what the Department was doing. They were placing advertisements in black magazines for mid-level and junior officers and visiting black colleges. And that's just not enough.

Q: Well here you are, you're the Deputy Assistant Secretary, basically this is on your plate. So what happened during the '80-'84 period? I mean, I was on the Board of Examiners from '74-'75, and we knew that the black colleges weren't the place to go. That was part of the problem knocking down these lateral entries. They just weren't of the same caliber. It's not surprising. When you're going after a real elite, once you move down there's a real falling off. This would be true if you were going after white postal workers. Were you able to make any dent or do anything about this problem?

LAUDERDALE: Well, we tried a few kind of imaginative, but cheap, things. I tried a couple of things. One is I tried to get more travel money to permit people to go out and recruit -- other than what we were doing. And I couldn't get it. I tried through the Public Affairs speaker program to get them to include in their speaker's program, where diplomats go out to foreign affairs councils making speeches, to tag on a ten-minute at the end and talk about Foreign Service careers. They did it, but on a voluntary basis. Some speakers felt comfortable doing that and some didn't. We tried to revive the diplomats-in-residence, I think we had ten of those at universities and get them to travel to other universities in their state. They were willing, and I called up the one in Oregon, for instance, and asked him if he'd do it and he said, "Yeah, how much travel money can I have?" And guess what I said -- "None. I don't have any for you." And he said, "OK, I'll do it at my own expense." So a few got in their own car and took off around the state and others said, send me travel money and I'll do it, otherwise I'm not going to." It was a resource-poor program in that sense.

Q: If you had the Secretary of State really committed to this, why wasn't it getting translated into money?

LAUDERDALE: I think they really didn't believe we were sincere, and thought this was just a ploy. Like a good bureaucrat who would say if you want this or that, give me money. And if we were really avid and sincere, not only me but the whole Foreign Service, that this would work.

Q: I take it then the time you were there this particular problem you didn't feel was really met full on or solved.

LAUDERDALE: No they were not. The problems were different at the mid-level than at the junior level. A mid-level program in a culture and structure like the Foreign Service is a very ambitious program. We brought in a lot of women, for example, who were not in the normal sense of the word disadvantaged and were not minorities. These people had Master's degrees, they were well educated, they came from middle or upper class families. Some of them failed too. The fail rate wasn't as high, but they failed because they would go in at mid-level in the Ankara, Turkey, Embassy and they have to compete with an officer that's been in the Foreign Service eight or ten years and has had two or three prior posts. He knows all the bureaucratic structure, how things operate, everything -- performance evaluations, how to get promoted, how to get a job. And this person who came from Seattle a few months ago has got a tremendous learning curve. That's just on the bureaucratic, self-survival side. Then on the work side they've got the same thing. They've never been a Political Officer or Economic Officer before and their competitors have. So their promotions were slower. And then if you add to that that the person is a minority, may not have the same educational background, maybe has a Bachelor's degree instead of a Master's, there's a pretty big disadvantage there.

At the junior level I think the fail rate...at the junior level they didn't have to pass a second oral but they had to get tenure after three years. We had started recruiting junior officers untenured, and the minority junior officers were usually younger, they usually just had a Bachelor's degree, which usually was not in Political Science, and they didn't go to Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy the way their white counterpart had. They went to Mississippi University and studied education, and that just doesn't have the same preparation. So they had the same kind of curve, or incline to climb up. What was needed really was more in-service training, counseling, and preparation. But under the law and under our situation, you can't do that just for blacks. So they tried to, and they'd make it available to everybody of course, they put continuity counselors in Foreign Service Counseling and Assignment, they were really there to help the minorities. A white person out of ignorance might go in there and think he could get this counseling too, and if he did he would, but that's not what it was set up for. So we did some things, but I think the reason it didn't work was the white candidates had a much longer incubation period. They knew when they were a junior or senior in college, or even earlier, that they wanted to be in the Foreign Service. So they went to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service or Tufts or Berkeley the way I did. That was their goal and they prepared for it for eight years. Whereas the minorities, by and large, we caught them in June of their graduate year and they had majored in education and we recruited them into the Foreign Service. So what we needed was much more lead time, and I expressed that in one of the meetings upstairs where we were getting raked over the coals because we weren't getting enough and why don't you get ten in next month's class. I said, "You know, I'm like the farmer that you're telling to go out and harvest the wheat and nobody planted it. This takes a long lead time. If you want to harvest in the fall, you've got to plant in the spring. You're saying go harvest, but did it rain? Did the seed get planted in the ground? No!" So that was my view of the program.

Q: What were some of the other major issues you dealt with during this '80-'84 period?

LAUDERDALE: Two other biggies. One was, there was an election in 1980, and after several years of Democratic rule, a conservative Republican, a distrustful Republican administration came into office, and that produced somewhat of a shock. The second was the Foreign Service Act of 1980, that was enacted and signed in the fall of 1980 under the previous Administration had a 90-day effective date and was to take effect January 14, 1981, and the new Administration came into office January 20, 1981, so implementing the new Foreign Service Act and all of its ramifications. And a third big one was we were in the throes of a women's class action suit, and it came to trial during that period and I gave depositions, three days worth of depositions, and later testified in court, very shortly it turned out.

Q: Why don't we continue discussing the structure of the Foreign Service by going ahead with the women's class action suit. What was the problem during your time, and how did it work out?

LAUDERDALE: My time was the so-called period of discovery, when the lawyers were gathering information from the Department. So they were amassing and analyzing data. The suit had been filed quite a few years before, I think '74, but under the law a class action suit covers from the day it is filed until the date of the trial so it covered what was going on today as well. It had alleged discrimination in recruitment, employment, awards, assignments, conal assignments, ambassadorships, practically the whole range. We settled out of court the recruitment/examination/employment part of the case, and the rest of it went to trial.

The part on which the Department was most vulnerable and was probably the cutting edge of why the Department lost that case was on conal assignments. A lot of the testimony was on conal assignments. And the fact is that women and minorities coming into the Foreign Service were disproportionately assigned to consular and administrative cones. That was point number one. Point number two, the administrative and consular cones were deemed to be second-class citizens, their chances for advancement to the senior ranks and the chance to be awarded with top jobs, such as ambassadorships, DCMs, Assistant Secretaries, and DAS, were deemed to be lower. And one can prove that statistically pretty easily. So on both counts, the Department was vulnerable. The third reason they were really vulnerable is that by and large these women and minorities had been assigned to their cones administratively; that is, by some Board or consultation between two officers who were usually white males. Of course there was some rationale for some difference. As I told you before, the white male probably graduated from Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the minority candidate may have graduated from the University of Tennessee with a degree in education. You look at that and say, "Well, education, that's probably consular. Georgetown School of Foreign Service, that's probably political." And that's one of the reasons they lost it. They won in the District Court, because the testimony of the witnesses couldn't sustain a finding for the plaintiffs. They weren't able to prove overt, deliberate discrimination. And so they lost. But on appeal, they won on statistics, by and large.

Q: You weren't in charge of placement, but you were sitting at the council of the mighties within Personnel at that time. The suit was pending, there must have been a lot of self-examination. I mean, hell, I knew what we were doing and there was justification for it but at the same time qualified people were getting put in the wrong places. In '80-'84, what were we doing in the seats of Personnel to rectify the situation?

LAUDERDALE: Another factor was that during the Carter Administration, President Carter himself, to some extent I think, set the tone. But certainly people like Cyrus Vance and Ben Reed were very high on this program. It was important to them. It was an important motivation of what they wanted to achieve. And everybody knew it and that was their marching orders. When the Reagan Administration came in the rhetoric was quite different. They didn't seem to be very interested in that and their appointments of ambassadors and assistant secretaries and DAS's didn't seem to reflect any particular desire for balance in those areas. Within the Department and in the Foreign Service the blacks felt that by and large the program had been killed. It hadn't actually been killed, it

just didn't have the enthusiasm that was there before, maybe it didn't have the rhetoric or the managerial attention. So subsequently they filed a black class action suit because they didn't perceive that things were happening... So the five years elapsed. We didn't have 100, we had about 80. We continued the program and in year six, we passed 100. That was during my time. We wrote a letter to the Under Secretary for Management and told him that we have now recruited 120 and the goals were 100 and it took us six and a half years instead of five, and so forth. And they approved stopping the mid-level program. In the meantime, at the junior level they also stopped bringing in minorities without having taken the written examination, for various reasons. The fail rate was fairly high, there was a new attitude and atmosphere. There was a lot of criticism of what people felt were quotas, that the Carter Administration had quotas and we don't believe in quotas, quotas are illegal. And I must admit that the Carter Administration did kind of talk out of both sides of their mouth. They also said quotas are illegal and we don't have any, but your quota is 20 a year. Also, people like me, at least for the first year, were not going to be on the cutting edge of anything. We felt that we weren't trusted. We felt suspect. I didn't even know if I was going to be kept on as DAS.

Q: We're talking about the Reagan Administration looking on you as "one of those Foreign Service guys." It had nothing to do with...

LAUDERDALE: Well, not only that. People who were ambassadors and to some degree DAS's, we were Carter DAS's, we must be Democrats and not quite to be trusted. And when the Administration came in almost one of their first acts was to fire Harry Barnes. He was Director General of the Foreign Service, and he was precipitously replaced early on. And his two deputies...we didn't know what was going to happen. We were without a DG for a couple of months until Joan Clark got back and took over, and during that inter-regnum which was partially during the transition, I think Harry left office on January 20, if not before.

Q: Was this because he was Harry Barnes? He was in bad odor with some of the Republicans because of being too friendly with the Romanians, wasn't that it?

LAUDERDALE: That came later. I don't actually know why, except that he was a Carter Administration Director General. The Foreign Service Act itself was sort of suspect too. This is some law passed by the Democrats, we better read it very carefully. I think Harry was perceived as a liberal. They started appointing ambassadorships and pretty soon they were all assigned, by let's say June or so, they were all lined up and Harry didn't have one. So either Ben Reed the old M, or the new M told the Secretary that it would really be a very bad signal to the Foreign Service if you replace the DG and don't give him another job. And since a lot of middle-level embassies to which he might have aspired under the circumstances were already given, they gave him India, one of the few that was left. So he came out well.

Q: You were there til '84, so how did this work? Did you see a settling in?

LAUDERDALE: Well, during the transition and during the early days there was a lot of tension. I felt a lot of tension and stress. It's hard to be objective about that. But in some cases, in retrospect, I think it was no more than just dealing with strangers who had some innovative ideas but they scared the hell out of me. One was, for example, that they were going to have...We have the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, it's always been filled by a career officer, historically. It was the highest career job in the State Department. They wanted to appoint a political Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And I said, "That's a bad idea. Where is the interface going to be between the career diplomats and the political appointees? That's where it's been in the past, and if you wipe that out you lose that interface that's very important to the Secretary and it's always been..." So they call me back and I got such words as "California wants..." California being the Reagan transition team that was still out there, so they call and say "Give me a list of all Under Secretaries for Political Affairs for the last 20 years, indicating whether they were career or non-career." That's a lot of work, sometimes you can't even find it. But we did it, and, by the way, one of them was non-career. Then they wanted to appoint some Consul General that was non- career, and I told them the same thing. Consuls General are career officers, those are not political appointments, they're not made by the President. They're made under the authority of the Secretary of State, and there's no real mechanism to appoint...they have to be in the Foreign Service and there's no mechanism to...the old FSRs have been killed by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 -- what are you going to appoint them as? Same story. Give me a list of all non-career Consuls-General of the last 20 years. So we did that. And we found a couple. But they weren't really non-career. They were technically non-career, but they had spent most of their life in the government or in the State Department. They weren't career Foreign Service. They might have been in the civil service of the State Department for 15 years or something. We carried the day with our Secretary of Political Affairs. They did appoint a career officer. On the Consuls General, they appointed one political one in Bermuda -- and that's lost forever to the Foreign Service. It's now a tradition that it will be political. So there were some strains like that.

We had a lot of FSRs, who, under the old act could be appointed domestically, and a lot of the political appointees in the building were Foreign Service Reserve Officers. The new Act of 1980 prohibited the appointment of Foreign Service Officers for domestic service only. So they wanted to do two things, one, get rid of all the ones from the previous administration and secondly they wanted to know "How are we going to appoint our folks?" So that created some stress. We identified 87 people who were non career, either non-career SES or FSRs, wrote them a letter, saying we no longer have trust and faith in you and so forth, and who's going to sign this letter? Well, they decided Lauderdale's going to sign this letter, because there was no Director General and they wanted a career officer to sign it and that was me. So I signed the letters to 87 people. I always worried later that that might hurt my career, but nothing ever came of it. Even when the Clinton Administration came in, I thought they might look to see who did us in when Reagan came in. But nobody ever held a grudge against me personally. So that was one of the sources of tensions, and then the third thing was... So I felt sort of under stress, under probation, so I wasn't in a mode to take a lot of new initiatives or to be a firefighter

on, let's say, such things as affirmative action, particularly when the message and image of the new Administration was "We're not very interested in that." So if I don't push for those things, who is? And the answer was, at the Senior level nobody did. So the program just basically continued along, it wasn't killed, it wasn't even de-emphasized, it just wasn't a high priority program.

Q: This was probably happening all throughout the government, wouldn't you say?

LAUDERDALE: Yes it was, and there was publicity about it in the papers.

Q: Because it's not just having a program, the bureaucracy has to both be engaged and know that there'll be some follow through. Well Clint, what about the other thing you were...you've already alluded to some of the other problems, but I mean, the new Foreign Service Act came in in 1980 after you took... sometimes called the Act of '81, because that's when it came into effect. In the first place, as you were sitting in Personnel before it came in and looking at this thing, it was already a done deal by the time you got there, but what was the feeling within Personnel about this Act?

LAUDERDALE: By and large, I think, enthusiasm. And by and large we felt that it would resolve a lot of the existing problems in the Foreign Service. Now there were some provisions in there that I didn't like personally, and that I opposed, personally. But the system was bigger than any of us individually, so there wasn't anything we could do about it. For example, I didn't favor performance pay. I thought it was a lost concept, but the rest of the government had it, and civil service had it, OPM set it up in the law and said that for the civil service and the SES, and it became a common part of the pay structure. So to say that you can't have it for the Foreign Service is just not feasible.

I didn't agree with the concept of the window. The new Act reemphasized the "up and out" principle. There had not been a retirement for time in class in the senior ranks for a long time. It was moribund, because the time in class had been 12 years at the lowest senior grade and 10 years at the highest senior grade. Those are OC and MC now. And Eagleburger, when he was Under Secretary for Management, to avoid a specific officer retiring, merged the two into 22 years combined. And the result was that nobody reached 22 years. They reached age 60 before they reached 22 years. And it was deemed desireable to reactivate the up or out principle for senior officers and lower that. And to have a junior threshold, which we had, establish a senior threshold with time in class to cross the threshold or you're out and then a time in class for the senior ranks with limited career extension. In establishing the senior threshold, it was deemed desireable to establish a window. It was believed that officers shouldn't be allowed and the system shouldn't be required to keep officers for promotion indefinitely. The theory was, well, you really ought to be promoted within seven years. If you get reviewed for seven years and you don't get promoted we're not going to review you any more and you're no longer eligible for promotion. I thought that was okay, it didn't bother me at all. But then they took it one step further and said, well, it you reach the point in your career where you're no longer eligible for promotion, you ought to be forced to retire because you're not

motivated, we don't have the EER to hold over your head, you may lay down on the job, and therefore you've got to be forced out. I didn't agree with that, and that's causing us to retire a lot of people today who are not senior manager talent or motivated, but they're quite good technocrats or whatever, and a lot of them could stay. We could say, look, we're not going to compete you any more for senior rank, it's pretty clear to us and to you that that's not your niche, but you can be what you are. But anyway, they established a window, you "open" your window, which means you click the seven years competitive time, and if you're not promoted within that time you're no longer competed and you must retire.

The framework at the time, it all fit very nicely. Claude Pepper was chairman of the Committee on Aging, at that time he was Congressman from Florida, and he forced through... I shouldn't say forced through, it's kind of derogatory... His momentum and public speaking and persuasion convinced the nation that there shouldn't be a retirement age, that people should retire based on productivity and that there are a lot of differences in energy and health and motivation and performance of people that is not just as simple as saying how old are you. So he abolished, by and large, by law, retirement age in the private sector and in the government. Now the Foreign Service had this age 60 retirement, and he wanted it abolished. And everybody kind of shook their head, and they compromised by elevating it to age 65, which he bought provided that the Foreign Service in its career progression system and its "up or out" system would retain people based on their performance and not on some other factor. So, they put into the law limited career extensions, authority for "up or out," authority for time in class, but with a provision for limited career extensions. So what the structure was envisioned and what we created -- because the law only said you are authorized" -- was a system of fairly short time in class for senior officers. Up to the senior threshold it was already set at 25 years. If you get promoted across the senior threshold into the senior service, you have a fairly short time in class; six years in the first grade, five in Minister Counselor, and four at CM with a provision for an extension for three years. And you could get multiple extensions, you could get reviewed every three years for another three years if you didn't get promoted. That was also deemed to solve the problem - we had career ministers with no time in class limit under the old system who wouldn't take a job that we wanted them to take and they only wanted to be Ambassador to Germany or India or something, and we didn't need them for that and they wouldn't do anything else, but they didn't have to retire. And the numbers weren't great, but they were significant. At any one time there might be five or six. They have it again right now. So we said you get four years as a career minister, and if you do a good job and if you're needed and if you take the job we want you to take, you'll get an extension. And if you don't, you get to retire. So that structure was set up, and then one of the big issues was how do you compete for that career extension. Well my colleague Andy Steigman wanted it to be across the board. And I said, "No Way," you're going to extend all the political officers and then we don't have jobs for them. The only people that are over complement right now are political officers. We don't have over complement consular or administrative officers. They're needed, there are jobs for them, and they will take them. So we have to compete by cone. And he eventually came around to that, and we will give numbers by cone. Well, we had the

problem that some people didn't have a cone. Harry Barnes, for example, had no cone. So we said we have to give him a cone for LCE competition purposes. And I think career minister may be the class where we competed them as a class. But minister counselor...because some of our administrative and some of our consular officers are minister counselors, and they are quite happy to go be Consul General in Rome or Toronto or Mexico and so forth, so for minister counselor and OC I won out and we said we'll give LCEs by cone.

Performance pay - same thing, they wanted to give it across the board and I said "No." The first year, we had across to the board competition for performance pay. It was an embarrassment. Ninety percent of the recipients were ambassadors. And there were complaints in the press, and M complained and said, "Fix that." And I said, "Folks we have to compete these by different competition rules." Also, an OC really shouldn't compete with an MC for performance pay. So we set up three competition zones for MC and one for OC. Then it began to work better. I didn't believe in performance pay anyway. It never worked well and it still doesn't work well.

Q: Yeah, I received performance pay because they had an earthquake in my district, for no other reason than that. I did what I was supposed to do. An earthquake helps, but...

LAUDERDALE: You know LCE extensions are now dead, they killed them. It's too bad in my opinion. The system was defective and it should have been fixed. But they didn't fix it, they just abolished it. But reflecting back I wonder if I made a mistake. The way we actually did the numbers was... first of all you have to accept the principle that an LCE competes with a promotion. You can either extend an existing officer, let's say a minister counselor, or you can promote an OC into that opportunity. So we added up all the opportunities and we did extension numbers first. We said, okay, we're going to extend so many people in each group and there are so many promotions left. And that's the way the system worked. One of the reasons we could do that was we had a means of fixing the numbers for limited career extensions. It was 50% in one category and 60% in another, and so forth. We didn't have a system for establishing promotion numbers of any specific number. So the first year or two we did LCEs first and promotions were the residual. Since we didn't have LCEs before and everybody was coming up for time in class, as a transitional basis we took the entire population, divided them into three tranches, and said you will come up for LCE consideration in 1986, and you will come up in '87 and you will come up in '88. So kind of idealistically I said to the system the LCE percentage opportunities need to be identical for the three groups. And we had already had year 1, and their percentage and chance was so much and so much. For example, Andy Steigman was in year 1 and I was in year 2, so I said it's only fair that my chance for extensions be just as great as his, and so forth. That was a little bit misguided, looking back. Secretary Shultz brought in an outside CEO named Van Gorkom to be Under Secretary for Management. He was going to bring business practices to the State Department. He lasted one year and then quit! But in the year that he was there, and he learned about this and we briefed him, because M approves promotion numbers and LCE numbers. He said, "I want this process reversed. We'll do promotion numbers first and let the chips fall with the

LCEs." And I knew that everybody in Personnel was against that and I knew that their mouths were agape. The DG was there and I was there, and various other people, MMO and his staff group, and I was reflecting very quickly... Joan Clark may have told him it's not possible, I don't remember, maybe she turned to me, I guess she did. I said "We can do it, but for us to do it you have to tell us what the promotion numbers are to be, so we can compute the residual." I mean we could just do it historically, add up the number of promotions from each class over the last ten years and average it out and say the average has been 37, and therefore there will be 37 promotions this year and the LCEs get the rest. But the opportunities swing and sway from year to year. The total opportunities this year might be 50 and you might say give 37 of them to promotions, but next year the opportunities might be 70 -- are you going to give 37 promotions and all the rest of them to extensions? The extensions might actually exceed the number of people to compete for extensions. So those are the problems. You have to fix the promotion numbers if you're going to let the chips fall the other way, because now the largesse goes to promotions and the lean years comes out of promotions, because the LCE population is much smaller. And if you want to switch that you're going to have to decide how you're going to set the promotion numbers. What are you going to do if you end up with 100% extensions, for example? You probably wouldn't want to do that. Are you going to have a provision for rolling it back into a promotion? What if there are more extensions than there are candidates? So there are a lot of questions to be resolved if you're going to do it that way. And he said, "Well, let me think about all that." So we broke up and a week later he called up and said, "Forget it." I don't know where he got his advice, but... Actually there would be some merit, considerable merit, to doing the promotion numbers first. The LCE system was stopped, and I think there were two reasons. One, it was abused. The numbers were too high. A couple of years they gave 100% to career ministers. That's ridiculous. And in the other categories the numbers were too high. And then the people who wanted to get promoted complained, of course. The second reason was that it was extremely difficult to administer, because you had senior officers, sometimes serving overseas, and their time ran out. If they got an extension, all was well. But if they didn't, suddenly the assignments system said, "Oh, our man in Rome has got to retire, unexpectedly. He was sent there for four years and he's only been there for two." And if they were here in Washington and they were coming up for an extension review, they'd say, "Well, I'm not going overseas. You want me to go to Manila? I'm coming up for an extension review next year, I'm not going to go unless you tell me you're going to extend me." "Well we can't tell you that." "Well I'm not going." So they would linger around here because they only had a year til their review. So for those reasons it was hard to administer for assignments and hard to compute, they just stopped LCEs altogether. My solution was to review two years before your time runs out instead of the last year. There were ways that they could have fixed it: don't give 100%, set a limit, in no grade will it ever be more than 50% or something like that. They destroyed the principle that Claude Pepper espoused, that retirement should be based on performance review. And the second thing they did is to create a system where career ministers are walking around without jobs and you can't get rid of them because when they stopped extensions, they increased the regular time. And career ministers went from four years to ten, and they pooled the other two (minister counselor + counselor). Seven years and five for counselors + minister counselors would

be 12. They changed that to combined 14 and said people are going to come up slower and they've got 14 years. But we have people in the Service who didn't come slow, people like Bob Ryan and George Moose and lots of others, who under the 14 year rule, are going to be forced to retire at age 52, 53, because they made senior officer when they were age 38, 39, or 40. And there's a fairly large number of them. They're coming up this year, next year, and the year after, and they're all going to be thrown out unless there's a reprieve. If you're serving in a presidential appointment, then you don't have to retire. George Moose made career minister, and a few others will make career minister and get that reprieve. A few will be serving as ambassadors and get that reprieve. But the consuls and the administrative people and the political and economic people who are not serving as ambassadors are going to get zapped in fairly large numbers, fairly young, and the Department is losing a lot of talent. So the whole thing isn't structured right.

Q: Clint, one other thing that was happening at this time that I viewed with a certain amount of disquiet after I saw how it was being put into effect, and that was the stress on "management." This was up and down the ranks...because it soon, the Foreign Service uses people of all sorts of specialties, including somebody who may be an expert on Mongolia and very good with that, and they don't really have to "manage" that much. But it seems like there's much more of an effort to get your ticket punched. You had to have this kind of job, that kind of job, in order to get promoted, so that somebody who wanted to concentrate particularly on language skills, which are bread and butter, I mean you want somebody who really knows Balkan politics and Balkan languages and all that, and yet they may find they can't spend the time doing it, at least that's my impression. Could you talk about that during this '80 - '84 period?

LAUDERDALE: Right. Let me start out by saying -- it's not within the period, but -- I just met yesterday with Under Secretary Dick Moose on a management issue, and he asked me... I had gone to Vienna to set up a Joint Administrative Office, that's why I met with him, and he asked me how the one works in Brussels. It was a trick question, he knew that there had been some strains in the past. And I told him that there was a point in the past, three years ago specifically, when two of the Ambassadors out there -- Brussels has got three -- wouldn't talk to each other. They wouldn't take phone calls, they wouldn't go to meetings, they wouldn't see each other. And a Joint Administrative Office in Brussels to serve three missions won't work very well when two of the Ambassadors won't talk to each other. Secondly, they don't work very well with the Joint Administrative Office in the Embassy if the Embassy Ambassador does not understand that an important part of his mission is to provide administrative support to the other two missions. And sometimes you've had ambassadors there who appreciated that, and it worked very well. And if you send one out who doesn't appreciate it, it's not going to work very well. And sometimes you've sent out ambassadors who don't give a damn about administration and management, and then these things are not going to work very well. Right now, the one you have in Vienna (Swanee Hunt) does. She's going to support not only the Embassy, but two other missions, and if that's an important part of her mission, it's going to work well. If she doesn't care, and says, I'm out here to have relations with Austria, then it's going to collapse.

Moose's answer was that he agrees with that, and that he's going to emphasize management by having it at various levels of career at the Foreign Service Institute. I give you that as background. Now, I am one of those people that you're talking about who believes that management is an important part of an ambassador's responsibility. The ambassador is not a political consultant; he is not an expert diplomat, responsible only for diplomacy. Now that may be the principal reason that he's out there, and we used to have ambassador's like that in the 19th century. They had an aide and a secretary, and their job was diplomacy, full time, dealing with the King of Spain or the Czar or whoever. Those days are over. Our big embassies are fairly big government bureaucracies, and the law gives the chief of mission a lot of authority and responsibility. And that comes with the turf. he's not only prime diplomat, he's also prime manager. And most of it cannot be delegated very well. In Bonn and Paris, as you know, there are 22 U.S. government agencies, each with a head who reports back to their Secretary. Now those folks will take orders from the Ambassador who is a Presidential appointee, but they're not going to take orders from some State Department diplomat. And by the way everybody else out there is State Department, except the Ambassador. One of the unique things about ambassadors is they say "I don't work for the State Department, I work for the President. I was appointed by the President, I was approved by the Senate, I am the chief of this mission under law. You will do what I say." It works! But let the DCM try it. Let the Political Counselor try it. And the Agricultural Minister will tell him to go jump you know where. So it's inherent in the job, and when they accept it, it works well.

Oh, there's two other parts. I gave you some personal philosophy and observation, the way I see it working. That is kind of the background that caused this to get emphasized. But there were two other reasons; one reason gets into the career and non-career. It started in the '70s, I think, when the DCM failure rate was quite high. You know somewhere between 30 and 40% of our ambassadors are non-career people. They did a survey and concluded that 50% of our DCMs were failing, defining failure in a certain way: if the Ambassador sent them home, if they didn't get a good onward assignment, or if they didn't get a good EER. And it was deemed that they were failing largely because they weren't prepared to be managers. Many of them, 80%, were from the political cone and had very little, if any, managerial background, training, or experience and then they were thrown in to be DCMs. They were good policy advisors to the ambassador but the other things didn't work and the ambassador held them responsible. So they started a DCM course. That was their solution to that. Then they started a week-long ambassador's course, that was not management per se, but... Another thing that they concluded was that very often the non-career ambassadors run better embassies than the career ambassadors. The career ambassadors may be better diplomats, and they usually serve in more sensitive countries and they did that very well. But on the managerial side they often stubbed their toe, and some got relieved because of the managerial side. Their personal conduct, morale is poor, more than one ambassador has not gotten a second shot because morale was poor in his embassy. Although on the diplomatic side he may have done exceedingly well. I know that when Mr. Whitehead was Deputy Secretary, he complained to the Inspector General, and that's why we started Inspector's efficiency reports on ambassadors. He had

two complaints. He said some of our ambassadors don't know a damn thing about how to manage a post, and number two, we don't always know who they are. So when candidates come up for ambassadorships, we want to know who can manage and who can't, and the system doesn't tell us that. Their EERs are written back in the Department and the Department doesn't know how they're managing. You guys do. So we had a debate in OIG about how to do that. There had been a period under Bill Harrop as the Inspector General, when inspectors inspected a post they wrote a letter about the ambassador to the Secretary, usually a page or page and a half long. But the Ambassador didn't know about that. I've seen some of those letters. They eventually had to stop that, on advice of attorneys. So we said, shall we do a letter? We went through that legal history and the lawyer says you've got to be careful. That letter is subject to the Freedom of Information Act and you haven't shown it to the Ambassador, so, you know... We talked about putting it in inspection reports, no that isn't a good idea. Well, let's use the inspectors efficiency report (IER). I was given the job of implementing it. I said, okay, searched the regulations to see if any new authority was needed and said "No, we can do it with what we have." But let's only do it on career officers. The Department does performance evaluation reports on career ambassadors, but not on non-career ambassadors. It makes me nervous as an inspection team leader to go out to Paris and do an Inspector's efficiency on Pamela Harriman. Number two, the cable announcing it should have management clearance. I mean, Mr. Whitehead asked for this, let's ask him to clear on it. "Oh, I'm Inspector General, I have the authority."

Yeah, still, you have authority to write it, but the DG doesn't have to put it in the file. Okay, so I sold that. They sent it up to Mr. Whitehead to sign and clear. He did. But he put a note on it: "include non-careers also." So we did, we sent it out, career and non-career. So that tells you. It wasn't just Mr. Whitehead. Secretary Kissinger was frustrated sometimes because his Departments couldn't manage. And it was the management, sometimes security or other management... Look at Moscow! Hartman got into trouble and his name was besmirched. It wasn't because of diplomacy, it was because of internal administration, security consciousness, KGB got in the building, secrets compromised. That's management, not diplomacy. These lines aren't very clear in the Foreign Service. Management is diplomacy too, but it's not paying attention to the managerial side that can sometimes... So it's important to the 7th floor principals how the ambassador manages. We've been making management and diplomacy two separate things, but often they are not all that separable. So for all those reasons, it is perceived as important. So they still do IERs on ambassadors today. IERs, and their performance in the field is still important to the Secretary and Under Secretary. It's not more important than the diplomacy side, it's just important. And some officers are not qualified to do it. They are excellent candidates to be ambassador to Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia or Thailand, but can they manage the establishment out there without getting the Secretary or staff or somebody in trouble? And the answer sometimes is NO!

Q: I saw this in one of the newly emerging ex-Soviet Republics. I had an expert there who was...bad morale, who was a loner, bird watcher, took a lot of long solitary hikes, and his staff was very unhappy. But excellent, knowledgeable of the Russian system.

Could you give me your view of how, I think you had three Director Generals running...Harry Barnes, Joan Clark, and Roy Atherton. Could you talk a little about how they operated, because the role of Director General is an important one.

LAUDERDALE: Well, Harry was the most open, the most simpatico of the three. I explained earlier that the two DASs up there had niches. We each had areas of jurisdiction, but under Harry it didn't make a lot of difference. He didn't get the wires crossed, I don't mean that. He knew what each of us was responsible for. But for many of his activities he was very inclusive and very open. So even though assignments came under my colleague, any time he had a meeting to discuss the subject, I was invited. If we were going over ambassadorial candidates or ambassadorial decisions, I was invited. It wasn't my primary responsibility, but I was listened to and my advice was sought. And knowing that I came from an administrative background and know most of the administrative officers, if he had a problem in the administrative area, he'd turn to me. If he couldn't get an administrative officer to go to New York, he'd turn to me and say "Find one."

Joan Clark. I had known her for a long time, I had worked for her. So we were kind of open. But Joan is quite good. She is not very open and not very inclusive. For example, I never sat in with Joan on any discussions of ambassadorial candidates -- almost never, although she turned to me in a few specific cases. But if they were having a meeting to discuss which candidates to recommend to the D Committee for next week, I wasn't there. And one of the reasons, I think, was that Joan is not as open and not as inclusive as Harry was. Also, Joan and my background's are more similar, and I think she may have felt that she didn't need my skills, that she had them herself. Whereas Ron Palmer and Andy Steigman were from political backgrounds she didn't have. But she turned to me in a few cases, asked my advice, "Oh, do you know so and so, what do you think about him." But broad scope, no. She had a case once where the committee had picked a candidate to be ambassador, and in the background investigation something came up that they lost interest in him. They deemed this candidate to be disqualified. So she came down and asked my advice. "What are we going to do about this?" And I said, "You have no commitment. You can just be de-select him if you want to do that. If the Under Secretary of Management says I'm not going to go forward with this candidacy, just tell him, we're not going to go forward with his candidacy. You have no obligation to him." Or sometimes if my colleague was out I would get into these issues, because we traded off for each other. Or sometimes ambassadors would call me and I'd relay... So I was on the fringes, but not in the core of that.

In other ways, it's a little bit hard to separate the environment under Joan from the new Administration. I told you earlier that a new Administration came in January 21st, it was largely a distrustful attitude toward the bureaucracy in general, including me as a Carter holdover. Am I to be trusted? So I was on probation and I knew it. I was on my good behavior. So Joan, as the Director General of that Administration may have felt some of that too. She may have felt she was on probation too. So everybody was kind of careful. I

think Joan may not have been as expansive or sharing with me for that reason. Joan is very cautious, she doesn't want leaks. And the way to prevent leaks is not to tell anybody. So some things she didn't tell me because maybe in the early days she thought it would get out. Based on a friend of mine's advice I went in and knocked on her door within a month of her arrival. By then I had been in this job a year and a half. I said, "Joan, do you want me to stay, or get out of your way, pick your own deputy or whatever." And she said "No, I want you to stay." The next year I did it again; I went by after two and a half years, "do you want me to stay or look for another job?" "No, I want you to stay another year." The third time she said "Stay, and when I leave I'll get you a post. I'll put your name forward for ambassadorship." Okay. So, I stayed. And one day Joan went, and I was still there. It came as a surprise. The Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary had called me and asked if Consular Affairs was a Presidential appointment. Diego Asencio was in the job. I said, "Yes, it is." He said, "Are you sure it's one of those presidential appointment jobs?" And I said "Yes, it is." "Okay, thanks very much." The next day, Joan was called up to see the Deputy Secretary. She came back down, she called me in. I didn't tell her about my call, there was no reason to tell her. She said "The Secretary wants me to be Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, and I told him if that's what you want, that's what I'll be." So she moved over to Consular Affairs and Roy Atherton moved in. I learned later why, and I'll come back to Joan in a minute. But Atherton had been Ambassador in Egypt and the Secretary, for domestic reasons in Egypt, changes in policy I think, he wanted to change ambassadors, but had a great respect for Roy Atherton and according to Atherton asked him what he would like to do. And he said, "I'd like to be DG." And the Secretary said "You got it." They came back, other wheels were turning, Diego Asencio wanted to go to Brazil. Joan was a woman, they didn't want to kick her out, they moved her over to Consular Affairs.

Now Joan was not a shining DG. It gets a little bit back to this ambassadorship thing, diplomacy and management. The DG job is a dual job too. In some ways its a technocratic job. You need personnel expertise. The other one is a ceremonial job, there's a lot of ceremonial stuff. Most of our DGs have been very good at the ceremonial side but don't know a damn thing about the technocratic side. Joan was very good on the technical side, and therefore she didn't need me as much as say, a Harry, because much of the expertise I brought, she also had. Joan was very good on the technocratic side, very good. She and I constantly reinforced each other, so I suppose I was helpful. But she was awful on the ceremonial side, her speeches and public appearances and public ceremonial was mediocre at best. Everybody knew it, people grumbled to me "Why can't we get a DG that can run a ceremony?" Secretary Shultz went out to Andrews Air Force base to receive the body of some dead diplomat. And Joan's got to be there, the DG's got to be there. And this wasn't a role she played very well. So I think some people were happy to see her move on, even though they knew she was professionally competent. Anyway, they moved her to CA, where I understand she did a tremendous job.

Now Roy Atherton came in under the circumstances I told you. He came in at almost the same time that Ron Spiers came in as the new Under Secretary for Management. And between them, they were going to be a new broom.

Roy, I think both of them, but Roy had some preconceived ideas -- we all do -- that I put in the nostalgia category. He did something that frightened us all. We heard that in Egypt his wife Betty had an office in the Embassy, and also we heard that he had a real shrew as a secretary. So here's Roy coming in and he wants to bring this woman in as a secretary and Betty is in the office every day, taking up my time and staff time. So we're a little concerned about the role of the wife here. Overseas it's different, but here in the bureaucracy in the Department and having a difficult secretary.... Both of those kind of died away. We talked Roy out of bringing the secretary and I think after a couple of weeks Ron Spiers spoke to Roy about Betty being in the office. I guess somebody told him and he told Roy it really wasn't a good image.

Now, the impression I got from them, you know I had just spent a year and a half plus, two years under Joan Clark, implementing the Foreign Service Act. And some people didn't like the way the Act was or the way it was implemented. And I'm the wrong guy to undo all this stuff we just did. So I told Roy, even though some of the implementation I may not have agreed with and I didn't always get my way either, still, I'm not the guy to undo it all and I've now been here over three and a half years on a two year tour, so I told Roy early on, get your own executive, my time is up. I think he came in in January and I said I'd like to leave in the summer. That gives you time to get somebody. Joan told me she would propose me for a post; if you want to do that, fine; if you don't I'll look for something myself. But let's plan that you bring in your own staff. He said okay, and in the end I did get my post.

But he envisioned the Foreign Service of the 1950s -- they should be young people, Master's Degrees, 23 years old, they should come to Washington, they should get a dentist and a doctor and put them in their little black books so when they come home on home leave they've got a dentist and a doctor and they've got roots and they should buy a leather suitcase that'll last them 15 years and so on. Kind of early 19th century idealized diplomatic service. But there are a lot of things wrong with that image, and I sometimes told him what was wrong. I said "Roy, first of all you have an illegal age discrimination." Well, they were outraged! Ron too! They were shocked that some of our FSOs coming in were in their 40s, 50s even. We don't need that! We want 24 and 25 year olds for a career. And I said "Age discrimination is illegal. The law says you can't do it. "Well, what can we do?" I told them that there was something they could do that would lower the recruitment age -- lower the salary. Lower it from $25,000 to $15,000 and you'll get young people. Thirty-year olds aren't going to come in for that. But the young people will. Well, they didn't like that idea. But there's no other way you can do it. And on this idealized notion of setting up a home base in Washington, I said "These young folks do not want to set up residency in Arlington. They don't want any of this stuff you're talking about. They don't want to pay Virginia taxes for 30 years. They don't even want to get license plates. In and out of here and avoid the tax liability." So there were a lot of little practical things. And times had changed. We had the civil rights movement, we moved into the eighth decade of the 20th century, you can't go back to the '50s, as attractive as it may have been for some purposes. But that was kind of Roy's vision as I saw it, so I left shortly thereafter.

He didn't stay long either. He only stayed about a year. I'm sure he did a lot of good things and meant well...

Q: While I've got you trapped here talking about the DG, I know at one time the idea of the Director General was somebody who would stay on for a while, a senior diplomat, well respected, who also was not going to get another job. It's always bothered me to have somebody having to deal with this professional, non-career interface, and yet having to deal with looking for another job at the same time. How did you feel about that?

LAUDERDALE: Well, there's a difference between the ideal model and the real world, the hard cold world. Harry Barnes told me that Carol Laise, who had been the DG before him, told him, "Harry, we should have an incumbent Director General during the transition, so don't plan to leave with the Administration. Either leave before and let them find somebody else before the transition, or stay through the transition. Because it's an awful time to have a grass green Director General and the institution suffers if you put it through that. So, Harry told me "I'm going to stay." He could have left before the election, that year he could have gotten another post and gone. But he said he would stay a year into the new administration. Well, he got fired on January 20! It doesn't work. You can talk about it, but the world doesn't work that way.

Q: Clint, let's talk about Guyana then. Obviously it was time for you to move on and you were looking for a new job, and it was time to get something both overseas and at the ambassadorial level. But how did the system work in 1984?

LAUDERDALE: I think I told you before that when Joan Clark left unexpectedly and Roy Atherton came in as DG, Ron Spiers had come in as M, Under secretary for Management, a little before that, and I had been in this Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel about four years, and Joan had told me that at the appropriate time she would put my name forward for an ambassadorship. She never had, although she did ask me a couple of times. Once she kind of hinted about Papua New Guinea. She asked me if I wanted to go. I didn't actually give her an answer. I wasn't enthusiastic about it so I gave her an evasive answer and she didn't raise it again. Then one day she came and asked me if I would take The Gambia, and I said "No, it's just too small."

Q: That's a river.

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, it's a river.

Anyway, so I was never put forward. I guess those were a couple of opportunities. I may also have told you before that Joan was completely different in processing the ambassadorial appointments than Harry Barnes had been. Harry always had a discussion with the three of us, the other DAS who at first was Bob Gershenson and then Ron Palmer. He would have the two of us and usually I think the head of FCA in a meeting and we would go over the posts and go over the people, and his theory was that between

the three or four of us, almost always one of us knew the person, sometimes all of us knew the person! So we used to have a little caucus. But Joan came in and that stopped, there was no such discussions. First of all she knew people herself and second she was more closed. I didn't really know in those days which candidates were going for what posts. I knew when people were selected, because I got a list, but I never knew who the candidates were. But then suddenly she got transferred out and I didn't have a post. She had asked me at one point, a week or two before she left, she said, "Well, I guess there's no post for you right now. Are you interested in going to Toronto as CG?" I said, "Well, yes, but that takes me out of the running for an ambassadorship." She said: "No, not necessarily." I said: "Okay then." So after she left I was paneled for Toronto to be CG, Consul General.

I told Roy Atherton when he came in. He particularly and also Ron Spiers were like a new broom, there were a lot of things about the Foreign Service Act of 1980 that they didn't like. There were some of the implementations of it they didn't like. There were some I didn't like either. So they came in and kind of wanted to start at ground zero and I had been there four years, and I thought, I'm not the person. So I told Roy within a week or two that I'd like to move on. Get your own deputy, do your own thing. I think this was in about February or March, maybe I'll leave by the summer. Anyway, an opportunity came, I went on a list upstairs to the D Committee, and I was picked as Ambassador to Malawi. I don't think I was asked ahead of time. As far as I remember I was not. I went to look it up and I said "Okay, fine," and my name went to the White House and I'm pretty sure it was approved. So I was doing my homework to go to Malawi. And one day Ron Spiers called. He said "Clint, it's going to change. You want to go to Guyana?" I said "I don't know. How soon do you need to know?" And he said, "Right away." I called my wife, to see if she'd go with me. I tried desperately to find my wife but she had gone shopping and I couldn't find her. So I called Bob Ryan. He was a DAS at ARA and he had been proposed for Guyana about nine months before that, and got beat out by a politico. I figured he knew something about Guyana so I called him and I said, "What do you think?" He said "Take it. It's hardship but it's only five hours from Miami. So you've always got an escape valve." So a couple of hours later I called Ron Spiers back and said "Okay, I'll take it." He said: "Good, it's already arranged." He then explained that the White House had called and said that the political appointee that had been picked for Guyana, kicking out Bob Ryan, had failed to get an agrément from the host Government. He was a dentist from El Paso, who had been Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Republican Party, and had previously been proposed for Belize, and Belize had denied failed agrément. So they subsequently nominated him to Guyana, instead of Bob Ryan, and Guyana said "Well, if he's not good enough for Belize, he's not good enough for us." So the White House called over and said they wanted to send him - not to my country, Malawi, that would have been too simple - they wanted to send him to Lesotho and send the candidate for Lesotho to Malawi. And that left Lauderdale hanging loose and left Guyana uncommitted. So Ron Spiers spoke right back and said why don't we send Lauderdale to Guyana and just close the circle. And they said "Okay." So then he called me and I said okay. So that went forward.

Q: Just for the future historian. Do you know why the candidate for Belize and Guyana had been turned down?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. Belize had just gotten its independence. Before that we had had an American Consul General there. He was very popular with the Belize government officials. And they asked the U.S. government, why don't you make this guy the ambassador. But the U.S. government, in its wisdom, selected a dentist from El Paso who had not only no foreign affairs or diplomatic expertise or ever even worked for the government before. He was just a dentist who was in local political circles. So Belize said "We deserve better." A newly independent and, I suppose, sensitive country, and so they said no. Guyana then refused agrément because Belize had done so. And there were articles in the press in Lesotho which made the rounds in the State Department, an editorial which said, we're over here little old Lesotho, you think we're a babe in the woods who doesn't know what's going on, and we know that your candidate was turned down by two other countries and you figure you can foist him off on us. But still, it worked, they accepted him and he went.

Q: Well, you're heading for the shores of Latin America and all, how did you prepare for this, which was completely out of your territory and all?

LAUDERDALE: Well I had served two tours in Latin America, although this was English speaking and is considered, even though it's on the continent, to be Caribbean. In my four years as DAS for Personnel, I kept records on who was picked for Ambassador. Not biographies, but categories. I wanted to do a little research to find out who gets picked for ambassadorships and why. So I made a chart and kept records for four years. I'll read you some of the categories I created. After some experience, I put everybody in one of six categories, although most candidates got more than one tick. Often candidates fell into three categories. First of all I computed what I considered to be the ambassadorial pool. My memory is that the pool was about 200 officers, which is larger than one might think. But I put into the pool all former ambassadors, not now serving in an ambassadorship; the number of ambassadors who reached the end of their tour every year, which is another about 40; all Deputy Assistant Secretaries; all career ministers if they weren't already counted. I considered that to be the pool, and it was about 200. I also computed the opportunities, and wrote a paper to Ron Spiers about the number of ambassadorial candidates in the pool and the number of opportunities. We now have about 200 ambassadors, but at the time we had about 140 ambassadors. Tours were two or three years. I added them up and you come up with 50 or 60 ambassador appointments a year. When they changed it to three-year tours, that lowered that considerably, down to about 40. Again I wrote Ron Spiers a paper on how many ambassadorships would come up if you have a three-year tour and how many under the current system, how big the pool is, and so forth. So in this pool, all the officers are qualified to be ambassadors. So you've got a pre-screened, pre-qualified pool, and you have let's say 200 officers and 40 opportunities, and my question was which 40 get picked out of the 200 and why. We know the process but what I was charting were their decisions. My categories were: water carrier, which I defined as usually a Deputy Assistant Secretary, someone who carried the

load for an Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary, usually the principal deputy. All of these people are major decision points in the Department, often acting on behalf of a principal, but they all know each other, they're all high profile among the Under Secretaries, so you could call them high profile people. I called them "Water Carriers." Another category I created was "Bureau favored." By Bureau I mean the regional bureau, the post is Guyana, who does the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau or the principal deputy of the Bureau want. Whichever bureau controls the post, who is the favorite of that bureau. Another category was "Technocrat." We don't have so many of those anymore, but in the days of Communism, if you picked an ambassador to Poland or Czechoslovakia, they had to be country or area political experts, Soviet specialists or China specialists. If you sent a career officer to China, he was an old China hand or to Saudi Arabia you had an Arabist. I called those "technocrats." "Affirmative Action."

Q: Affirmative Action would be basically black or a woman?

LAUDERDALE: Or Hispanic. I created a category called "Promotion-Out" Somebody that was in a job, in a way you might have considered me a "promotion out." I'm a Deputy Assistant Secretary, we've got a new DG, he wants to get his own DAS, but he's got to find a way to get rid of me.

Q: You're talking about a double tick. You were a water carrier and also they had to find a job for you.

LAUDERDALE: Right, so in that case, I conceivably could have gotten two ticks, but I didn't call myself a promotion-out because I took the initiative. And then the final category I had was "Insider." An insider I defined as the college roommate of Larry Eagleburger, or Ron Spiers' former DCM. People with special inside connections. Now insiders, there weren't very many. In the four years I was there we only had about a half dozen. And even fewer promotion-outs; two or three, where they wanted to get this guy or woman out of the building. Affirmative action, you know... So anyway, those were the categories I created. The water carriers were by far the most numerous, and bureau favorites. Technocrats were according to the number of countries, declining population.

We had an off-site which PER hosted for Eagleburger, a conference out of town over on the east shore, to get people away so they can concentrate, get to know each other, and discuss things for 12 hours at a time without having telephone calls. PER, me and Bill Baucus and Andy Steigman put this on for Ron Spiers and Roy Atherton shortly after they had come, to brief them on PER. And also for them to give us some policy guidance, their thinking, on all of these things. Anyway, at this off-site, when we discussed this subject I told the group of my record keeping, and Eagleburger asked me what the categories were. I remembered, I read them off and gave a five-minute briefing, as I did here, and his conclusion was: "Well I don't see anything wrong with that." And I said, "I didn't say there was anything wrong with it. I was just doing a little research to find out what is happening and find out how the system works." So that's how I think ambassadors were chosen in those days. We had a couple of rules, probably some even that I didn't

know about. But one rule that I heard about was no first-time ambassadors over age 57. Because when Roy Atherton came in, and I sat in with him on the vetting of candidates again, the list came and it had a candidate that was 59. And I told him of the rule. He didn't like the rule; he said, "I was 59 when I was first appointed ambassador." So they scratched that rule.

Q: I've heard stories about people who were doing very well, and very obviously on their way to becoming ambassadors, but either they hadn't paid their income tax on time or there had been some impropriety, nothing awful but enough to... visas given when maybe they shouldn't have been given, or people who had squabbles with their staff and other positions as far as efficiency reports go, or something like that. Did these things play a role?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. We had several cases. These all came out through the security investigation process. As you know, candidates, after they are picked by the committee then get a security update. And security sends the file, along with a two-page summary, to the DG and Under Secretary for Management, and they decide whether the nomination will go forward. And there were some cases where the nomination, or the selection, was withdrawn. In one case, after the selection was withdrawn, the candidate came to see the Director General, complained, the DG said go take it up with Security. He got a Freedom of Information Act request, went through his file, rebutted a lot of it, demanded that things be removed from his file, some others he rebutted. In short, he sort of cleaned up his file and it went back to the Under Secretary for Management for a decision. Obviously the post that he had been selected for was gone, but he wanted a decision as to whether he could be competed for another ambassadorship. I considered it borderline, but the Under Secretary for Management said OK, he can be competed again. And we put him on the list and he subsequently was accepted. Some others were withdrawn and they resigned.

Q: When Guyana came up, how did you prepare yourself, how does an ambassador prepare himself? And did you prepare any sort of an agenda when you went out there?

LAUDERDALE: In those days, I think it's true today, the Country Desk has a checklist for new ambassadors. I suppose they did. I never saw it. But the Desk Officer lined up a series of things and told me all the people I was supposed to call up, read files obviously, you prepare for the Senate Hearing. In some cases H gives you a mock hearing, in my case they didn't because they didn't think one was necessary. Neither was I a candidate that was likely to get grilled, nor the country... So there was a process of briefing and orientation and consultations and interviews that I went through, all arranged or coordinated by the Desk Officer.

Q: What types of people were you seeing?

LAUDERDALE: Well, I went outside the building for some. Inside the building would be the ones you normally expect. Now, for example, they all go see the Inspector General. I didn't, in my day. But outside the building I went to the IDB, Inter-American

Development Bank, the World Bank, AID, USIA, Department of Agriculture about the PL 480 wheat program and some other things. Inside the building I went to FBO, etc.

Q: As you went through this, what did you see were American...I mean, this is before you go, what in 1984 were American interests and what were the things that you had to get your teeth into?

LAUDERDALE: That's very interesting because in those days the Ambassadorial letter, the Secretary of State sends everybody a letter, they didn't have those in those days, that tells them what the objectives are in their country. They didn't have the goals and objectives either. It was one of those hiatuses when they stopped it. But in those days... When I asked the Desk Officer what are the goals and objectives in Guyana he said, "Well, you know, they are not in one place, you read through the..." And I said, "Well I think we need some. I'll write some up." And he said "Oh no, don't do that." "Why not?" "Well, they'd have to get cleared and so on." Anyway I did that. I made a little back-of-the-envelope list. I thought the Senator might ask me. I made a list of seven, and had them typed up and showed them to the desk officer and asked, "Does that look ok?" And I think he edited one a little bit. So I had in my coat pocket a list of seven.

You asked where I went. One of the places I went was to the National Security Council. And another place I went, after the Hearing, one of Jesse Helms aides came up to me...

Q: You mean the Jesse Helms who was a Republican Senator from North Carolina who was very conservative and particularly had almost his own foreign policy towards Latin America.

LAUDERDALE: Yes. He was on the Foreign Relations Committee and was Chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee. And he chaired my hearing. He chairs the hearings of most ambassadors for Latin America. And after the Hearing one of his aides came up and said "Senator Helms would like to meet with you privately. So call over for an appointment." So I did that, I made an appointment for a couple of days later and went over. It so happens I didn't see him face to face because he was tied up. But his aide took me in his office and told me what the Senator wanted. He had a concern in Guyana about Russian airfields. Remember this was after Grenada...

Q: And we were very sensitive about messing around in those countries, including, well, Guyana was a prime target at that time.

LAUDERDALE: I'm reverting back now to the hearing. Well, despite my good preparation, at the hearing I was completely taken aback by his opening question. After I gave my opening remarks and said I'd be pleased to answer any questions, he said: "Mr. Lauderdale, how far is it from Guyana to Grenada?" And I didn't know. I said; "I don't know. Maybe 300 miles, just a guess." And he said, "Yeah, 300 miles or so," and I said, "Yeah, I think that's about right." And he said: "We took the airfield in Grenada. Are they building airfields in Guyana?" I said "No." And he said: "Are you sure?" I said "Yes, I'm

sure, they're not." I had been to all the briefings. I had been to the CIA. And anyway his aide called me and said "Senator Helms is interested in airfields in Guyana and he thinks they may be enlarging some landing strips or building an international landing strip. And he would like for you to write to him after you get to post, write to him and tell him what you find out about it." I said: "Okay." "And anytime you hear anything about airfields, you write regularly to Senator Helms." I said: "Okay." And then I left. And when I went to the National Security Council, they also asked me to write them a monthly newsletter on what was going on in Guyana.

Before I went to post, the last day or so I had an appointment with the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Elliott Abrams. No sorry, he came in later. It was Tony Motley at that time. Tony Motley said: "Did you finish all your consultations?" I said "Yeah." "Did you go to the National Security Council?" "Yeah." He said: "Did they ask you to write them a letter?" "Yeah." "Are you going to?" I said, "No." I told him about Jesse Helms too, and that I wasn't going to write to him either. I said that what I will do, to honor my commitment, if I give a report to the Department, letter or cable, that I think they ought to know about, I will put it on there, "Please pass to Jesse Helms or please pass to the NSC." But I'm not going to blindside you guys. And he said: "Good for you. Because I've got a guy out there who is doing that; he's a political ambassador. So we have written him a letter saying "Don't do that, do it through channels. And as a matter of fact we are now going to write a letter to all ambassadors. So don't take offense, Clint, you're going to get the first one. As a matter of fact, you write the first draft." So we did that. My Desk Officer and I wrote a draft of an ambassadorial letter, and it talks in general terms, but we also put in there what the goals and objectives of the country are and about the reporting channels, which was what the Assistant Secretary wanted. He said just put in there what it is that we want to achieve in your country and what your reporting channels are to do that. We wrote it up, and later I got the letter addressed to me when I was ambassador, signed by Elliott Abrams. And he also told me that they used the letter as a model for all the rest of Latin America and that when he sent it up for the Secretary to sign, the Secretary said "Oh, this is nice, why don't we do this for everybody?" So now we have the ambassadorial letter. That's a long answer to your question.

Q: I think it's particularly interesting because in 1984 we're still talking about relatively, the first part of the Reagan administration and you had a rather divisive, nasty little war going on within the administration, with Jesse Helms and his part of the Senate almost carrying on their own foreign policy, highly suspicious of the State Department. You had the National Security Council, which was also running somewhat amok, and the State Department trying to reconcile, not to get into an outright war, but this was a reflection of this particular period of time. And Latin America was very much the focal point. There was something called the Iran-Contra Affair that was coming out of this whole business. Am I correct in characterizing this...

LAUDERDALE: Yes, you're right. And at that time Guyana was friendly with Cuba, friendly with the Soviets, with North Korea. It was on a kind of anti-U.S. kick, it was kind of annoyed at the U.S. going all the way back to the time that the CIA had

intervened there. And they blamed a lot of their ills on us. So it was not unreasonable for Senator Helms to think that they might let an airfield be constructed there, a la Grenada. It wasn't true, but it wasn't unreasonable to suspect it.

Q: Clint, also, the Grenada business, which maybe, I think, because this is going to come up, you might describe just a little for somebody who might not be aware of what Grenada was. And also Suriname had turned pretty sour during this period too, so it looked like we were developing sort of a communist boil in the shoulder of Latin America there.

LAUDERDALE: Yes. Well, Grenada is one of the islands in the Caribbean, and as I said earlier, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guyana are considered a part of the Caribbean, even though they are on the coast of the mainland, because they were settled by European, non- Spanish European, and they had more in common with Caribbean countries than they do with the Spanish speaking mainland, because the three are French, Dutch, and English.

Anyway, as a result of a coup that had occurred there, Grenada came under the control, dictatorship one might say, of a leftist, pro-Marxist prime minister, at least temporarily, whose legitimacy wasn't all that solid. But he was in control and ran the country. He permitted Cuban technicians to come in to enlarge and extend the airport to take 747s, large tourist aircraft, under the guise that Grenada could become a tourist mecca, as many other Caribbean islands had. But they needed a good airfield. Of course the fact that they didn't have the hotels in those days is another matter. Well, this airfield would also accommodate fighter aircraft and fighter bombers and so forth, so the U.S. became concerned about the presence on an island in that location that could accept Soviet or Cuban-based MiGs or other military aircraft and questioned the economic need for it. So their intelligence and other information led them to believe that, while the country was under the control of a Marxist, this presented a threat to the United States. So eventually we invaded Grenada threw out the Marxist prime minister who ruled by the gun, and restored the country to democracy. And so of course then the democrats kicked the Cubans out, and the U.S. finished construction of the airfield.

Q: But we're still talking about a very sensitive time when you went to Guyana. I guess maybe we'd better talk about how you saw the history of Guyana before you got there, as an American-Guyanese...

LAUDERDALE: Well Guyana was kind of tricky. It was historically under the colonialship at various times of France, Britain, Holland. The Dutch came first, the French kicked them out. Then the British kicked out the French or got it in one of the European trades. It was a sugar plantation initially, and when they got their independence in 1966, about the time Trinidad and many Caribbean nations got their independence, it was a black country, the population was largely black, except for the planters. But after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1834, and the blacks refused to work in the sugar plantations, they imported indentured servants from India, and some from

Ceylon, I think, and also from Portugal and a few from China. So the population is about 40% black, maybe 45% or so Indo-Guyanese, and then a few percent Chinese, Portuguese. European was under 1%.

When they had their first election Cheddi Jagan, who was an avowed Marxist and his wife, who was an American and also an avowed Marxist--and his party, the PPP was a Communist Party, won. Of course the Indians were the majority and his party won, and his party was Communist and he was a Communist and that made Churchill and the U.S. kind of nervous. So the U.S. -- this is now public, according to the Freedom of Information Act it's time to release this information but the State Department doesn't want to do it -- but according to the stories at that time the CIA funneled money and other efforts to get the Communists out of office, and at the next election Forbes Burnham was elected. He was a black, with the non-Communist Party. So he was president when I was there, and had been president, almost 20 years, ever since independence, well-ensconced, black, representing a minority party. And the opposition party was Communist. So it was nice to talk about free elections and all that stuff, but if they were free, the Communists would probably come into power. And I'd probably be relieved as Ambassador!

Forbes Burnham was an odd kind of fellow. He was kind of sneaky and manipulative, very political and kind of postured as anti-U.S., but he transmitted signals that he wasn't all that anti-U.S., that this was just posturing. He told me once, for example: "Mr. Lauderdale, do not forget when you evaluate my regime that my opposition is the Communists. I don't have any opposition on the right. So if I want to stay in office I have to constantly usurp the left." That's all he said, but it was useful for me to know that.

So we had one election while I was there. There was some fraud. There have always been allegations of fraud. My report to the Department was that some fraud occurred but probably not enough to have altered the outcome of the election. They would not permit international observers at that time. Since then they had international observers, they had a fully free and fair election, and Cheddi Jagan won. Of course the Berlin Wall came down in the meantime, so nobody gets high blood pressure.

Q: Nobody gives a damn, really.

LAUDERDALE: But in those days they did! When the Wall was there, the Iron Curtain was there, if the Communists had won in Guyana the U.S. would have been restive.

Q: So you arrived when?

LAUDERDALE: I arrived in '84. The Ambassador's post had been vacant almost a year because it had failed agrément twice. I changed the tone. The previous ambassador, who was a black, retired admiral, had kind of played hard line with the local regime. The relationship was strained. And I decided to go the other way. I was not going to lecture them, I was not going to cause grief. I was going to try to establish friendly relations. So that's what I did, and I think it worked. There were groups that wanted me to give

speeches and rail against fraudulent elections or dictatorship or high-handed actions by the government, but I wouldn't do it.

Q: Let's talk about ambassadors. You had one of these policies where the United States was...there were a lot of pressures, particularly on the Latin American connection, to be more rightist, you might say, than in other areas. I mean, were you getting any signals that you were supposed to posture more than you felt you should? Or were you kind of left alone?

LAUDERDALE: No. I was kind of left alone. I didn't really get any instructions in the years I was down there, other than from USUN about the vote in the U.N. and some kind of worldwide stuff. I didn't get anything specific to Guyana. When I was in Washington for consultations the word I got was more or less "keep up the good work." So I didn't get any of that, and what I did do was establish good personal relationships with everybody, except Forbes Burnham. You couldn't establish a good personal relationship with him. And he didn't even see me for about four or five months. His vice-president accepted my credentials.

Q: Was this deliberate?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, I am convinced it had to be deliberate. I found in the files that a previous ambassador had wanted to see Forbes Burnham and asked for an appointment and nothing happened. And then one day, the day before he was leaving to go to the United States, he got a phone call, and they said "The president would like to see you tomorrow." And he said "Oh geez, I'm going to the United States tomorrow. I'm catching a plane at 7:40 and I'll be gone three days. But I can see him as soon as I get back." And they said, "No, thank you very much." So I read that and I wasn't sure if it was deliberate. The implication was that this was deliberate. And the same thing happened to me. You know when we are going to leave we have to notify the foreign minister. I notified the foreign minister's office that I was going to the United States, I was going a certain time, returning a certain time. And I got a call for an appointment with Forbes Burnham. So I just changed my flight schedule. It wasn't anything that couldn't be changed, so I just changed it and I didn't say a damn word. But I think it was deliberate.

Q: Let's talk a little about the Embassy. Here you had a DCM who I guess had been charge for about a year or so. How did you...this sometimes is a difficult relationship, because somebody has been running the show for a year, and even though you're both professionals, somebody else appears -- that's a little difficult. How did this work?

LAUDERDALE: Well, a lot of strange things happened. He left a week before I got there. That was David Beale. He is now DCM in Brazil, I think, somewhere down there, Mexico maybe. I wanted him to stay, but it didn't work out. I delayed my own arrival, by the way, because in my consultations one of the things I asked for was an appointment with the President and a photo-op. For the piano, you know. And it didn't come. In the meantime I went around about my own business, and I was going to get there in the

middle of June in order to host the 4th of July. We had ordered napkins and hot dogs and all that stuff. Well, about three or four days before I was scheduled to leave -- and then I would have overlapped with the DCM for a couple of weeks -- the White House called over and said "You have an appointment on Wednesday." And I said, "Well, I was leaving for country on Tuesday. But I'll tell you what, it's the President of the United States, I'll change my plans." So I called the post and said I had to delay my departure by about ten days. I don't want to arrive on July 2. So I'm going to push it past July 4. I'll come about the 10th or something, you guys go ahead and have your 4th of July or whatever. The DCM left about the 6th. So my new DCM arrived a day or two before I did.

Q: How did you find the Embassy? What was the staffing like and what was your impression? You're an old hand now, you've been around. How did you feel about it?

LAUDERDALE: I thought the staffing was pretty good. I was more upset and concerned about the physical facilities. This is already a hardship post, but in this hardship post the office is a firetrap and a fleabag, and the residence is old, a 100-year old wooden colonial house and the air conditioning goes clank, clank, clank at night. So the staff of Americans and FSNs, I liked the American staff just fine, we got on just fine and didn't have any real strains. I had decided given the circumstances in this country, even though I had served in a lot of high-profile, hectic environments, that this was not the place to crank things up and create a boiler room and all of that. I said, this is a low profile kind of take it easy post. So I did that. I didn't demand the cables at 7:30 in the morning, I didn't keep my secretary and the communicator til late at night. We were in the same time zone as Washington, and I told the Political Officer when he rushed in with his 5:00 cable that we'd send it out tomorrow, at 10:00. And that worked. The communicator went home, in fact I deliberately didn't go to the office for about 30 minutes after office hours so that my secretary could open up, get the cables and have them for me, without having to come in early. And I did the same thing in the afternoon. She's supposed to go home at 5:00, I tried to get out at quarter to five so she wouldn't have to work overtime. And the communicator was supposed to be out by 5:30. Most of the time that's the way it worked, unless we had an election or a little flap, which wasn't often, maybe once a quarter something would come up. But mostly, day to day, it would work just the way you talked about. So I tried to...I emphasized morale and baseball games on Saturday and stuff like that, and I think it worked well.

Q: Were there any repercussion from the Jonestown business then, this was the mass suicide, about 900 or more, maybe 1200 people who settled in the hinterland on a...

LAUDERDALE: A cult, a largely black cult...

Q: Charismatic leader, these were all Americans and the upshot was that an American Congressman was killed and the DCM at the time was wounded. It was really very nasty. This was about '79. So, was this still hanging around?

LAUDERDALE: It wasn't so much hanging around. it was something people talked about, particularly people outside Guyana, in the United States if I told somebody I was Ambassador to Guyana they'd say "Oh, Jonestown." But in Guyana it wasn't talked about very much. It was, you know, passe. There were still some goings on, we got a visit fairly regularly, either from the FBI or from the Justice Department, there were still some prosecutions going on in Los Angeles. So a lawyer, an investigator, or a prosecutor would come down occasionally to interview witnesses or follow up in some way. Or in a few cases we contacted witnesses and got them on the plane to Los Angeles, but that's really about all. I went out and inspected the site, so many people asked me about it I thought I should see what it was like, but it was just covered with weeds, there wasn't much there.

Q: Were there any major issues that you had to tangle with of one nature or another there. You were there from '84-'87.

LAUDERDALE: Their U.N. voting record in favor of the U.S. was very low, very low. So I got pressures from the USUN and IO to influence their vote on Antarctica or Israeli credentials or... In most cases it was completely unsuccessful. I did my duty, I made my talking points, went over to see the Foreign Minister. But I didn't change anything, really.

Q: Did you have a feeling that this was a way of showing the left that they weren't in the pocket of the United States more than anything else? Not spite, but just to show that they didn't get along with the United States. Or was this a personality thing of whoever was their ambassador at the U.N. or the foreign minister?

LAUDERDALE: No, I think it was two other things. One, they were a poor country. They wanted and needed foreign aid, and they sought it where they could get it. They got it from the Soviet Union, they got some from East Germany, North Korea, all kind of poor countries, but still those countries helped Guyana. So association with the "outs" so to speak, bore them some fruit. And they cultivated those. Their instructions to their ambassadors, I happen to know, was that they should garner more foreign aid than it cost to run their missions. That was kind of the minimum. If you didn't do that, we're going to bring you home. But hopefully in the hundreds of thousands, maybe the millions, send tractors, send trucks, whatever you can get. And they did a lot of barter trade, so they didn't earn enough dollars. Their principal export was sugar and rice, and they had a U.S. sugar quota, which was their mainstay, really, but they kept the U.S. at arms length in order to get aid from other countries. On the other hand, the United States stopped aid. We closed the AID mission during my time, and got an editorial that kind of said "Good riddance." I went over and protested to the foreign minister about it and asked for a retraction, but he told me, he called me three days later and said "No, we're not going to retract it. We didn't dictate it but we're not going to retract it either." So I said, "well, you may want it back one day and you may regret that editorial." And he said, "Well, that's how it is." So I think it was... they got aid from Cuba, they were friendly to Cuba, because I think they thought that's where their bread was buttered.

Q: What sort of aid had we been giving and why did we shut it down? I mean, was this on your watch or had this been made before?

LAUDERDALE: The decision had been made before I went. There's an amendment, I've forgotten the name of it, to the Foreign Assistance Act that says that aid will be cut off to any countries that is in arrears in their payment by a certain amount. Guyana was in arrears and they triggered that statute that they couldn't get more aid because they were in arrears in their payment for prior aid. As to what kind of AID, it wasn't a big program, maybe four million a year in the areas of public health, public transportation. We built health clinics, mostly for the Indians; we built some highways, which are expensive, as you know. We had an agricultural project, we did experiments and research on rice seeds and gave Guyana some improved grains of rice. So it was agriculture, transportation, and public health, as I recall.

Q: How about relations with the Cubans. Was this something we were watching with concern at that time?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. We were concerned about their relations with Cuba. There was a Cuban ambassador there, whom I was not allowed to talk to, by the way, so at diplomatic functions where we were all present I always made sure I sat at opposite ends of the table. Although once I got trapped next to him and we exchanged a few pleasantries, that's all. He wasn't a very gregarious or friendly or likeable person anyway, so it was pretty easy to avoid him. Yes, we were suspicious of the relationships with Cuba. As you know Cuba had for years fomented revolution in Latin America, so we were watching them pretty carefully.

Q: Well, was it an over-riding concern that Jagan, the Communist, Marxist Party was going to take over by fair means or foul? Was that something you were watching?

LAUDERDALE: It wasn't so much we were concerned about Jagan. It wasn't so much that we were concerned internally either. What we were concerned about was the international aspect; that there would be some treaty of alliance or mutual assistance with East Germany, the Soviet Union, the North Koreans, or worst of all, Cuba. That they would set up some bases or have a base of operations. So that was our primary concern, to keep the Communist powers from having another stronghold in the Caribbean area. Now theoretically if Jagan and his Communist Party came to office that threat would be increased. But in fact it happened even under Forbes Burnham, so I didn't see any increased threat by the election of Jagan per se, but, except the public relations aspect, the publicity it would get in the United States, that you've got another communist country, that's semi-communist now, in the sense that they are friendly with all these and cater to these other communist powers. But it would have been more public, high-profile, and would have caused a little bit more trouble.

Q: Did you have any relations with Jagan?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. I called on him and invited him to my residence and so forth. I didn't mix him. When I had government or diplomatic officials or so forth I usually didn't invite him. But occasions like the 4th of July, or if it was a larger group or a reception...Secretary Elliott Abrams came down during my time. Burnham died, and Abrams came down for the funeral, so on occasions like that I would have Cheddi Jagan over. I tried to talk to him, but I found out we couldn't talk unless we talked about...[tape cut off]... I talked to him a few times, and I knew his sister quite well and I had a lot more contact with her. She was the wife of a Guyanese businessman whom we liked and associated with quite regularly, and I asked her about her brother. But I figured I had to talk to him once or twice, just to make sure. But what I found was that he was ideologically a Marxist, and you can argue or discuss till you're blue in the face but you're not going to change anything, so I didn't try.
Q: How about his wife, was she still an American citizen?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, I think she maintained her citizenship. And she also was ideologically a Marxist. So I'm not going to talk to these folks about Communism or democracy, it's useless. So we talked about Guyana, or New York, or Florida, or the Caribbean or other things when we socialized.

Q: How about American business in the area. Was there much American business presence there?

LAUDERDALE: All of the American expatriate business people had gone by the time I came. The economy had soured so bad, Citibank closed its office, Barclay's Bank closed its office. Some of the bigger industries there, like the bauxite and the sugar industries had been nationalized before. The bauxite was American and the Sugar was British. They had both been nationalized. There were no American expatriate citizens. There was one. he was the manager of the flour mill, which was U.S. owned. There were some other American companies, but they were run by Guyanese. I went to the Chamber of Commerce meetings and so forth and there were some American investments and interests, but no Americans. There was one other, it wasn't in Guyana it was up in the Bauxite mines, I think it was, Green Construction. They did the bauxite mining and there were 27 Americans up there. We used to go up and play a little baseball game.

Q: What about the, I mean, the, we were very much involved in a war, guerrilla war and all in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Did that play at all in Guyana? Did you find yourself having to explain it?

LAUDERDALE: Yes, yes, because Guyana's position on that was very similar to Mexico's. Guyana thought we were off-base in our fear for Nicaragua. They were themselves friendly toward Nicaragua. Yes, that's something we gave them information on. Among other things, votes would come up in the U.N., you know at one time we mined the harbor in Nicaragua, and Guyana, you know, its the usual outrage along with the rest of the Marxist-Leninist world. I was not able to convince them, mostly, however. They just had a different perspective on it. Some Americans did too.

Q: How about the press?

LAUDERDALE: There were two newspapers. One was the Party, the Guyana Chronicle was actually put out by Burnham's Party, the PNC. The Catholic Church had a little flyer that was the only thing that approached an independent newspaper, that we all waited for weekly, it was about four pages. During my tenure I helped get started an independent newspaper. There were people there that wanted to run an independent newspaper, but they needed grants and loans and they needed a press and paper. You couldn't get paper in Guyana and you had to have dollars to buy it. So they got a grant from the organization that was set up by the Congress, I've forgotten what it's called now, there's one set up by the Democratic Party and one by the Republicans. They give grants. So they got a grant of I think $50,000 and probably a printing press, and for the last year and a half that I was in Guyana we had an independent newspaper and that helped quite a bit. And also television came. Somebody set up a local television station, pulled it down off the satellite and rebroadcast it. Theoretically you're supposed to pay a royalty on that, and countries do pay royalties to the networks. But Guyana was so poor that they either waived it or didn't care. So... most of this was after Burnham died and Desmond Hoyt, who had been vice president, became the president. He was more tolerant of a lot of this stuff.

Q: What happened when Burnham died, how did this impact and how did you see it at the time.

LAUDERDALE: Burnham died prematurely because of his ideological convictions and posturing. He was kind of a victim of his own style. He had some problem with his vocal chords, and they needed to be scraped or whatever. It's not a procedure I'm familiar with. But he had postured so much, and he was too proud to go to the United States for medical treatment. In the past he had usually gone to Britain. But his advisers convinced him that he should do it in Guyana, and they had Cuban-trained doctors in Guyana. Most of the Guyanese who wanted to become doctors, they'd send them off to Cuba to medical school. And also in the past he had on occasion gone to Cuba for medical treatment. But in this case, they brought two Cuban doctors to Guyana and the operation was to occur in the Guyana Hospital. The significance is that it requires full anesthesia. I had been in a Guyana hospital once overnight -- you wouldn't want to be in a Guyana hospital. Anyway, he didn't survive. He never came out of anesthesia. They didn't really have the right equipment, or the equipment they had didn't work. So he died as a result of that, which would have been a minor procedure, except for the full anesthesia, in any American or British hospital.

Q: Well, did this cause much change?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, quite a bit. Desmond Hoyt, who was much more moderate, much more reasonable, became president. He an I had been friendlier, as I said I couldn't really be friendly with Forbes Burnham, but Hoyt had always been friendly with me from the beginning, from my first call. Of course he was circumspect, he wasn't going to embrace

me or anything like that. But he would send signals that he appreciated what I was doing and that he wanted to continue to work with me. Now he was president. He reversed some of the Burnham policies -- he authorized the importation of flour, the re-opening of the flour mill the reimportation of wheat, I should say, through the PL 480 Program, and I went to see him to talk about that. He changed some of the cabinet members, he let the new newspaper open up, because the previous administration wouldn't give them a permit for importing newsprint. He let the TV station start, so more communications, more access to information occurred.

Q: This, of course, is an unclassified interview, but it's a question I often ask. How did you find your relations with the CIA. I would think this would be an area where you might be stepping on each others' toes.

LAUDERDALE: Well, there may be things I don't know, I have to acknowledge that even though I was the ambassador, but as far as I know, things were very good. They told me everything they were doing, in some cases they needed my approval, in some cases they probably didn't. When I thought it was reasonable, I gave approval. I personally liked the station chief and most of the staff. A couple of them I thought were kooky. But the relationship was on the whole harmonious and fruitful.

Q: Did you keep on sniffing around for airfields, or was this sort of passe by this time?

LAUDERDALE: No. I did several things. One, I asked to be briefed by the CIA. I had had a briefing before the Senate hearing, and they have some satellite pictures and they take some. Now I don't know how extensive it was, I didn't ask for any special satellite sweeps or any of that stuff. Maybe Senator Helms did. But they told me that as far as they knew there were no airfields being constructed. As far as they knew.

Q: It's pretty hard in that kind of area to come up with some secret field.

LAUDERDALE: Yeah, although Guyana's pretty big. On the other hand, to build an airfield you have to have bulldozers and equipment and gasoline, and there were no roads, you'd have to fly in the gasoline, and that couldn't have happened without my knowing it.

Q: And also you get a big gash and we're taking pictures of the world all the time. It's not something that...

LAUDERDALE: What we did find was that except for the highway up to Linden... Guyana had three highways, one along the coast, one up to the bauxite mines at Linden, and one out to the airport. Beyond that there are no paved roads. On the other hand, it's a big country and communication and transportation within the country are by river and by air. So they have a lot of small, one and two-engine airplanes, and that's how they deal with the interior. So there are quite a few little landing strips around Guyana, and often they wanted to improve them, enlarge them, and in a couple of cases that's what they were doing. Upgrading the quality of a little landing strip, maybe putting gravel on it, or if it

has gravel maybe cementing it or something. I found a couple of places where that's what they were doing. And I flew out to Jonestown and we landed on a little landing strip. It's hard ground with a little gravel on top. And I had been to some others. So I had a sense of what these little landing strips looked like and in a few places I found out that the government was trying to upgrade them a little bit, and I think that's all it was.

Q: Well, did you get around, sort of in the outback or whatever you call it?

LAUDERDALE: Some, but not as much as others. The Canadian Ambassador was more adventurous. He went into the backwoods and the wilds, and his canoe turned over in the river and he got wet and lost his $200 hunting rifle, and he slept in tents and was eaten by mosquitoes. I didn't do that. I wasn't interested in that. We went up to lumber mills when the businessman that owned it invited us for a boat ride up the river to the landing mill, have lunch with us and come back. So we did some of that but we didn't do any of the real roughing it into the interior.

Q: Were there any fleet visits from the Soviet or American navies that sort of stuck in your mind?

LAUDERDALE: No. There was a threatened fleet visit by a U.S. ship a couple of times, but there was nothing significant that I can remember either from the Soviets or American.

Q: How about official visits?

LAUDERDALE: No, you don't get many of those down there. Elliott Abrams came down for the funeral with an entourage of four people. Otherwise, our visitors were all working level -- like the desk officer, country management level, telephone technician. We got significant numbers of visitors, but I don't think I got anybody of senior rank except for Elliott Abrams and his entourage.

Q: Well, it was a relatively... it was a working period, but with no great upsets, except having the head of state die...

LAUDERDALE: That, and the election was during my time. They have them every five years. Those were the high points.

Q: How did you feel about the election? How was it run?

LAUDERDALE: Well, we monitored it and participated in election activities. I thought there was some... I didn't cable the State Department my opinion for two or three days because I wanted some more... but more and more congratulations came in from the British and the French, and everybody had congratulated Forbes Burnham on his election except the United States. But I was trying to get more reports, interview more people. I went to see the bishop. There was a time when they were raking the bishop over the coals

because he was a democrat and he would speak out. Once when he spoke out and they had a nasty editorial in the paper about him, I made a point to go see him the next day.

I would call and have a cup of coffee and so forth and give him encouragement, which he seemed to appreciate. Of course I had the big black cadillac, so everyone would know of my visit. So I did things like that, I interviewed as many people as I could, that I thought were objective. I didn't endorse Cheddi Jagan.... Based on my conversations with people, our conclusion was that there was some cheating, some irregularities but it wasn't massive and it didn't affect the outcome. So that's what I told the State Department and suggested that they congratulate Forbes Burnham on his election. And they even used the language I sent, that there were some irregularities, some evidence of fraud but they didn't seem to be so massive or grand in scope that they determined the outcome of the election. Whether that was true or not I really don't know.

Q: You left there when?

LAUDERDALE: In June 1987. FBO was going to build a new Chancery in the compound of the residence, so a new residence would be needed. I sent a cable to FBO saying I would not approve the new Chancery until they developed a plan for a new residence. I got a cable back that said "Well, we don't know, but maybe the Ambassador could take the DCM's residence", because they looked in their little book and saw that we owned a DCM house. And I cabled back that the DCM house is hardly adequate for the DCM. As a matter of fact the DCM thinks he needs a better house, but I said, well you've got to wait, we've got to take care of the ambassador's residence first. So that is not a solution. So I finally got a commitment out of them that they would build an ambassador's residence. Not in my time, of course. So then progress went forward and I was supposed to move out of the residence in March so they could start construction on the site, and my tour was up in June. So where was I going to move in March? We didn't have a house. We scouted the market and we couldn't find one. The GSO, the Admin. officer did the screening and every time we thought he'd found one I'd go look. We didn't have a place for me to live, and construction and all that, a permanent facility is going to be two years away. So finally I wrote to the DG and the Assistant Secretary and said my time is up in June, but I'm going to be evicted from my house in March with no real place to live and really, I don't want to move. So why don't I tell you folks right now that I'd like to come out in March -- I did this in September -- and you can put my job on the list and get a new ambassador. I got a letter back from both of them kind of lamenting, saying that's too bad, and saying gee we'd really like for you to stay til June, but even though this was September, we've already picked an ambassador, she's in the senior seminar and doesn't graduate until June, so will you stay til June. So I said okay, I'll stay til June. Then, come March, it turned out FBO wasn't ready and I got to stay in the house right up til June. Of course the new ambassador was mad because she didn't have anywhere to live. So I said "Look, go talk to FBO." And then FBO was not going to let her move into the house at all, so I interceded. Because by then construction had been deferred until August. I said, let her move into the house, let her have her welcome reception, it proved very handy for me. She needs to have her reception to meet everybody and probably give

a party for the staff. She can do that in the first couple of months and then she can move to a hotel until she finds another place. So they finally relented and that's what happened. She moved into the residence, and I think in the meantime found a temporary residence. It was not adequate, by the way. It was a one bedroom house. It had a nice representational area but only one bedroom, which would not have been adequate for me, and she lived there, I think, for most of her tour. And they never did build the house. I think subsequently they may have found something more suitable and more permanent. I think they arranged with somebody else to build one for us that we would than rent or something like that. So it was finally solved about five years later.

Q: So you came back, what did you come back to? Or did you come back to anything?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. The DG called me. I was impressed that George Vest called me personally, you know how it is, small-time ambassador. He said that Ron Spiers wanted me to do a project for him for the summer, and then in August would I become a senior inspector, team leader? I said, "Are the two linked." He said "No, not necessarily." I said, "I'll take the project. I'd prefer to go overseas or do something different, but I'll let you know." In due course I took both, I did the project and then I reported on Labor Day to OIG, just at the time there was a big OIG upheaval. Harrop left and his organization was abolished and incorporated into a larger OIG under Sherman Funk. So Sherman Funk reported on duty in August, I reported on duty in August, as a part of the inspection staff that he had just absorbed.

Q: Well what was your special project before you came into the OIG?

LAUDERDALE: Foreign Service mail system. Ron had been getting a lot of complaints about the Foreign Service mail system and asked me if I'd do a study of it. And I said yes, and I wrote him a report with 11 recommendations, all of which he accepted and ordered implemented.

Q: Let's talk about the inspection system. You were there at the time of a great upheaval. Could you explain what happened to the inspection system?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. State Department had had an office of Inspector General for a long time, I think since 1906. Many of the other agencies, a few now are creating offices of inspection, but most other agencies don't have an office of inspection. Some of them might not need them. You need an inspection system especially for the Foreign Service, and from 1906 up to the 1970s, it was under the Inspector General of the Foreign Service, and they inspected the Foreign Service only, I stress only. And it is critical for the Foreign Service. But in the '70s they found that they could not solve all the problems of the Foreign Service that they encountered without dealing with the bureaucracy back home, so they started inspecting domestic bureaus as well. Now in the meantime, in 1986 Congress passed, actually it was earlier, in the late '70s, Congress passed an OIG Act, that required every major agency of the government to establish an office of the inspector general with an office of audits and an office of investigations. State got itself exempted

from that law on the basis that "We're different, we already have an Inspector General, etc. etc." So State continued kind of on its own. But that provided a source of constant frustration to the rest of the government. When they had meeting of inspectors general, State wasn't there. Or if they were there, they didn't fit, etc. etc. Reports to make, forms to fill out, and we don't follow the format. There were also some substantive reasons too. Again, Senator Jesse Helms and other felt that Foreign Service inspecting the Foreign Service was the Old-Boys inspecting the Old Boys, and that ain't good enough, that these inspectors should be civil servants and they should be outside the network. So in '86, Congress amended the OIG Act to incorporate State, and they included a provision in the amendment that the Inspector General can no longer be a Foreign Service Officer. So they cast the net and came up with Sherman Funk. Harrop's tour was over anyway. State had already created an office of Inspector General with Audits and Investigations, but Harrop's inspection corps remained separate. So after Sherman Funk was selected, negotiations were entered into with Harrop and his deputy to incorporate this Office of Inspections under the new OIG. And that happened, and that's the same time that I was reporting for duty. Sherman Funk brought with him all of his front office staff, from elsewhere, Commerce mostly, he came from Commerce. His secretary and his aide and his lawyers and his investigative staff came from other agencies, outside State. And he built up the audit staff, which had been 10, to 90, and the investigative staff, which had been three or four, to 50. All civil servants, mostly outsiders. And then the Office of Inspections, which was almost exclusively Foreign Service, was incorporated in that. So there was a certain degree of cultural shock all around, internally and externally. Internally there was a lot of, there were attitudes by these new groups, from Sherman on down, that inspections protects the Foreign Service, that there are a lot of crooks and thieves that don't get prosecuted because the inspectors shield them, and we're going to ferret them out and all this stuff. So there was considerable strain.

Q: How were you received in all this, I mean you're part of the old-boy network?

LAUDERDALE: I was viewed as Mister Foreign Service, not to be trusted. Eventually, two things happened over the five years that I was in OIG. One was that I convinced them of my talent, I think, and bona fides, and two was that they became a little bit more acculturated, so a lot of that has been toned done, dissipated now, but not all of it.

Q: Well, I must say that sometimes when I go back to the Foreign Service, where people are getting shot at, going through earthquakes, malaria, a lot of very difficult things, the big signs on the walls seem to be "Waste, Fraud, Mismanagement." If you look at what is displayed on the walls, that seems to be the main purpose, which is not very inspiring. I mean... how did you feel about this organization? Were these people out to get people? If you've got so many investigators, you've got to have raw meat to throw to them all of the time.

LAUDERDALE: Well, if you recall back in the 1980 election, one of Ronald reagan's campaign promises and slogans was he was going to ferret out all of this waste, fraud, and mismanagement within the government. How are you going to increase defense,

balance the budget and cut taxes? And his answer was we're going to stop waste, fraud, and mismanagement. So there was a great kind of philosophy of these outsiders on the Reagan team and political conservatives that there is a lot of waste, fraud, and mismanagement, including in State Department. Now, we know that over in the Welfare Department there's a lot of fraud, and other places where people get money, but State Department really doesn't dispense any money. But nevertheless, there must be a lot of waste, fraud, and mismanagement and we're going to find it out. Besides, you've got all these Foreign Service people protecting these Foreign Service people and you don't even know! So there were some strains. In the years I was there they didn't find very much. They didn't prosecute very many Foreign Service people, they didn't find very many crimes. One of the constant irritations I had was one of the things the inspectors always did is when they found misconduct cases, they dealt with them. They usually were not criminal. They were an abusive ambassador or an unfair admin. officer that plays favorites, or a little hanky-panky here and there. Sometimes you got an alcoholic. Inspectors used to ferret this out and deal with it, but we got this new big OIG with 50 investigators and they're not interested in that, they're interested in criminal prosecutions. Somebody's overpaid on his voucher? They want to prove fraud. What fraud? We had a case of an ambassador in Germany who gave a representational affair. He took three members of the press to lunch and bought them lunch for $100 each, so the bill was $400, and I took great pride in collecting that because it didn't meet the requirements and regulations. It wasn't fraud, it was waste and bad judgment. The investigators weren't interested. So as an inspector I was able to do that. That's the kind of stuff inspectors did. They wanted us to refer everything to them, but if so, that killed it for two years, because by the time they investigated and decided to present it to the Justice Department for prosecution and they decided there's no case, then they give it back and say okay, now you guys can deal with it. Well, you're not at post any more. Because these problems we used to solve right on site, right now.

Q: I did a history of the American Consular Service, and in 1906 inspectors were called consuls-general at large, and they would go around and do exactly this. They'd act as traveling psychiatrists, settle problems, see where problems were, try to take care of this thing. Like the officer on the beat, who can take care of problems before they turn it into a federal case. Did you see as you dealt with this, did you see a change, and an understanding that the main job of the inspectors, really, once you take care of the obvious fraud things, is to settle problems on the beat?

LAUDERDALE: Only moderately. Mostly these outside civil service types do not accept that this is a role for the OIG. They don't understand the inspector's role, because the inspector's role as it grew up, we were really an arm of management. We would clean up the messes for management, and these folks had a different concept of OIG. For them, OIG was an outside, semi-independent agency, like the FBI, to investigate crime, find fraud, prosecute it. So, the DCM is a drunk in Timbuktu? That's not an OIG problem. The Admin. Officer is sexually harassing one of the staff? That's not OIG, that's management, that's EEO or management. So they weren't too interested in these issues, but they didn't want the inspectors or anyone in OIG to do them either. If it were wrongdoing they want

to investigate it, and if it's not criminal they want to drop it. So, that was always a source of stress with me.

Q: How did you find Sherman Funk? Because Sherman Funk, whom I have interviewed, was the first one, and he came in and there was distinct hostility, even before he arrived on the scene he was seen as a creature of Jesse Helms, which he wasn't actually, but this was the perception, and he had been dealing in a whole different field. Can you talk a little about Sherman Funk and your relations with him?

LAUDERDALE: I have a lot of respect for Sherman Funk, and he for me. I think he has a lot of talent and ability, and he also has the right ideology. I think the Department was very lucky to get him as its first outside Inspector General. I do think that he was kind of dramatic, I do think his affect on the bureaucracy was kind of traumatic, but in retrospect I think that that was necessary.

Q: You had to hit them on the head with a two-by-four to get their...

LAUDERDALE: Exactly, because a lot of the Department, we have a lot of people in the State Department today who are not interested in affirmative action, they're not interested in equal employment opportunities, so that kind of attitude projects to other things. When you talk about improprieties and irregularities, and I'll tell you a story in a minute, a lot of people weren't interested. So Sherman got their attention.

I'll tell you a quick story. OIG, not very long ago, got a hot line complaint about an ambassador. It came from a member of the staff, who said the ambassador is finagling, he's manipulating, he's, you know, building a swimming pool or whatever it is he's doing. OIG read it over -- the reason I know about it is they thought about asking me as a retiree, to go out and check into it. They found out that it wasn't criminal, so the investigators didn't want it. It was just some irregularities, but not criminal. So they gave it to the Bureau, with the recommendation that the Bureau ask me to go check into it, not as an OIG man but as a Bureau Management official. The Bureau decided not to have me do it. So the next time I was in the Bureau, I asked them, whatever happened to that case. They said, "We're going to send a post management officer to look at it." And they said, they mentioned the ambassador's name, who I'll say is Joe, they said: "You're talking about old Joe, for God's sake. Old Joe wouldn't do that! Old Joe's not guilty of some wrongdoing. That's out of the question!" That's the kind of attitude. Well, I talked to them sharply. I said "Listen, don't be so quick to brush this off, and your post management officer better interview the person who complained. Because if you don't, he'll complain louder, like a letter to Jesse Helms, or a letter to the Secretary and you'll be sorry you didn't listen. So even though you think old Joe wouldn't do that, you better check it out. So I kind of stiffened their backbone a bit, but you had some of that. Not in the inspection system, in the Department. So Sherman got their attention with some of his drama, but didn't find a lot of crime.

Q: Well when you were in inspection were you able to do some of what I called the "officer on the beat" straightening out local problems?

LAUDERDALE: Yeah. I got criticized within OIG several times for it too. I found this representation case, for example. The reason I recollect it is it occurred outside the country. This was the ambassador to Germany, drove over to France to a one-star restaurant, took three reporters to lunch, $100 bucks each and turned in a bill for $400. And I showed him regulations that say "for representation within your country of assignment." This is in France. Pay it back. Well, when I came back I got criticized. You shouldn't do that. You find irregular vouchers you should give it to the investigators. And I said, "It's low priority for them. They won't investigate it for a year or two. The ambassador's gone, the admin. counselor's gone. They'll find out that it was inadvertent, they'll refer it to the Justice Department, the prosecutor says no, and then it comes back to me to fix. Forget it. I've had too many cases like that. At other posts I collected on irregular vouchers, through misunderstanding. And every time I got criticized by OIG. Because the other system, the witnesses are gone, the people have been transferred, you can't fix the problem. So when I was convinced it wasn't criminal, I fixed it myself. I did that, even though OIG criticized it.

Q: How about other, you know, we use senior Foreign Service people to go out on these inspections, do they have to continue working in the same way. It sounds like an apples and oranges type operation, an operation that's geared up for the big case, when you have a little minor petty problems.

LAUDERDALE: You mean at OIG or at Inspections?

Q: Well, I'm having trouble understanding. The OIG is Sherman Funk's operation. But within that inspectors go out, they're part of Sherman Funk's organization, aren't they? What are they doing?

LAUDERDALE: Oh, they inspect both posts and bureaus. Their mandate is not criminal activity or even wrongdoing. Their mandate is efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. Are things organized right? Is the job getting done? Is money being wasted? And so forth. And in most cases they find things where economies can be effected, where things can be done better and so forth. That's what the inspections do. Now inspections are done organizationally and geographically. Audits are done only functionally. They take a specific function, like security guard program or travel vouchers or leased property. They take some function and audit it in depth. And then investigators investigate crimes and wrongdoing.

Q: It sounds like you've got a huge staff. In the first place you've got regular auditors who are going through the books anyway. And to have, as you say, auditors who are maybe 90 people and 50 investigators, I mean, it sounds like this is part of waste, in a way. You've got a very big operation to go out and pick up rather minor activities.

LAUDERDALE: Well, I often said that the inspectors should inspect OIG. Because as I said, efficiency, effectiveness and so forth, and it was actually semi-seriously proposed at one time, because we inspect everybody else for efficiency, economy, and effectiveness and write up a report. And I jokingly said after working there for five years, I can write up a report without even doing an inspection. One of the problems I think is the way they are organized. The way they are organized, they need all these people. Their attitude and their organization require that, and I'll take both cases.

Audits they break up functionally, and they're not just working when they're auditing they're monitoring all the time. They read cables all the time from the State Department. They take a function like INM, the International Narcotics Matters, or they take a function like the Office of Security or FMP, and they have a division in Audits to read all their cables and so forth and then periodically they go audit, but in the meantime they monitor and they work and they challenge and they question and so forth. You and I might think auditors might be able to go audit an organization that they haven't monitored, but the way they do it, its a kind of a year-round activity, and they cover the entire Department. Somebody monitors Personnel and somebody else Consular, they have a Consular branch, and if you do it that way, to cover all the organizations, you need 90 people.

Investigators do the same thing. They are organized geographically, as if some geographical expertise, as if a voucher thief in Stockholm might have something in common with a voucher thief in Berlin, but not Timbuktu.

Q: It's a traditional duplication of...

LAUDERDALE: Well that's the way OIG is organized in other Departments and most of their procedures they just brought with them, and they don't fit.

Q: During the time you were there, from '87 til around '93, were inspectors going out... I mean an inspector arrives and problems surface, I mean all of us have sort of saved up to unload on the inspectors, particularly at the more junior levels, where you feel there are problems. But most of these problems are not criminal, but they certainly are organizational and often deal with personalities. How were you all treating these personality problems which were coming out and were affecting the management of...

LAUDERDALE: When I joined, the inspectors were almost exclusively Foreign Service and the whole system was geared for that. The new people come in the summer, we had a training session, an orientation session, you start inspecting in the fall and so forth. Well Sherman changed most of that. More than half of the inspectors are not civil servants. That had some unintended consequences. One is that the new crop of foreign service inspectors every year only totals four or five. We used to have Eagleburger and all of the Assistant Secretaries come talk at an annual grouping of inspectors. This last year they didn't do that. The rest of OIG resented it. They didn't have the training program either. Didn't have enough people. Because now most of the inspectors don't rotate out. There were when I started 42 inspectors, it's down a little bit to 38 or 40, more than half are civil

service, so you only have about 10 or 12 Foreign Service inspectors, so each year you may only get five or six. The civil servant ones, many are ex FSOs that retired early, and were hired as civil servants. And the others that were pure civil service have been doing it so long that they have a Foreign Service ambience about them. So what do they do? They do what the Foreign Service inspectors have always done. They're not as good. An FSO 1, if he goes out and talks to a Political Officer who has some problem with FCA, he may be able to help that officer. The civil servant can't do that the same. They just don't know how. But we deal with Personnel problems, somebody on the team does basically the same way as we always did.

Q: Maybe we might close at this point. Do you have any final things to say about the inspection thing or how you felt about the career as a whole?

LAUDERDALE: Yes. I was promoted to senior rank - FSO-2 (now OC) in 1975, just before I went from Bonn to Madrid; and to FSO-1 (now MC) in 1980, just before I became DAS for Personnel. My rank was converted to MC in 1980, and I subsequently recieved two LCE's of 3 years each. LCE's were stopped, and I reached my time in class of 1990, when I was DAS for Inspections in OIG. I filed a grievance, and my time was extended a few months while it was being considered. I was mandatorily retired in January, 1991, at age 60. Ironically, that's the same time I would have been required to retire (at age 60) under the old system. It was still two or three years earlier that I wanted to retire. A big pay raise had been approved in 1989 after having been capped for several years, and I benefitted from only 1 year of the higher pay for my annuity, which is based on the high 3 years of salary. And of course, I had virtually no chance for promotion to Career Minister, which would have extended my time. So that was the basis for my grievance: equal pay for equal work, because of the difference in my pension from that of an officer, even of lower rank, who had been promoted slower, would retire a year or two later, and who would have benefitted from a full three years after the pay raise; and because there had not really been an opportunity for promotion. The greivance was denied, and I retired. Retirement is difficult for most people, but it's a lot harder to be retired mandatorily than it is to pick your own timing. Bob Ryan reached his time in class a year before I did, and he was five years younger. He too filed a grievance, and lost, although the process allowed him to serve one of the three years under the higher salary. Because of the frozen salary, then a big make-up pay raise, I thought (and still think) mandatory retirements should be suspended to permit officers to get a new high-three annuity. Still, after I saw what happened to people in the years immediately following my retirement, I realize that I was relatively fortunate.

I guess one thing I would close on is when you retire, particularly a case like me, a former ambassador, you can't just fade into the sunset. I got a call this week, and I have an appointment tomorrow, to go meet with the lawyers to testify in an EEO suit about actions ten years ago. So this is the second or third time that I've had to come back and deal with an old issue. So I save files at home. I'm careful about throwing things away, because you don't know what might come up later. I gave three days testimony in the

black officer's class action suit, three days deposition, so I'm waiting to get called for trial. So I've had things like that. There's always some loose ends for a while.

Q: Okay, well I want to thank you very much, Clint.

End of interview